Opinion
I.D. Nos. 9907011615, 0001004515
June 6, 2001
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief. Summarily Dismissed.
ORDER
This 5th day of June, 2001, upon review of the record in this case and the papers filed by the Defendant, it appears that:
(1) Defendant, John E. Foster, was charged with Burglary, Third Degree, Misdemeanor Theft, and Criminal Mischief under I.D. number 9907011615. Defendant was charged with Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine Within 1000 Feet of a School and Resisting Arrest under I.D. number 0001004515.
(2) On August 8, 2000, Defendant entered a guilty plea, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(C), encompassing both above-captioned I.D. numbers Defendant pleaded guilty to Possession within 1000 Feet of a School, and Burglary, Third Degree. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant was to admit habitual offender status under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).
(3) On October 4, 2000, Foster filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On October 31. 2000, the Court denied Foster's motion. On April 24, 2001, the Court sentenced Foster for Burglary, Third Degree, to three years Level 5 incarceration, the minimum mandatory sentence due to Foster's habitual offender status. For Possession with 1000 Feet of a School, the Court sentenced Foster to five years Level 5 incarceration, suspended immediately for five years Level 4 home confinement, suspended after one year for four years Level 3 probation.
(4) Foster has now filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. This is Foster's first Motion for Postconviction Relief and the Court finds that none of the procedural bars listed in Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Foster's motion.
(5) Foster makes several allegations in his motion, all of which can be construed as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntary entry of his guilty plea. The Court finds that Foster's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. A criminal defendant who raises an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that an attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards so that such conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant must be able to show that "[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 669.
(6) Foster claims that his defense counsel was ineffective because defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence and a motion for speedy trial, as requested by Foster. As noted above, Foster pleaded guilty to the above-captioned charges. thereby giving up his trial rights, including the right to a speedy trial and to challenge the evidence against him. Therefore, even if the Court accepted Foster's allegations regarding his attorney's conduct as true, Foster cannot show that the result of his proceedings would have been different.
(7) Foster also claims that he did not enter into his guilty plea voluntarily. Although Foster's argument in support of this claim is not clear, he apparently claims that his statement on the guilty plea form that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation was not made by him, but rather checked off by counsel. The Court, upon review of Foster's guilty plea form and the plea colloquy, cannot find that Foster entered into his plea involuntarily.
(8) During the plea colloquy, Foster's counsel noted that Foster wished to have a different attorney represent him during the plea proceedings and that he had previously filed a motion to withdraw as Foster's counsel. Counsel candidly admitted that he and Foster had a "personality conflict" and that Foster had filed numerous complaints against him with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
(9) Foster indicated to the Court that he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily and that no one had threatened or promised him anything in return. When asked whether he was satisfied with his attorney's representation in the case, Foster responded, "somewhat." The Court explained that the question required a "yes" or "no" answer and directed Foster to respond honestly. The Court explained that if Foster answered that he was not satisfied with his counsel, the Court would reject the plea and Foster would go to trial on the charges. Foster then responded, "Yes."
(10) In addition, on the guilty plea form signed by Foster, Foster checked off the box indicating, "Yes," in response to the question, "Are you satisfied with your lawyer's representation of you and that your lawyer has fully advised you of your rights and of your guilty plea?" There is no evidence to support Foster's claim that he did not fill out the form himself. Therefore, in conclusion, the Court finds that, despite an apparent personality conflict with his counsel, Foster understood the consequences of his plea and entered into that plea knowingly and voluntarily.
Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record in this case that Foster is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.