State v. Fox

8 Citing cases

  1. State v. Harrington

    128 Vt. 242 (Vt. 1969)   Cited 28 times
    Interpreting similar statute

    The rule applies only where the evidence is entirely circumstantial. State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 85, 181 A.2d 74; State v. Tatko, 119 Vt., supra, at 465, 128 A.2d 663; State v. Marston, 82 Vt. 250, 251, 72 A. 1075. The law affords him a presumption of innocence which attends him until the jury returns its verdict.

  2. State v. Crosby

    204 A.2d 123 (Vt. 1964)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that where defendant requested instruction on “the inferences [the jury] may draw,” but declined to elaborate on what inferences he had in mind, and refused multiple requests by court for proffered instruction, objection was not preserved

    If we can assume the instruction the respondent had in mind was that the jury should be told it could not base an inference upon an inference to establish respondent's guilt, we discern no harm done the respondent by the court's failure to so charge, as the jury had before it an abundance of evidence that the respondent was driving at an excessive rate of speed at the time in question, and failed to exercise proper control of his vehicle. See Huestis v. Estate of Lapham, 113 Vt. 191, 198, 32 A.2d 115; Capello's Admr. v. Aero Mayflower TransitCo. 116 Vt. 64, 67, 68 A.2d 913; State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 86, 181 A.2d 74 for a discussion of inferences. We may observe in passing, that respondent has not suffered the loss of any rights by failing to properly save his exception, as the court, in charging the jury "when all of the evidence of a respondent's guilt is circumstantial, it is incumbent upon the State to produce evidence of circumstances which exclude every reasonable theory consistent with respondent's innocence," gave the respondent the advantage of a charge that the evidence did not warrant. This instruction, if ever essential in this jurisdiction, is required only in cases where the evidence is wholly and entirely circumstantial.

  3. People v. Helcher

    14 Mich. App. 386 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 21 times
    In Helcher, one witness testified that defendant took him for a ride on the day the vehicle in question went missing in a car that defendant said was stolen.

    In Curry v. State (1964), 235 Md. 378 ( 201 A.2d 792), certiorari denied 379 U.S. 1004 ( 85 S Ct 729, 13 L Ed 2d 705), the defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of an automobile on testimony similar to that presented in the case at bar, in that it was only established that he had been driving a car fitting the description of the stolen car under circumstances which might lead one to conclude he had driven the stolen car; in affirming the conviction the court observed that possession of recently stolen goods allows an inference that the possessor is the thief. Similarly, see State v. Fox (1962), 123 Vt. 82 ( 181 A.2d 74). The probative value of the people's evidence, albeit circumstantial, was for the jury to determine.

  4. State v. Angelucci

    135 Vt. 43 (Vt. 1977)   Cited 8 times

    Consequently, we will restrict our consideration of the case to this one particular issue. When testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of guilty, we, as an appellate court, are required to gauge that evidence in its aspect most favorable to the State. State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 83, 181 A.2d 74 (1962). However, by the same token, this Court has consistently subjected verdicts founded upon circumstantial proof to a strict standard of scrutiny.

  5. State v. Roby

    360 A.2d 572 (Vt. 1976)   Cited 2 times
    Holding evidence insufficient on manufacturing charge where defendant arrested at the beginning of manufacturing process but no finished product obtained and one necessary ingredient missing

    This challenge requires us to test the evidence in its aspect most favorable to the State, free from the force of modifying evidence. See State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 181 A.2d 74 (1962). So viewed, the evidence discloses the following factual situation.

  6. Woodmansee v. Stoneman

    133 Vt. 449 (Vt. 1975)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow separate voir dire of each juror because of widespread publicity

    Our analysis bears out his contention of insufficiency. This Court has long adhered to the view that where evidence of guilt is entirely circumstantial the circumstances proved must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the one that the defendant is guilty. State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 181 A.2d 74 (1962). And this conclusion cannot be reached by basing one inference from established facts upon another inference.

  7. State v. Bruce

    126 Vt. 367 (Vt. 1967)   Cited 8 times
    In State v. Bruce, 126 Vt. 367, 231 A.2d 207 (1967), a case brought under a similar statute, we stated at page 371 that "[s]uch offense... need not necessarily occur on a public highway as we held in State v. Bromley, 117 Vt. 228, 230, 88 A.2d 833."

    '" The respondent claims the charge violates the rule set forth in State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 181 A.2d 74 and State v. Sanford, 118 Vt. 242, 108 A.2d 516. The rule therein stated is that where the evidence is entirely circumstantial, it must be sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with respondent's innocence and to sustain a verdict of guilty.

  8. State v. Fairbanks

    187 A.2d 335 (Vt. 1963)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that the trier of fact is the judge of a witness' credibility

    We are required to test the evidence in its aspect most favorable to the state, free from the force of modifying evidence. State v. Fox, 123 Vt. 82, 83, 181 A.2d 74; State v. Tatko, 119 Vt. 459, 460, 128 A.2d 633; State v. Hart, 119 Vt. 54, 55, 117 A.2d 387; State v. Perras, 117 Vt. 163, 164-165, 86 A.2d 544. The test laid down in passing upon the respondent's motions for a directed verdict is whether the state introduced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show respondent's guilt, or in other words, whether the jury on the evidence was justified in finding the respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.