As an administrator claiming property standing in the name of the decedent, William should have inventoried the property, at the same time asserting his right thereto. In re Love's Estate, 176 Tenn. 696, 145 S.W.2d 778; Simms v. Guess, 52 Ill.App. 543; Hartwig v. Flynn, 79 Kan. 595, 100 P. 642; Potter v. Titcomb, 10 Me. 53, 64; Buchser v. Buchser, 72 Wash. 675, 131 P. 193, rehearing denied 132 P. 239; but see Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 212 Ind. 120, 6 N.E.2d 938; State v. French, 60 Conn. 478, 23 A. 153. However, if he had inventoried the property without assertion of his right that would not necessarily have estopped him from asserting his claim later.

The estate of a deceased person consists of property the title to or an interest in which is derived from him, which it is the duty of the executor or administrator to inventory and for which he must account to title Probate Court. An executor may, for instance, deposit money of his own in an account in the name of the estate; so far as it is used for the purpose of the estate he may, on his accounting, be given credit for it; but, if not so used, he is entitled to withdraw it at any time for his own benefit. Williams v. Morehouse, 9 Conn. 470, 474; State v. French, 60 Conn. 478, 480, 482, 23 A. 153; Hewitt v. Beattie, supra, 612; Reiley v. Healey, supra, 76. The moneys we are considering, by their deposit in an account in the name of the estate, did not become assets of the estate; there was no obligation on Mrs. McMullen to account for them and until used for the benefit of the estate they did not enrich it. As it was not established that any of the money went for the benefit of the estate, there was no basis for claiming that the estate was equitably liable for it. As the money was not an asset of the estate, when McMullen expended it for purposes other than the benefit or protection of the estate he was not guilty of converting its assets, and for this, if for no other reason, Mrs. McMullen, as coexecutor, was not personally liable upon the ground that she would be equally responsible with him for his use of the fund. Undoubtedly, for certain purposes, coexecutors "are considered in law as an individual person"; Foster v. Mix, 20 Conn. 395, 400; but that principle is not carr

In such an action, the executor or administrator is not liable for any damages "except such as are shown to be equitably due to the persons for whose benefit an action may be brought." State v. French, 60 Conn. 478, 480, 23 A. 153. Formerly such bonds ran to the judge of probate, Olmstead v. Bailey, 35 Conn. 584, 586; and an action upon a bond was brought in the name of the judge of probate who, in case of recovery, was trustee for the parties really interested. Blakeman v. Sherwood, 32 Conn. 324, 329.

As a consequence he must be deemed, in law, to have divested himself of his marital statutory rights over this stock, and to have invested her with it as her sole and separate estate. Coe's Appeal, 64 Conn. 352, 357, 30 A. 140; State v. French, 60 Conn. 478, 481, 23 A. 153; Williams v. King, 43 Conn. 569, 574. The trial judge in his memorandum says: "But this property was clearly held by her as her own."

This was a question of fact, and substantially the only fact in issue. The defendant executor assigns as error the claim that the facts set forth in the finding do not support this conclusion. It is sufficient if the facts found are not legally inconsistent with the conclusion; but in this case they are obviously sufficient to support it. A conclusion of this nature is, in the absence of any inconsistent subordinate fact found, one of fact drawn from all the evidence, and is conclusive and is binding upon us. State v. French, 60 Conn. 478, 481, 23 A. 153. The court did not err in overruling the defendant's alleged claims of law. It appears from the finding that on November 10th, 1883, there was distributed to Sarah A. Clark, as her distributive share of the estate of Lucy Selden, about $2,000 in cash and other property; that of this amount Gilbert M. Clark then turned over to his wife $614 ($100 in cash and the remainder in other property), and divested himself of his rights and interests in said property as statutory trustee ; and that there then was an oral agreement between him and his wife that the former, out of the cash coming to her upon the distribution, should have $600 for his services in connection with her legacy and said estate, and on November 13th, 1883, Gilbert M. deposited $600 of the cash distributed to his wife to his account in his book No. 41,250 in the Society for Savings. There is nothing in the finding inconsistent with the conclusion of the court that this agreement, in view of all the circumstances disclose