Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid prosecution requires the trial judge to conduct a two-part analysis. See, State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 834 P.2d 323 (Ct.App. 1992). First, the judge must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401, and second, the judge must determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

McCabe relies on State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 215 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 834 P.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1992); and Kimbley to show that each case involved flight to avoid a criminal proceeding or police interview. While the circumstances of those cases may relate to a scheduled criminal proceeding or law enforcement interview, they do not stand for the proposition that flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt is limited to those situations.

Evidence of flight, escape, or failure to appear on the part of a defendant is often identified as relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819-20, 965 P.2d 174, 179-80 (1998) (admitted evidence that defendant left Idaho for his home in Oregon to avoid a scheduled interview from an officer investigating lewd conduct); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 821-22, 215 P.3d 538, 541-42 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowed evidence that defendant failed to appear at a hearing to increase bond and left the jurisdiction); State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 322-23, 834 P.2d 323, 324-25 (Ct. App. 1992) (allowed stipulation that defendant failed to appear at arraignment and at the initially scheduled trial on drug charges). The inference of guilt may be weakened when a defendant harbors motives for escape other than guilt of the charged offense.

Evidence of flight, escape, or failure to appear on the part of a defendant is often identified as relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 822, 215 P.3d 538, 542 (Ct.App. 2009) (allowed evidence that defendant failed to appear at a hearing to increase bond and left the jurisdiction); State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819-20, 965 P.2d 174, 179-80 (1998) (admitted evidence that defendant left Idaho for his home in Oregon to avoid a scheduled interview from an officer investigating lewd conduct); State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 322-23, 834 P.2d 323, 324-25 (Ct. App. 1992) (allowed stipulation that defendant failed to appear at arraignment and at the initially scheduled trial on drug charges). Evidence of a defendant's efforts to influence or affect evidence, such as intimidating a witness, offering to compensate a witness, and fabrication, destruction or concealment of evidence may be relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt.

Gonzalez urges this court to substitute his version of the facts in place of the state's version, which was accepted by the jury. Such a result, as we previously stated in State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 323, 834 P.2d 323, 325 (Ct.App. 1992), would violate the well-established principle that an appellate court cannot substitute its views for those determined by a jury as to issues of credibility, weight of the testimony, and reasonable inferences stemming from the evidence. State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 288, 805 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App. 1991).

On appellate review of a conviction, this Court may not substitute its views for those of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of testimony and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321, 323, 834 P.2d 323, 325 (Ct.App. 1992). When a defendant has been convicted, on appellate review all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the prosecution.