State v. Fredericks

28 Citing cases

  1. State v. Bardales

    164 Conn. App. 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Bardales, 164 Conn. App. 582, 585, 137 A.3d 900 (2016), the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's residence and person after a confidential informant indicated that the defendant stored illegal firearms for sale.

    Section 4–5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence refers to three relevant exceptions to the general rule against admitting evidence of prior misconduct to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which he is accused, all of which find support in our cases. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible ... to prove ... common plan or scheme ... knowledge ... or an element of the crime....” Conn.Code Evid. § 4–5(c) ; see State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328, 342, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007) (common plan or scheme); State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961) (knowledge). A fourth relevant exception to the general rule against prior misconduct evidence, not listed in § 4–5, is that such evidence is admissible to complete the story of the charged crime.

  2. State v. Palkimas

    153 Conn. 555 (Conn. 1966)   Cited 31 times

    In other words, the circumstantial evidence of possession of recently stolen property raises a permissible inference of criminal connection with the property, and if no explanation is forthcoming, the inference of criminal connection may be as a principal in the theft, or as a receiver under the receiving statute, depending upon the other facts and circumstances which may be proven. See State v. Weston, supra; State v. Raymond, supra; State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 125, 176 A.2d 581; Commonwealth v. Ross, 339 Mass. 428, 431, 159 N.E.2d 330; Regina v. Langmead, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 464, 468. And of course the circumstantial evidence may be found by the trier not to be strong enough to warrant a conviction under either charge.

  3. State v. Sawyer

    279 Conn. 331 (Conn. 2006)   Cited 82 times
    Finding harm because, among other reasons, state repeatedly emphasized improperly admitted evidence during its closing argument

    "(6) absence of mistake or accident; e.g., State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 415-16, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); "(7) knowledge; e.g., State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); "(8) a system of criminal activity; e.g., State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644, 664-65, 500 A.2d 1311 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 106 S. Ct. 1642, 90 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1986);

  4. State v. Brown

    235 Conn. 502 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 177 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Criticizing majority's conclusion that hearing was required under supervisory authority, rather than state constitution, given that "the jury is a bedrock of our democracy" and that "the allegations involved the jury's possible exposure to racist remarks made by the court's own sheriffs"

    Ordinarily, knowledge and intent can be proven only by circumstantial evidence; they may be and usually are inferred from a defendant's conduct. See State v. Montanez, 219 Conn. 16, 20, 592 A.2d 149 (1991); State v. Carpenter, supra, 214 Conn. 82; State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 119, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986); State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961). In this case, the defendant carried two checks into Gateway Bank, falsely represented his identity to a bank teller and attempted to cash one of the checks and deposit the other.

  5. State v. Figueroa

    235 Conn. 145 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 122 times
    Determining the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the state to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence to prove the identity of the victim's assailant because the characteristics of the two assaults were sufficiently distinctive and unique to be "like a signature"

    "As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399. State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) § 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged.

  6. State v. Mooney

    218 Conn. 85 (Conn. 1991)   Cited 134 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that defendant retained reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of duffle bag and cardboard box located under highway bridge where he was living

    Connecticut case law parallels the exceptions found in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). For example, similar to the federal rule, evidence of other misconduct is admissible in Connecticut to show intent, identity, motive; State v. Sierra, 213 Conn. 422, 429, 568 A.2d 557 (1990); opportunity; State v. Silva, 201 Conn. 244, 248-49, 513 A.2d 1202 (1986); absence of mistake or accident; State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 414-17, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); knowledge; State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); and common scheme or plan. State v. Morowitz, 200 Conn. 440, 442-43, 512 A.2d 175 (1986).

  7. State v. Sierra

    213 Conn. 422 (Conn. 1990)   Cited 68 times
    In Sierra, we reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial court admitted prior misconduct evidence by the defendant without "performing the necessary balancing test.

    State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399." State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged.

  8. State v. Jones

    205 Conn. 638 (Conn. 1987)   Cited 66 times
    Rejecting claim for heightened requirement for waiver of counsel

    State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399.' State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961)." State v. Braman, 191 Conn. 670, 675, 469 A.2d 760 (1983); C. McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) 190; 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) 170.

  9. State v. O'Neill

    200 Conn. 268 (Conn. 1986)   Cited 58 times
    In O'Neill, the defendant had been found guilty of the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a)(1), a class A felony.

    "`As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399.' State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged. See State v. Williams, 190 Conn. 104, 108, 459 A.2d 510 (1983); State v. Howard, 187 Conn. 681, 684, 447 A.2d 1167 (1982); State v. Ibraimov, 187 Conn. 348, 352, 446 A.2d 382 (1982); State v. Barlow, 177 Conn. 391, 393, 418 A.2d 46 (1979); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) 215-18.

  10. State v. Simino

    200 Conn. 113 (Conn. 1986)   Cited 103 times
    Holding that criminal defendant can waive right to be present in court during jury charge in contravention of Practice Book § 968, now § 44-8

    The evidence in toto, as reviewed above, was sufficient for a jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant probably knew or believed that the furniture was stolen. As we stated in State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961), "[o]rdinarily, guilty knowledge can be established only through an inference from other proved facts and circumstances. The inference may be drawn if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man of honest intentions, in the situation of the defendant, would have concluded that the property was stolen.