Opinion
A20-1384
09-23-2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Bailey Bodell French, Appellant.
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69HI- CR-19-151
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Peter M. Reyek, Jr. Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On August 13, 2019, appellant Bailey Bodell French pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting murder in the second degree and aiding and abetting kidnapping. Appellant entered into a plea agreement with respondent State of Minnesota to receive sentences of 367 months and 86 months, respectively, for the two offenses. The sentences would "run consecutively for a total sentence of 453 months" in exchange for her guilty plea. Appellant stated on the record that she understood the benefit of the plea agreement that "the life sentence goes away and [the plea agreement] will effectuate [her] release from prison in about twenty-five years." Accordingly, the district court sentenced appellant to permissive consecutive sentences within the presumptive guidelines range of 367 months and 86 months for the two offenses, consistent with the plea agreement.
The minimum term of imprisonment or two-thirds of the 453-month sentence is approximately 25 years.
2. Despite having understood and received the benefit of the plea agreement, appellant now contends that the permissive consecutive sentences are unreasonable because she was less culpable than a codefendant, was 17 years old, and suffered mental illness at the time of the offenses. Appellant does not request to withdraw her guilty plea, but rather to modify the presumptive sentences to run concurrently for a total of 367 months.
3. We review sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). We "will not generally review a district court's exercise of its discretion to sentence a defendant when the sentence imposed is within the presumptive guidelines range," because a presumptive sentence is presumed reasonable. Id. Nor will we modify a sentence within the presumptive range "absent compelling circumstances." State v. Freyer, 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982).
4. In this case, neither appellant's relative culpability to a codefendant nor appellant's age and mental illness is a compelling circumstance warranting modification of her presumptive sentences. District courts base the appropriate sentence on several factors, including the offense, criminal-history score, remorse, and culpability among others. See State v. Gamelgard, 177 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Minn. 1970) (noting that numerous and various factors determine sentence); see generally Minn. Sent. Guidelines II (Sup. 2019). Any one factor could explain a discrepancy in sentences among codefendants.Additionally, appellant was not in fact less culpable than the codefendant who stayed in the car during the murder. Appellant admitted to planning the murder with the shooter and was present when the shooter killed the victim.
Appellant has not satisfied her burden in providing a record that includes her codefendant's sentence, offenses, criminal-history score, or even culpability, to allow a meaningful comparison of their sentences.
5. Our careful review of the record reveals that appellant's age and mental evaluation do not indicate the degree of "extreme" mental impairment that could constitute a mitigating factor. State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 716 (Minn. 2007) (stating that a defendant's impairment from mental illness "must be extreme to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over [their] actions" to be a mitigating factor for sentencing (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) ("[W]e will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence falling within the presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or durationally, even if there are grounds that would justify departure." (quotation omitted)).
6. Because appellant has not advanced compelling circumstances to warrant modification of her permissive consecutive sentences under the plea agreement, we affirm the district court's sentencing order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's sentencing order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.