With near unanimity, federal and state courts have upheld the practice. See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck (C.A.9, 1996), 77 F.3d 285; United States v. Paul (C.A.6, 1980), 614 F.2d 115; State v. Fox (Iowa 1992), 493 N.W.2d 829. These courts have upheld the practice on one of two independent grounds.
The district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. It determined the statute was not void for vagueness because the meaning of the phrase in question could be ascertained from State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1992) and its reference to Iowa Code chapter 808B, delineating circumstances in which a person has the "right or authority" to intercept communications. The court found the statute was not overbroad because "the defendant has not established there is a First Amendment right to tape record communications while a person is absent."
With near unanimity, federal and state courts have upheld the practice. See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck (C.A. 9, 1996), 77 F.3d 285; United States v. Paul (C.A. 6, 1980), 614 F.2d 115; State v. Fox (Iowa 1992), 493 N.W.2d 829. {¶ 58} "These courts have upheld the practice on one of two independent grounds.
Rather, the law is well established in Iowa that the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable government intrusion upon a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. See State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1992); State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Iowa 1990); Showalter, 427 N.W.2d at 169; State v. Flynn, 360 N.W.2d 762, 764-65 (Iowa 1985). Thus a search is said to have occurred when the government unreasonably intrudes upon an individual's reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy.
Washburne signed a form at the Hancock County jail authorizing the monitoring of his telephone calls except for those to or from his attorney. Second, as explained in State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1992), it is clear that Iowa law permits prison officials acting in the ordinary course of their duties to monitor communications of prison inmates. Additionally, chapter 808B does not apply to jail personnel and facilities in other states.
edge of monitoring practice constitutes such agreement); United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir. 1989) (outsider who telephones inmate has no reasonable expectation that conversation will be private because "'[i]n prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day'"); United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Abbamonte v. United States, 485 U.S. 1021, 108 S.Ct. 1573, 99 L.Ed.2d 889 (1988); United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Clark, 651 F. Sup. 76, 81 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (distinguishing monitoring of public telephone booth from monitoring of jailhouse telephone on grounds that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in jailhouse conversation); Teat v. State, 636 So.2d 697, 699 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) ("there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone conversations of inmates at penal institutions"); State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 1992) (no fourth amendment violation even though inmate not specifically notified of monitoring). The jurisdictions that have considered the privacy rights of inmates under their respective state constitutions similarly have concluded that those rights, to the extent that they exist, are severely limited.
Accepting the reasoning of Hudson v. Palmer and Bell v. Wolfish, at least four courts have already held that jail inmates have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in calls to non-attorneys on institutional telephones. See United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (CA2 1987); United States v. Clark, 651 F. Supp. 76 (M.D.Pa. 1986); United States v. Vasta, 649 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1992). I have found no cases holding to the contrary.
We find that Luthi did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations while in the custody room. See State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831ꟷ32 (Iowa 1992) (finding inmate's legitimate privacy interest in phone call placed while in custody not sufficient to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment despite inmate not being aware phone calls were monitored).
He filed a motion to suppress based on the wiretap statute—Iowa Code section 808B. However, “as explained in State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1992), it is clear that Iowa law permits [jail] officials acting in the ordinary course of their duties to monitor communications of [jail] inmates.” See State v. Washburne, 574 N.W.2d 261, 268 (Iowa 1997) (applying Fox to statements of an accused recorded while in county jail) ( overruled on other grounds by State v. Palmer, 791 N.W.2d 840 (Iowa 2010).
Rather, the law is well established in Iowa that the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable government intrusion upon a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. See State v. Fox, 493 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa 1992); see also State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Flynn, 360 N.W.2d 762, 764-65 (Iowa 1985). Thus a Fourth Amendment violation is said to have occurred when the government unreasonably intrudes upon an individual's reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy.