State v. Frost

44 Citing cases

  1. Gibbs v. State

    341 Ga. App. 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296 , 302 (773 SE2d 700 ) (2015). The Court further ruled that evidence of a prior DUI “could strengthen the inference that the factfinder could draw from [the accused’s] refusal to take the state-administered test this time, that had he done so, it would have shown the presence of alcohol.”

  2. Green v. State

    339 Ga. App. 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 8 times

    We disagree. "Rule 404 (b) permits the admission in cases of all sorts of evidence of other acts relevant to any fact of consequence to the determination of the action , so long as the evidence is not offered to prove the character of the person in order to show action in conformity therewith." State v. Frost , 297 Ga. 296, 300, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015) (footnote and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). The applicable standard for determining relevance is set forth in OCGA § 24–4–401.

  3. Kim v. State

    337 Ga. App. 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 9 times
    Noting that, in finding that evidence was admissible under OCGA § 24-4-403, the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury and qualified jurors under oath are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions

    Under Georgia law, evidence of a prior DUI charge “shall be admissible” in a DUI prosecution where the defendant refused to take the state-administered chemical test to show “knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake or accident.” See OCGA § 24–4–417(a)(1) ; see also State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 301, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015). In upholding the admission of prior DUI convictions under Rule 417, the Georgia Supreme Court specifically declined to address the issue presented in this case—that is, whether the balancing test in Rule 403 applies to the admission of evidence under Rule 417(a)(1).

  4. Adams v. State

    809 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 12 times
    Noting that the officer "chose not to perform the walk-and-turn and one-leg stand field sobriety tests because [the suspect] was too unsteady on his feet"

    A prior DUI is admissible under Rule 417 (a) (1) only if it is relevant to prove knowledge, plan, absence of mistake, or accident. State v. Frost , 297 Ga. 296, 301, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015). However, Rule 417 is a "rule of inclusion" that creates a presumption in favor of the admission of such evidence, given that "Rule 417 (a) (1) speaks of evidence that 'shall be admissible.' "

  5. State v. Tittle

    782 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)

    In this DUI case, the State appeals from an order of the trial court that prohibits the State from introducing the defendant's prior DUI conviction as part of its case in chief. Finding that the trial court's ruling conflicts with the Georgia Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015), we reverse.The relevant facts are undisputed and the record shows that on May 9, 2014, a car driven by Joshua Tittle was involved in a single-car accident in Clayton County. The responding officer detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Tittle's person and observed that Tittle's speech was slurred.

  6. State v. Voyles

    814 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)

    OCGA § 24-4-417 (a) (1) provides that "[i]n a criminal proceeding involving a prosecution for a violation of Code Section 40-6-391, evidence of the commission of another violation of Code Section 40-6-391 on a different occasion by the same accused shall be admissible when [t]he accused refused in the current case to take the state administered test required by Code Section 40-5-55 and such evidence is relevant to prove knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake or accident." In State v. Frost , 297 Ga. 296, 301, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015), the Supreme Court noted that OCGA § 24-4-417 applies only in DUI cases; it only concerns the admissibility of evidence that the defendant drove under the influence on other occasions; and that it addresses the special problem of proof the State encounters in a DUI case where the defendant refused to take a state administered test. The Supreme Court further noted that as the statute provided that such evidence "shall be admissible," there is a strong presumption of admissibility.

  7. Steele v. State

    337 Ga. App. 562 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The language of this provision was intended to create a “rule of inclusion,” with a strong presumption in favor of admissibility as it provides that such evidence “shall be admissible.” See State v. Frost , 297 Ga. 296, 300–01, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015) (OCGA § 24–4–417 applying to DUI cases is a “rule of inclusion,” with a stronger presumption of admissibility than OCGA § 24–4–404 (b) as it provides that such evidence “shall be admissible”); Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 241 (3d ed. 2015) (Fed. R. of Evid. 413, which OCGA § 24–4–413 closely tracks, “create[s] presumptions in favor of admission of the defendant's other sexual offenses in sex crimes prosecutions”). Steele's trial was held in July 2013, after the effective date of Georgia's new Evidence Code. See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101 (new Code applies “to any motion made or hearing or trial commenced on or after” January 1, 2013).

  8. Chrysler Grp. LLC v. Walden

    812 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 2018)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that because a party failed to object to the admission of evidence based on OCGA § 24-4-403, "we can only analyze whether the admission of this evidence [on this ground] constituted plain error, not whether it was an ‘ordinary’ abuse of discretion"

    Georgia’s new Evidence Code was modeled in large part on the Federal Rules of Evidence, "and when we consider the meaning of such provisions, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit." Glenn v. State , 302 Ga. 276, 280, 806 S.E.2d 564 (2017) (punctuation and citation omitted); see also Davis v. State , 299 Ga. 180, 185, 787 S.E.2d 221 (2016) ; State v. Frost , 297 Ga. 296, 299, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015). Then, there are provisions that "were carried over from our old Evidence Code, and when courts consider the meaning of those provisions, they may rely on Georgia decisions under the old Code."

  9. Danley v. State

    342 Ga. App. 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 5 times

    As the Supreme Court of Georgia has held, evidence that a DUI defendant previously refused a state-administered blood test “ ‘shall be admissible’ ” to permit the trier of fact to infer that “a prohibited intoxicant was present to some degree” and that the defendant “knew that the test results likely would tend to show that he was, in fact, under the influence of a prohibited substance.” State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296 , 297, 305 (773 SE2d 700 ) (2015), quoting OCGA § 24-4-417 (a) (1) (emphasis supplied). Here, the trial court specifically found that the State offered evidence concerning the December 2011 DUI for the valid purpose of proving Danley’s knowledge and intent, and that the probative value of the 2011 DUI was “not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or the confusion of issues or misleading the jury.”5

  10. Gibbs v. State

    800 S.E.2d 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    Monroe v. State , 340 Ga.App. 373 (2), 797 S.E.2d 245 (2017), citing Frost , 297 Ga. at 304, 773 S.E.2d 700. See State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 299, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015).Specifically, proof of Gibbs's prior DUI could allow the factfinder to infer that