Section 4–5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence refers to three relevant exceptions to the general rule against admitting evidence of prior misconduct to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which he is accused, all of which find support in our cases. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible ... to prove ... common plan or scheme ... knowledge ... or an element of the crime....” Conn.Code Evid. § 4–5(c) ; see State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328, 342, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007) (common plan or scheme); State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961) (knowledge). A fourth relevant exception to the general rule against prior misconduct evidence, not listed in § 4–5, is that such evidence is admissible to complete the story of the charged crime.
In other words, the circumstantial evidence of possession of recently stolen property raises a permissible inference of criminal connection with the property, and if no explanation is forthcoming, the inference of criminal connection may be as a principal in the theft, or as a receiver under the receiving statute, depending upon the other facts and circumstances which may be proven. See State v. Weston, supra; State v. Raymond, supra; State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 125, 176 A.2d 581; Commonwealth v. Ross, 339 Mass. 428, 431, 159 N.E.2d 330; Regina v. Langmead, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 464, 468. And of course the circumstantial evidence may be found by the trier not to be strong enough to warrant a conviction under either charge.
"(6) absence of mistake or accident; e.g., State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 415-16, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); "(7) knowledge; e.g., State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); "(8) a system of criminal activity; e.g., State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644, 664-65, 500 A.2d 1311 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 106 S. Ct. 1642, 90 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1986);
Ordinarily, knowledge and intent can be proven only by circumstantial evidence; they may be and usually are inferred from a defendant's conduct. See State v. Montanez, 219 Conn. 16, 20, 592 A.2d 149 (1991); State v. Carpenter, supra, 214 Conn. 82; State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 119, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986); State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961). In this case, the defendant carried two checks into Gateway Bank, falsely represented his identity to a bank teller and attempted to cash one of the checks and deposit the other.
"As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399. State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) § 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged.
Connecticut case law parallels the exceptions found in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). For example, similar to the federal rule, evidence of other misconduct is admissible in Connecticut to show intent, identity, motive; State v. Sierra, 213 Conn. 422, 429, 568 A.2d 557 (1990); opportunity; State v. Silva, 201 Conn. 244, 248-49, 513 A.2d 1202 (1986); absence of mistake or accident; State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 414-17, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); knowledge; State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); and common scheme or plan. State v. Morowitz, 200 Conn. 440, 442-43, 512 A.2d 175 (1986).
State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399." State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged.
State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399.' State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961)." State v. Braman, 191 Conn. 670, 675, 469 A.2d 760 (1983); C. McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) 190; 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) 170.
"`As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399.' State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961); McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) 190; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) 170. The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especially the predisposition to commit the crime with which he is now charged. See State v. Williams, 190 Conn. 104, 108, 459 A.2d 510 (1983); State v. Howard, 187 Conn. 681, 684, 447 A.2d 1167 (1982); State v. Ibraimov, 187 Conn. 348, 352, 446 A.2d 382 (1982); State v. Barlow, 177 Conn. 391, 393, 418 A.2d 46 (1979); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) 215-18.
The evidence in toto, as reviewed above, was sufficient for a jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant probably knew or believed that the furniture was stolen. As we stated in State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581 (1961), "[o]rdinarily, guilty knowledge can be established only through an inference from other proved facts and circumstances. The inference may be drawn if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man of honest intentions, in the situation of the defendant, would have concluded that the property was stolen.