Opinion
No. COA10-1082
Filed 7 June 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 12 February 2010 by Judge Robert F. Johnson in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 May 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Sueanna P. Sumpter, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Emily H. Davis, for Defendant.
Mecklenburg County Nos. 09 CRS 61932; 09 CRS 234697.
Laffette Lynn Franklin (Defendant) appeals from a judgment consistent with a jury verdict finding him guilty of larceny of a motor vehicle, possession of a stolen motor vehicle and with his guilty plea to having attained habitual felon status. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we find no error.
Juanita Brown owned a gray 2007 Hyundai Elantra ("Hyundai"). Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on 16 July 2009, Brown, accompanied by her granddaughter, drove her Hyundai to the McDonald's on Freedom Drive in Charlotte. Brown parked her Hyundai in the parking lot and she and her granddaughter entered the McDonald's. Brown's car keys were clipped to a name badge she wore. After Brown placed her order, she went to the soda fountain for beverages. Brown and her granddaughter then sat down in a booth to eat.
Shortly before 6:00 p.m., Stephanie Robinson was standing in line at the McDonald's soda fountain and noticed a set of keys on the counter. When she asked if anyone had lost some keys, a short black man wearing a white tank top claimed them. The man and his companion walked by Brown's booth and immediately left the McDonald's. Through the large windows surrounding her booth, Brown watched the two men walk across the McDonald's parking lot in the direction of her Hyundai. Brown jumped up from her seat as she observed the two men enter her Hyundai and drive it out of the McDonald's parking lot. Brown realized her keys were missing from her badge. Brown called 911 and reported her Hyundai stolen. She gave a description of the vehicle, the license plate number, and a description of the suspects.
At around 10:00 p.m., two Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department officers were patrolling Brookshire Boulevard when they observed a vehicle matching the description of Brown's Hyundai. The officers confirmed that the vehicle was Brown's stolen Hyundai by running the vehicle's registration tag. The officers stopped the Hyundai and ordered the two occupants to exit the vehicle. One officer first detained the driver, who was later identified as Defendant, and then the passenger. The officers observed the vehicle registration card lying on the front seat and noted that the ignition area was not damaged. Defendant was placed under arrest. Upon a search of Defendant, an officer found a garage door opener and a key-ring sized CVS loyalty card in Defendant's right front pocket. These items were later identified by Brown as being her property. Brown went to the scene of the traffic stop and identified the Hyundai as her vehicle.
A jury found Defendant guilty of felonious larceny and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to having attained habitual felon status. The trial court arrested judgment on the felonious possession of a stolen motor vehicle conviction and sentenced Defendant to 110 to 141 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of larceny of a vehicle under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72(a). Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that he stole the Hyundai from the McDonald's parking lot.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss, we must determine whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, would permit a reasonable juror to find defendant guilty of each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673, 681 (1987). "To convict a defendant of larceny, it must be shown that [the defendant] (1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner's consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently." State v. Reeves, 62 N.C. App. 219, 223, 302 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1983); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72(a) (2009). "Larceny of goods of the value of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) is a Class H felony." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72(a).
The State relied on the doctrine of recent possession to show that Defendant was the perpetrator. Under that doctrine, "possession of recently stolen property raises a presumption of the possessor's guilt of the larceny of such property." State v. Maines, 301 N.C. 669, 673, 273 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1981). "Recent possession is not evidence of guilt; it just raises an inference that will permit the case to go to the jury under proper instructions from the court." State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 583, 223 S.E.2d 365, 368-69 (1976). "The presumption is strong or weak depending upon the circumstances of the case and the length of time intervening between the larceny of the goods and the discovery of them in defendant's possession." Maines, 301 N.C. at 673-74, 273 S.E.2d at 293.
In order for the State to invoke the doctrine of possession of recently stolen goods, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the property described in the indictment was stolen; (2) the stolen goods were found in defendant's custody and subject to his control and disposition to the exclusion of others though not necessarily found in defendant's hands or on his person so long as he had the power and intent to control the goods; and (3) the possession was recently after the larceny, mere possession of stolen property being insufficient to raise a presumption of guilt.
Id. (citations omitted). Defendant only challenges the second element of this test, and argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the stolen vehicle was subject to his control and disposition to the exclusion of others.
Our Supreme Court explained in Maines that a defendant's possession of the stolen property may be constructive possession: "It is sufficient that he be in such physical proximity to [the stolen property] that he has the power to control it to the exclusion of others and that he has the intent to control it." Id. at 675, 273 S.E.2d at 293-94. Further, the exclusive possession required to support an inference of guilt may be joint possession. Id. at 675, 273 S.E.2d at 294. "For the inference to arise where more than one person has access to the property in question, the evidence must show the person accused of the theft had complete dominion, which might be shared with others, over the property or other evidence which sufficiently connects the accused person to the crime." Id.
Here, Defendant had actual possession of the stolen vehicle, as he was driving the Hyundai four hours after Brown saw two men drive it without her permission. Further, while Defendant did drive the stolen Hyundai accompanied by a passenger, Brown was not the passenger in the vehicle. In addition, Defendant had Brown's garage door opener and her key-ring CVS loyalty card in his front pocket, "which sufficiently connects [him] to the crime." Id. Finally, Brown confirmed at the scene of the stop that the Hyundai driven by Defendant was indeed her stolen Hyundai. Therefore, the State satisfied its burden of proving all of the elements necessary for the application of the doctrine of recent possession, so as to justify submitting Defendant's guilt of felonious larceny to the jury. Id. at 674, 273 S.E.2d at 293 (noting that a defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of felony larceny is properly denied and his guilt is a jury question if the doctrine of recent possession is applicable). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss that charge.
No error.
Judges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).