(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gainey , 76 Conn. App. 155, 158, 818 A.2d 859 (2003).
Our standard of review in determining whether a court properly conducted an in camera review of confidential records is abuse of discretion. See State v. Gainey, 76 Conn.App. 155, 158, 818 A.2d 859 (2003); State v. Walsh, 52 Conn.App. 708, 722, 728 A.2d 15, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 911, 733 A.2d 233 (1999). On appeal, “[t]his court has the responsibility to conduct its own in camera review of the sealed records to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to release those records to the defendant....
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 58-59, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004); see also State v. Gainey, 76 Conn. App. 155, 163, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). "In determining whether a defendant's right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.
Furthermore, after an in camera inspection by this court of the department's files in question relating to the accusation, we agree with the trial court that the files do not contain any information that would allow the shield of § 54-86f to be pierced. See State v. Gainey, 76 Conn. App. 155, 161-62, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). The defendant also wanted to introduce into evidence expert testimony about the result of DNA tests, which indicated that he and the other two men with him on the day of the assault on T had been excluded as the source of semen found on T's socks and anus.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gainey, 76 Conn. App. 155, 158-59, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). After closely examining each of the challenged records, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting access to the victim's confidential records or in redacting those records that it did disclose.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. 58-59; State v. Gainey, 76 Conn. App. 155, 163, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). "In determining whether a defendant's right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.
We review the court's decision not to release confidential records to determine if the court abused its discretion. State v. Olah, 60 Conn. App. 350, 354, 759 A.2d 548 (2000); see also State v. Gainey, 76 Conn. App. 155, 158, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). "Discretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . . It goes without saying that the term abuse of discretion . . . means that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds. . . .
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gainey, 76 Conn. App. 155, 163, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). Here, the defendant argues that the court improperly restricted the cross-examination of the victim by not allowing inquiry concerning the victim's suicide attempt and its underlying causes.
5. The victim did not report these incidents of sexual assault to anyone until approximately four years later, in 1999, when she told Officer Hardy Burgin of the East Hartford police department. State v. Gainey, 76 Conn.App. 155, 156-58 (2003). 6. The petitioner was represented in the underlying proceedings by Public Defender Michael Isko.
1012 (2004); State v. Luis F., 85 Conn.App. 264, 856 A.2d 522 (2004); State v. Briscoe, 84 Conn.App. 120, 852 A.2d 746, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 944, 861 A.2d 1178 (2004); State v. Johnson, 82 Conn.App. 777, 848 A.2d 526 (2004); State v. Calderon, 82 Conn.App. 315, 844 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 905, 853 A.2d 523 (2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 487, CT Page 9739 160 L.Ed.2d 361 (2004); State v. Shells, 82 Conn.App. 332, 844 A.2d 235, cert. denied 270 Conn. 911, 853 A.2d 529 (2004); State v. Williams, 88 Conn.App. 1, 38 A.2d 214, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 904, 845 A.2d 409 (2004); State v. Gombert, 80 Conn.App. 477, 836 A.2d 437 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 915, 841 A.2d 220 (2004); State v. Aaron L., 79 Conn.App. 397, 830 A.2d 776 (2003), aff'd, 272 Conn. 78, 865 A.2d 1135 (2005); State v. Pepper, 79 Conn.App. 1, 828 A.2d 1268 (2003), aff'd, 272 Conn. 10, 860 A.2d 1221 (2004); State v. William B., 76 Conn.App. 730, 822 A.2d 265, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 918, 828 A.2d 618 (2003); State v. Gainey, 76 Conn.App. 155, 818 A.2d 859 (2003). The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying . . .