Some of the uncertainty on this issue arises from the discussion in Long of "common law" inverse condemnation actions. Defendant City is an agency created by the State, and has no authority other than that granted by the legislature, either expressly or by necessary implication. State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353. 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).
"[W]here the Legislature has enacted a statute making an act a criminal offense, a city may not adopt an ordinance dealing with the same conduct." Tenore, 280 N.C. at 245, 185 S.E.2d 644, quoting State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966). Plaintiffs maintain that the County's ordinance is pre-empted by N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 14-190.9 and 14-202.
It is hornbook law in North Carolina that a county or city has only the authority delegated to it by the state. State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966) (a municipality has no power to extend application of an ordinance outside of its territory without express state authorization). Since the state controls the coastal waters immediately off the coast, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 et seq., there is some question as to whether the state has delegated to Carteret County the right to enact an ordinance which regulates this coastal property.
Municipal corporations, including the Town of Emerald Isle, are agencies created by the State and have no governmental power or authority except that which has been expressly or impliedly granted by the legislature. See State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966); State v. McGraw, 249 N.C. 205, 105 S.E.2d 659 (1958); Clayton v. Tobacco Co., 225 N.C. 563, 35 S.E.2d 691 (1945). Powers conferred on the municipal corporation may be enlarged, abridged or entirely withdrawn by the legislature at its pleasure.
"In passing upon such motion, the court treats the allegations of fact in the warrant, or indictment, as true and considers only the record proper and the provisions of the statute or ordinance." State v. Vestal, supra at 520-21, 189 S.E.2d at 155; State v. Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969); State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966). See also State v. Greenwood 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972); State v. Brewer, 258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 9, 11 L.Ed.2d 40, 84 S.Ct. 72 (1963); State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961).
" In Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322, it is said, "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process." To the same effect, see: State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275; State v. Lowry and State v. Mallory, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870; State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768; State v. Morrison, 210 N.C. 117, 185 S.E. 674. The ordinance contains no definition of the term "the edge of any public road."
We are forced to the conclusion that it did not have such authority, for the reason that the General Assembly preempted this field by enactment of a statewide statute making criminal, and providing for the punishment of, the precise type of conduct with which the defendant is charged in this warrant. In State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275, we said, "[W]here the Legislature has enacted a statute making an act a criminal offense, a city may not adopt an ordinance dealing with the same conduct." In State v. Brittain, 89 N.C. 574, this Court, speaking through Justice Merrimon, later Chief Justice, said: "Nor can municipalities, by ordinances, create offenses known to the general laws of the State, and provide for the punishment of the same, unless they have special authority so to provide conferred either by some general or special statute.
The officer was not bound to accept as true the response of the driver, especially after observing the butt of a gun protruding from papers on the floor of the back seat, easily within the reach of the defendant. [11, 12] The City of Asheville has no inherent police power, Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879; State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275; State v. Byrd, 259 N.C. 141, 130 S.E.2d 55; G.S. 160-1. However, by G.S. 14-288.12, the State has delegated this portion of its police power to its municipalities.
It is well established that a municipal corporation has no inherent police power, but may exercise such power only to the extent that it has been conferred upon the city by statute. Dale v. Morganton, supra; State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275. Obviously, the Legislature cannot confer upon a city a power which the Legislature, itself, does not have.
Such a prohibition may be justified, if at all, only as an exercise of the police power of the State delegated to the municipality. A city or town in this State has no inherent police power. It may exercise only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the General Assembly or as are necessarily implied from those expressly so conferred. State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275; State v. Bryd, 259 N.C. 141, 130 S.E.2d 55; G.S. 160-1. G.S. 160-200(26) confers upon cities and towns the power to prevent and abate nuisances, but a mobile home is not a nuisance per se. As Hall, J., said, dissenting in Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129, "Trailer living is a perfectly respectable, healthy and useful kind of housing, adopted by choice by several million people in this country today."