State v. Fournier

12 Citing cases

  1. State v. Ortiz

    163 N.H. 506 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 11 times
    Ruling that "Padilla does not speak to the due process obligations of a trial court accepting a guilty plea," and upholding the traditional view that immigration consequences are collateral for that purpose

    We have consistently held that as a matter of constitutional due process, the defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of entering a guilty plea, but not the potential collateral consequences, in order for the guilty plea to be considered knowing. State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 231, 385 A.2d 223 (1978) ( per curiam ) (“[D]efendant need only be advised of the direct consequences of his guilty plea and not of consequences which are collateral.”); State v. Elliott, 133 N.H. 190, 192, 574 A.2d 1378 (1990); Harper, 126 N.H. at 821, 498 A.2d 310;see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).

  2. State v. Jenkins

    128 N.H. 672 (N.H. 1986)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that "[t]he act of taking the test is voluntary because the very act of driving on New Hampshire's public roads implies consent to take the test"

    The cases involved in this appeal can be analogized to cases in which we have held that defendants need not be advised of all of the consequences which may result from the entry of a guilty plea. See State v. Levey, 122 N.H. 375, 445 A.2d 1089 (1982); State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 385 A.2d 223 (1978). In Fournier, we found prior court records pertaining to the defendant's habitual offender status admissible even though they did not reveal whether the defendant was notified prior to each sentencing that she could be found to be an habitual offender after three convictions for motor vehicle violations.

  3. State v. Levey

    445 A.2d 1089 (N.H. 1982)   Cited 18 times
    In State v. Levey, 122 N.H. 375, 377, 445 A.2d 1089, 1090 (1982), we applied the same reasoning in rejecting a claim that the defendant could not be tried for DWI, subsequent offense, when her guilty plea to an earlier DWI offense was made without any warning that her plea would subject her to enhanced penalties in the future.

    In accepting a guilty plea, a court is not obligated to inform a defendant of all consequences of her plea. State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 231, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (1978). Similarly, a defendant need not be aware of all the future effects the plea might have.

  4. Brown v. Commonwealth

    297 Va. 295 (Va. 2019)   Cited 9 times

    "Because consequences attendant to the commission of an offense are so numerous and logically unforeseeable, to require more would be an absurdity and would impose upon the circuit court an impossible, unwarranted, and unnecessary burden." State v. Fournier , 118 N.H. 230, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (1978).

  5. Nollette v. State

    118 Nev. 341 (Nev. 2002)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that sex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and therefore district court's failure to advise defendant of that consequence does not invalidate a guilty plea

    People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. 1999).State v. Fournier, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (N.H. 1978). A. Sex offender registration and notification

  6. People v. Williams

    188 Ill. 2d 365 (Ill. 1999)   Cited 194 times
    Holding the in limine order excludes inadmissible evidence and protects the movant from whatever prejudicial impact the mere asking of the questions and the making of the objections may have upon a jury

    Because the consequences of committing an offense "are so numerous and logically unforeseeable, to require more would be an absurdity and would impose upon the trial court an impossible, unwarranted and unnecessary burden." State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 231, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (1978); accord Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244-45 (Wyo. 1988) ("We will not require our trial courts to consult astrologers or invoke psychic powers to comply with [that state's disclosure responsibilities in accepting guilty pleas]"). This sound reasoning "reflects the proper concerns for the * * * practical administration of criminal justice, and for the integrity of the plea process."

  7. State v. Elliott

    133 N.H. 190 (N.H. 1990)   Cited 11 times
    Recognizing "at least the possibility that deficiencies in advice about collateral consequences of a plea may pull a lawyer's representation below the level of 'reasonable competence' by which effective assistance of counsel is constitutionally measured"

    Boykin, of course, concentrated on the need for judicial inquiry into the defendant's understanding that a guilty plea waives the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and the rights of confrontation and trial by jury. Although the opinion did not purport to limit the relevant "consequences" that a defendant must understand to these three waivers, it is now understood that the consequences of which a trial court is bound to assure a defendant's appreciation before accepting a guilty plea are confined to those that are "direct," see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), to the exclusion of those that are merely "collateral, " State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 385 A.2d 223 (1978); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1979); accord Nunez Corvero v. United States, 533 F.2d 723, 726 (1st Cir. 1976). The possible significance of a guilty verdict for purposes of the habitual offender act is a classic example of a conviction's consequence that is collateral, see State v. Fournier supra, in the sense that the consequence requires application of a legal provision extraneous to the definition of the criminal offense and the provisions for sentencing those convicted under it.

  8. State v. Harper

    498 A.2d 310 (N.H. 1985)   Cited 14 times

    We have said that "[a] defendant need only be advised of the direct consequences of his guilty plea and not of consequences which are collateral." State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 231, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (1978). Therefore, the testimony by the defendant that her attorney did not advise her of the possibility of an enhanced penalty for a future conviction is without moment.

  9. Cahill v. Commonwealth

    No. 0489-22-1 (Va. Ct. App. Jun. 6, 2023)

    " Id. (quoting State v. Fournier, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (N.H. 1978)).

  10. City of Ottawa v. Lester

    16 Kan. App. 2d 244 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    In Lester, the Court of Appeals held that the district court was not required to advise the defendant of the possibility of suspension of his driving privileges because the suspension was a collateral rather than a direct consequence.

    ea. See, e.g., Minnifield v. State, 439 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (possible sentence enhancement following a subsequent conviction); State v. Hatch, 156 Ariz. 597, 599, 754 P.2d 324 (Ariz.App.1988) (sentence enhancement for subsequent conviction, DWI); People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 498, 617 P.2d 1178 (1980) (exposure to habitual traffic offender proceeding); Mainiero v. Liburdi, 214 Conn. 717, 725, 573 A.2d 1207 (1990) (ineligibility for sentence modification or intensive probation); Blackshear v. State, 455 So.2d 555, 556 (Fla.Dist.App.1984) (forfeiture of accumulated gain time); Davis v. State, 151 Ga.App. 736, 737, 261 S.E.2d 468 (1979) (possible exposure to federal prosecution); State v. Jackson, 362 So.2d 1082, 1088 (La.1978) (exposure to habitual offender charge); Moore v. State, 72 Md.App. 524, 526-27, 531 A.2d 1026 (1987) (enhanced sentence for subsequent convictions); State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 231, 385 A.2d 223 (1978) (exposure to habitual traffic offender proceeding); State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J.Super. 617, 622, 508 A.2d 1161 (1986), aff'd 107 N.J. 603, 527 A.2d 439 (1987) (loss of public employment); Griffin v. Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 621, 300 S.E.2d 482 (1983) (parole eligibility); State v. Barton, 93 Wash.2d 301, 305, 609 P.2d 1353 (1980) (habitual criminal charge); State v. Santos, 136 Wis.2d 528, 531, 401 N.W.2d 856 (Wis.App.1987) (deportation); Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo.1988) (deportation).        In State v. Elliott, 133 N.H. 190, 193, 574 A.2d 1378 (1990), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that exposure to habitual traffic offender proceedings was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to driving under the influence.