Opinion
No. 26564.
Filed October 19, 2001.
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Craig C. Kosonen, District Judge.
Order granting motion to suppress, affirmed.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Karen A. Hudelson argued.
Frederick G. Loats, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
The state of Idaho appeals the district court's order granting Kenneth Floyd Fuller's motion to suppress his statements and evidence seized during a search of his van. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Fuller was convicted of an undisclosed crime in the state of Oregon and eventually paroled. In early 1998, he transferred his parole to Idaho pursuant to the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision (the Compact), I.C. § 20-301, and was accepted for supervision by the Idaho Department of Corrections. When he arrived in Idaho, Fuller signed a standard form detailing the conditions of his parole. Among other conditions, Fuller consented to the search of his person, automobile, real property and any other property, and agreed to waive his constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches. Fuller also agreed not to use or possess any controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed by a licensed physician and to submit to tests for the detection of controlled substances.
In early 1999, Fuller's Idaho parole officer, Marler, submitted a report of parole violation to Oregon, requesting that Fuller be taken into custody and his parole revoked. On February 22, 1999, the Oregon Board of Parole/Post-Prison Supervision issued a "Warrant Authorization/Suspension Order" authorizing and directing any sheriff, peace officer, parole officer, or corrections officer to take Fuller into custody. The order further suspended Fuller's status as a parolee. Marler was informed of the warrant's issuance the next day.
On February 24, Fuller met with Marler at the probation and parole offices. When Fuller arrived, Marler did not arrest him immediately because she was waiting for the warrant to be formally entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). During the course of Fuller's visit, Marler requested Fuller submit to a urinalysis. The urinalysis tested positive for methamphetamine. Marler then phoned Oregon authorities regarding the status of Fuller's warrant, while supervising parole officer Moser informed Fuller that the test was positive for methamphetamine.
When questioned by Moser, Fuller initially denied use of the drug, but eventually admitted that he had used methamphetamine several days before. Moser asked Fuller if he had any drugs in his van, which was located in the parking lot. When Fuller denied having drugs in his van, Moser stated that he intended to search the van. Fuller told Moser that searching his van would be a considerable chore. Moser repeated his intent to search the van and asked Fuller to wait in the front lobby. Moser then advised Marler that she should search Fuller's vehicle and call law enforcement to assist with the search. At Marler's request, Moser called the Kootenai County Drug Task Force for assistance. After completing this phone call, Moser asked Fuller to accompany him to an office, where Moser handcuffed Fuller to a chair. Moser told Fuller that he was to remain handcuffed to the chair during the search of his van. At this point, Fuller requested to use the bathroom. Moser unhandcuffed Fuller and, as Moser accompanied Fuller to the restroom, Fuller stated, "It's under the front seat." Moser asked Fuller what he was talking about, and Fuller stated that he had methamphetamine under the front seat of his van.
Officer Hildebrandt from the Kootenai County Drug Task Force arrived, and Fuller was advised of his Miranda rights. Fuller waived his rights and agreed to speak with officer Hildebrandt. The officer questioned Fuller about whether there were any controlled substances in the van, and Fuller indicated there was methamphetamine under the front seat. The officer then assisted Marler in searching Fuller's van. Hildebrandt returned with what he described as approximately 3-4 grams of methamphetamine, indicating that he had found it under the front seat of the van. Fuller was arrested on the Oregon warrant later that day, after the warrant was entered into NCIC. Due to the officer's belief that Fuller would be returning to Oregon on a parole violation, Fuller was not arrested for possession of methamphetamine. Fuller was later charged with possession of methamphetamine upon his return from Oregon.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
On July 21, 1999, Fuller filed a motion to suppress all statements obtained on February 24, 1999. In a brief filed in support of the motion, Fuller also requested the suppression of all evidence seized during the search of his van. The district court held a hearing on the motion on February 28, 2000, and heard additional argument on March 27. Thereafter, the district court issued its memorandum opinion, granting the motion to suppress.
The district court concluded that under I.C. §§ 20-228, 20-301, Fuller was no longer a parolee subject to Idaho supervision upon the issuance of the parole violation warrant in the state of Oregon. Therefore, parole officers had no authority to request a urine sample. In addition, the district court relied on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) for the proposition that consent obtained by an invalid claim of authority is held to be no consent under the constitution.
The district court suppressed the statements and evidence seized, holding that Fuller's admissions to officers and the methamphetamine seized from the van were fruit of the poisonous tree — the urinalysis. The state appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App. 1999).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the state argues three alternative theories: (1) Oregon's issuance of a warrant for Fuller's arrest did not terminate Fuller's status as a parolee; (2) even if the Oregon warrant did terminate Fuller's status as a parolee, he was still an inmate and as such was subject to searches, such as the urinalysis, without warrant or probable cause; and (3) even if Fuller was neither a parolee nor an inmate, his statements and the evidence seized from his van were not subject to the exclusionary rule.
Fuller was a person in the legal and physical custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections at the time he was granted parole. See O.R.S. 144.050. Oregon then entered into an agreement with Idaho pursuant to the Compact. This agreement permitted Idaho to assume the duties of visitation and supervision over Fuller. See I.C. 20-301(2). At no time did Oregon transfer legal custody of Fuller to Idaho. Thus, contrary to the state's reference to Fuller as an "Idaho parolee," Fuller remained an Oregon parolee. When Fuller transferred his parole to Idaho he executed a standard form detailing the conditions of his parole, one of which was the waiver of his right to be free from warrantless search. Generally, when a parolee consents to warrantless searches as a condition of his parole, a parole officer is free to ask the parolee to submit to a urinalysis at any time. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 362, 972 P.2d 737, 740 (Ct.App. 1998).
Both Oregon and Idaho law provide that once a warrant is issued to retake a parolee, that warrant serves to suspend the person's parole and make him or her a fugitive from justice until he or she is arrested. See I.C. 20-228; O.R.S. 144.331; O.R.S. 144.380. Marler knew that a warrant had been issued for Fuller's arrest when Fuller came to her office on February 24, 1999.
Idaho Code Section 20-228 provides in relevant part:
Whenever the commission finds that a parolee may have violated the conditions of parole, the written order of the commission, signed by a member or members of the commission or the executive director, shall be sufficient warrant for any law enforcement officer to take into custody such person. . . . Such warrant shall serve to suspend the person's parole until a determination on the merits of the allegations of the violation has been made pursuant to a revocation hearing. From and after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice.
(Emphasis added.).
Oregon Revised Statutes 144.331 provides, in relevant part:
(1) The State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision may suspend the parole or post-prison supervision of any person under its jurisdiction upon being informed and having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has violated the conditions of parole or post-prison supervision and may order the arrest and detention of such person.
(Emphasis added.).
Oregon Revised Statutes 144.380 provides, in relevant part:
After the suspension of parole or post-prison supervision or revocation of probation or conditional pardon of any convicted person, and until the return of the person to custody, the person shall be considered a fugitive from justice.
(Emphasis added.).
Whether Marler was aware that she had no authority to demand Fuller submit to the urinalysis is irrelevant to our analysis because Idaho does not recognize the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 992, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (1992).
Therefore, Marler should have known that the Oregon warrant served to suspend Fuller's parole and make him a fugitive from justice. Fuller waived his right to be free from warrantless searches as a condition of being on parole. Once Fuller's parole was suspended and he became a fugitive from justice, his waiver was no longer effective. Therefore, Marler had no legal authority to ask Fuller to submit to a urinalysis on February 24, 1999.5 The state asserts that if Fuller was not a parolee then he was an inmate and, as such, had a lesser expectation of privacy. See State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 230, 657 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Ct.App. 1983) (holding that probationers and parolees have a greater expectation of privacy than inmates and, therefore, are not subject to routine, warrantless searches without a showing that the searches are reasonable). The state contends that in light of Fuller's lesser expectation of privacy, Marler had the authority to demand a urinalysis. The state's argument might apply if Fuller was an Idaho inmate, but he was not. The record indicates that while on parole in Idaho, Fuller remained under the legal custody of Oregon. Fuller's physical relocation from Oregon to Idaho did not cause him to cease being an Oregon inmate. Fuller was convicted in Oregon, and it was the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision that allowed Fuller to serve his parole in Idaho. Because Fuller was under the legal custody of Oregon and considered a fugitive from justice on February 24, 1999, we conclude he was not an Idaho inmate and therefore Idaho officers did not have any authority to require him to submit to a urinalysis.
The state finally contends that even if Fuller is not an Idaho inmate, the statements he made and the evidence seized from his van are not subject to the exclusionary rule. The district court held that Fuller's consent to search the van was obtained through the coercion of the officers, resulting from the positive urinalysis. Moreover, the district court found that Fuller believed he had no choice but to consent to the search because he had previously waived his right to be free from warrantless searches as a condition of parole. In light of these factors, the district court concluded that the statements and evidence seized were all fruit of the poisonous tree — the improperly demanded urinalysis.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the test of whether subsequent evidence constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree" is more than just a "but for" test. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 (1963). In Wong Sun, the United States Supreme Court stated:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
Id. (citation omitted).
The question of whether a statement is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250, 787 P.2d 231, 236 (1990). Whether statements should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree" depends on a number of factors, with no single factor being dispositive. The temporal proximity of the misconduct and confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant to the inquiry. Id. With regard to evidence seized during a consensual search, if consent to search is obtained by exploitation of unlawful conduct, the consent will not purge the taint of the unlawful conduct from the discovered evidence. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 at 478-88, State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 193, 998 P.2d 80, 86 (2000). Relevant factors in that inquiry include the presence of intervening circumstances and the length of time between the consent and the illegal conduct. See Radford, 134 Idaho at 193-94, 998 P.2d at 86-87. The burden of showing the admissibility of the statement rests on the prosecution. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho at 250, 787 P.2d at 236.
The state argues that Fuller's statement "it's under the front seat" was a spontaneous statement, free of any taint from the previously obtained urinalysis. The state also notes that Fuller's statements to officer Hildebrandt were made after he had been Mirandized. The state asserts that Fuller's statements to both officer Hildebrandt and Moser then provided probable cause to conduct a search of Fuller's van pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1998).
Fuller's statement to parole officer Moser that "it's under the front seat," was made only a short time after the urinalysis was taken and its results revealed to Fuller. The record indicates that after Fuller was informed of the urinalysis results, Moser informed Fuller of his intent to search the van. Fuller indicated that searching his van would be a considerable chore and then Moser again indicated his intent to search the van. Moser then spoke with Marler and called the Kootenai County Drug Task Force. As soon as Moser returned from making the phone call, he immediately reinitiated questioning of Fuller regarding Fuller's drug use and reasserted his intent to search the van. The interrogation of Fuller was conducted almost continuously from the time Moser told Fuller of the urinalysis results to the time when Fuller stated there were drugs under the front seat, with Moser stating at three different times that it was his intent to search the van. We conclude, as did the district court, that Fuller's statement to Moser was tainted by the improperly requested urinalysis and, therefore, the statement was fruit of the poisonous tree.
As for Fuller's statements to officer Hildebrandt, the district court did find that Hildebrandt Mirandized Fuller, and Fuller waived his rights prior to speaking with Hildebrandt. However Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho at 249, 787 P.2d at 235 (1990). They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited. Id.
In this instance, once officer Hildebrandt arrived on the scene, he immediately spoke with Moser and Marler. The record indicates that this conversation occurred soon after Fuller made his statement to Moser that "it's under the front seat." Following this conversation, officer Hildebrandt went into the office where Fuller remained handcuffed to a chair, Mirandized him, and spoke with him about whether there were any drugs in the van. Thus, we conclude that Fuller's statements to officer Hildebrandt were also obtained by exploitation of the results of the improper urinalysis.
With regard to the search of the van, officer Hildebrandt obtained Fuller's consent to search during the same conversation in which Fuller admitted that there was methamphetamine under the front seat of the vehicle. Fuller's consent to search followed his admission that there was methamphetamine in the van. Fuller was unhandcuffed so that he could sign the consent form, but was rehandcuffed to the chair once the form was signed. We hold the evidence fails to demonstrate that Fuller's consent was sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oregon warrant authorizing Fuller's arrest suspended Fuller's parole and made him a fugitive from justice. As such, it terminated Idaho's authority to request a urinalysis from Fuller pursuant to Fuller's Idaho parole agreement. Fuller remained an Oregon inmate during this time and, therefore, Idaho had no authority to request a urinalysis from Fuller as they might from an Idaho inmate. Fuller's later admissions to Moser and officer Hildebrandt regarding the fact that there were drugs in his van, and the consent given to search his van, were obtained through exploitation of the improperly requested urinalysis. Therefore, the statements made and evidence seized are all fruit of the poisonous tree. The district court's order granting Fuller's motion to suppress is affirmed.
By our holding, we limit our review to that of a parolee and the specific language of the cited statutes. No inference should be made, and our decision does not address, the consequences of a factual scenario involving a probationer.
Chief Judge SCHWARTZMAN and Judge Pro Tem BRUDIE, CONCUR.