Opinion
No. 5-206 / 04-0398
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Carolyn D. Grupp, District Associate Judge.
William Foster appeals following his convictions for three counts of assault on a peace officer causing injury, criminal mischief, and interference with official acts causing injury. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Greta Truman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, and Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
William Foster appeals following his convictions for three counts of assault on a peace officer causing injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.3A(1), 708.1, and 708.3A(3) (2003), criminal mischief, in violation of sections 716.1 and 716.6, and interference with official acts causing injury, in violation of section 719.1. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Foster's convictions arose out of an incident occurring outside of a Mason City bar owned by his brother, Leland, in the early morning hours of June 15, 2003. Earlier that evening, Leland had asked Jody Datema, Foster's fiancée, to videotape law enforcement activity near his bar. Leland was concerned that officers were unfairly targeting his bar for racial reasons.
Around closing time, a fight broke out between some patrons, and bar employees escorted a group of people out of the bar. Police were dispatched to the disturbance. Shortly before 2:00 a.m. Lieutenant McKelvey and State Trooper Anderson arrived at the scene. Several other officers and sheriff's deputies arrived later. McKelvey eventually decided they should obtain Datema's videotape as evidence of the melee. He approached Datema and reached for her camera. Datema backed away and threw the camera into a group of nearby onlookers. Margaret Foster, William Foster's sister, caught the camera and headed toward the bar, where she handed the camera to another individual before officers could seize it.
Meanwhile, Foster apparently exited the bar at the time Datema was involved in a struggle with various officers. He ran out of a side door, knocked Officer Lillquist to the ground, and threw several punches at his head and body. Several officers proceeded to the scene and attempted to arrest and restrain Foster, who was violently fighting off the officers. Officers eventually used pepper spray to subdue Foster and placed him under arrest.
Based on this incident, the State charged Foster with four counts of assault on a police officer, fourth-degree criminal mischief, possession of a controlled substance, and interference with official acts causing injury. Foster subsequently filed a notice that he intended to rely on the defense of self-defense and defense of another person or property. Following a trial, the jury found Foster guilty of three counts of assault on a peace officer causing injury, criminal mischief, and interference with official acts causing injury. It acquitted him on the drug charge as well as the assault charge on Officer Carroll. Foster appeals, contending the district court erroneously instructed the jury and the court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal.
Jury Instructions.
Foster first claims the court erred by the misplacement of Jury Instruction 23 and therefore caused confusion for the jury. Instruction 23 stated:
Instructions 5 through 24 instructed the jury as to the assault on a peace officer charges; instructions 25 through 27 related to the criminal mischief charge; instructions 28 through 31 related to the charge of possession of a controlled substance; instructions 32 and 33 instructed the jury on the interference with official acts charge.
A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest, either of the person's self or another, which the person knows is being made by a peace officer, even if the person believes that the arrest is unlawful or the arrest is in fact unlawful.
Foster maintains that Instruction 23 is only applicable to the interference charge and not to the assault charges. He believes the placement of Instruction 23 — immediately following the assault instructions — led the jury to logically conclude this instruction related to the assault charges and to believe he could not use force against the officers. Specifically, he claims "it was error for the jury to be instructed that [he] could not use force to resist an unlawful arrest in the context of the assault charges, where [he] was entitled to the benefit of the justification defenses. . . ." Thus, it appears the crux of Foster's argument concerns the simple placement of this particular instruction directly next to other assault instructions within the overall framework of the instructions. This is apparent, in part, because Foster concedes Instruction 23 "is an accurate statement of the law that a defendant is not allowed to use force to resist an arrest for purposes of an interference charge." (Emphasis added.) See Iowa Code § 804.12.
The State asserts Foster has not preserved this particular argument for appellate review. Upon review of the record, we agree. Foster objected to the inclusion of Instruction 23 on grounds that the statement of law contained therein does not apply to the assault charges. He did not resist on the ground it is inapplicable to the interference charge. More significantly, he never objected to the placement of the instruction or the overall order of the instructions so that the district court could have considered what he now claims confused the jury, resulting in his prejudice. Because that is his specific claim now on appeal, we conclude he has not preserved it for our review. See State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 38-39 (Iowa 1981) (noting we only consider on appeal those objections to instructions previously raised with the trial court).
Even if the instruction were misplaced, we would find no prejudice to Foster, as the instruction is a correct statement of the law. See Iowa Code § 804.12. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury as to which counts Foster's justification defense applied, thus minimizing or negating any alleged confusion Foster now claims.
Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Foster argues there was insufficient evidence to support his three convictions for assault on a police officer causing injury and the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. In particular, he maintains the State did not carry its burden to prove he was not justified in attempting to prevent harm to his fiancée and to himself. Because a jury verdict is binding on us when supported by substantial evidence, our appellate review is limited to the correction of errors at law. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational jury of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999). In making an assessment of the sufficiency of evidence, we are obliged to view the record in the light most favorable to the State. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d at 377. But we must consider all the evidence in the record, not just the evidence supporting guilt. Id.
The court instructed the jury that in order to find Foster guilty, the State was required to prove (1) he committed an assault — as defined in a separate instruction, (2) he had the apparent ability to do the act, (3) he caused bodily injury, (4) the assaulted individuals were peace officers, and (5) he knew they were peace officers.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Foster was not justified in assaulting Officers Lillquist, Klunder, and Buckman. First of all, there is no dispute Foster knew the persons he attacked were uniformed officers. Evidence supports that Foster knocked Officer Lillquist to the ground; bit Deputy Klunder's arm as he tried to pull Foster's arm out from underneath him; and punched Officer Buckman in the head as she tried to grab Foster's arm. This skirmish continued despite the officers' repeated admonitions to Foster to calm down and stop resisting. While Foster claimed he was merely protecting "his woman," a reasonable juror could have concluded Foster had other alternative courses of action available to him, used unreasonable force against the officers, or did not have reasonable grounds to believe Datema was in need of protection from imminent danger. Accordingly, we affirm Foster's three convictions for assault on a police officer causing injury.