Opinion
No. 57098-6-I.
May 21, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-1-01722-6, Michael J. Fox, J., entered September 26, 2005.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George Fornah challenges his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of RCW 9A.44.130. There is no dispute that in 1989, Fornah was convicted of rape in the second degree, a class A felony, and as a consequence of that conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender. Relying on a provision related to sex offenders who are returning Washington residents, Fornah contends that when he returned to Washington after living in Oregon for a period of time, he no longer had a duty to register. We disagree with Fornah's contention. As a sex offender convicted of a class A felony in 1989, Fornah has a duty to register as a sexual offender for life unless the court enters an order relieving Fornah of that duty. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 8, 1989, George Fornah was convicted of rape in the second degree, a class A felony. As a consequence of that conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender. Following his release from custody in 1990, Fornah was classified as a Level I sex offender. On June 7, 1990, Fornah registered as a sex offender with the King County Sheriff's Office. In March 1994, Fornah sent the Sheriff's Office a notice of change of address within King County. In April 1997, Fornah notified the Sheriff's Office that he was moving to Portland, Oregon. Fornah returned to Washington in 1999 and on February 5, 1999, Fornah registered with the King County Sheriff's Office stating that his residential address was in Seattle at 4401 34th Avenue South.
The Seattle police verify sex offender registration information for Level I offenders every six months. In September 2003, Detective Tim Fields verified that Fornah was living with Virginia Jones at the 4401 34th Avenue South address. On March 11, 2004, Detective Fields contacted Jones again to confirm Fornah was still living at that address. Jones told Detective Fields that Fornah was no longer living there. According to Jones, she asked Fornah to move out in December 2003, and believed Fornah was homeless. Detective Fields then obtained Fornah's registration records from the Sheriff's Office and verified that Fornah's most current address was 4401 34th Avenue South.
The Seattle Police Department has a database of registered sex offenders and based on an offender's status, which corresponds to his or her likelihood to re-offend, a police officer follows up either every six months or 90 days to verify the offender's address.
On July 19, 2004, the State charged Fornah with failure to register as a sex offender in violation of RCW 9A.44.130. The State alleged that between March 11, 2004 and June 7, 2004, Fornah moved and changed his address within King County without notifying the Sheriff's Office.
At trial, Fornah stipulated that he was convicted of a sex offense and was required to register as a sex offender between March 11, 2004 and June 7, 2004. The stipulation states:
The State agreed that the stipulation did not preclude Fornah from arguing on appeal that he did not have a duty to register upon his return to Washington.
One, that the defendant was convicted on September 8, 1989 of a sex offense that required him to register as a sex offender with the King County Sheriff's Office during the period of time intervening between March 11, 2004 through June 7, 2004.
Two, that the defendant was on active supervision with the Department of Corrections on or after July 28, 1991 as a result of that conviction.
Jones testified that Fornah had not lived at the 4401 34th Avenue South address since December 2003. Fornah admitted he was not living at his last registered address, 4401 34th Avenue South, between March 11, 2004 and June 7, 2004. Fornah also admitted that he did not report a change of address but said that he did not understand nor was he told that he needed to notify the sheriff's office if he changed his residence. The jury convicted Fornah as charged and the court imposed a standard range sentence. Fornah appeals.
The court gave Fornah credit for the 14 days he served and sentenced him to community supervision for 12 months.
ANALYSIS
Fornah contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated Washington's sex offender registration statute because under RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) he did not have an obligation to register as a sex offender or provide notice of a change of address when he moved back to Washington.
We review de novo the interpretation and application of Washington's sex offender registration statute. State v. Pierson, 105 Wn. App. 160, 165, 18 P.3d 1154 (2001).
In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. State v.
Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 340, 957 P.2d 655 (1998). We start with the plain language of the statute and give the language its ordinary meaning. State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). "We look for a statute's meaning from its wording, the context in which we find the statute, and the entire statutory scheme." State v. Stratton, 130 Wn. App. 760, 764, 124 P.3d 660 (2005) (citing State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)).
When the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, the intent of the legislature is clear and we do not construe the statute. J.P., 140 Wn.2d at 450. A statute is ambiguous only if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way. Stratton, 130 Wn. App. at 764. In construing a statute, "a reading that results in absurd results must be avoided because it will not be presumed that the legislature intended absurd results." State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 733, 63 P.3d 792 (2003).
In 1989, Fornah was convicted of rape in the second degree. Fornah was released from custody in 1990. As a consequence of his conviction, Fornah had a duty to register as a sex offender under former RCW 9A.44.130 for life unless otherwise ordered by the court under RCW 9A.44.140. The legislature describes the purpose of the sex offender registration act.
The legislature finds that sex offenders often pose a high risk of reoffense, and that law enforcement's efforts to protect their communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses, are impaired by the lack of information available to law enforcement agencies about convicted sex offenders who live within the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist local law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their communities by regulating sex offenders by requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies as provided in section 402 of this act.
Laws of 1990, ch. 3, §§ 401. See also State v. Heiskell, 129 Wn.2d 113, 116, 916 P.2d 366 (1996); State v. Vanderpool, 99 Wn. App. 709, 712, 995 P.2d 104 (1999).
Former RCW 9A.44.130 provided:
(1) Any adult or juvenile residing in this state who has been found to have committed or has been convicted of any sex offense shall register with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence.
. . .
(5) "Sex offense" . . . means any offense defined as a sex offense by RCW 9.94A.030:
. . .
(b) Committed prior to the effective date of this section if the person, as a result of the offense, is under the custody or active supervision of the department of corrections or the department of social and health services on or after the effective date of this section.
Under RCW 9A.44.140, a person convicted of a class A felony may only be relieved of the duty to register as follows:
. . . any person having a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 may petition the superior court to be relieved of that duty, if the person has spent ten consecutive years in the community without being convicted of any new offenses. . . . the court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register only if the petitioner shows, with clear and convincing evidence, that future registration of the petitioner will not serve the purposes of RCW 9A.44.130. . . . RCW 9A.44.140(3)
Former RCW 9A.44.140(2) (1990) provided in relevant part as follows:
Any person having a duty to register under [RCW 9A.44.130] of this act may petition the superior court to be relieved of that duty. . . . The court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register only if the petitioner shows, with clear and convicting evidence, that future registration of the petitioner will not serve the purposes of sections 402 through 408 of this act.
Because there is no dispute that Fornah did not petition the court to terminate his duty to register, any change in the current version is not relevant for this appeal.
Under RCW 9A.44.130, if a sex offender changes his residential address within the same county, the offender must give the county sheriff written notice of the address change. And if the offender lacks a fixed residence, the offender must give written notice to the sheriff of the county where he last registered. RCW 9A.44.130(5)(a) and (6)(a).
Former RCW 9A.44.130(3) (1990) provided: If any person required to register pursuant to this section changes his or her residence address within the same county, the person must send written notice of the change of address to the county sheriff within ten days of establishing the new residence. If any person required to register pursuant to this section moves to a new county, the person must register with the county sheriff in the new county, within ten days of establishing the new residence. The person must also send written notice within ten days of the change of address in the new county to the county sheriff with whom the person last registered.
Fornah admits he did not notify the Sheriff's Office that he no longer lived at 4401 34th Avenue South. But Fornah argues that under RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v), he did not have an obligation to register after he moved back to Washington. We disagree.
On July 28, 1991, the legislature amended the sex offender registration requirements to set forth and clarify the registration deadlines for sex offenders in custody, sex offenders who were convicted but not confined, and sex offenders who are new or returning Washington residents. Laws of 1991, ch. 274, §§ 2. The provision for returning Washington residents, RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v), provides:
Prior to 1998, registration deadline for a returning Washington resident was in subsection RCW 9A.44.130(3)(a)(iv). In 1998, an amendment to the sex offender statute redesignated this subsection as RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v), which is the subsection cited by Fornah. The change in the language does not affect this appeal.
(4)(a)(v) OFFENDERS WHO ARE NEW RESIDENTS OR RETURNING WASHINGTON RESIDENTS. Sex offenders . . . must register within three business days of establishing residence or reestablishing residence if the person is a former Washington resident. The duty to register under this subsection applies to sex offenders convicted under . . . Washington state for offenses committed on or after February 28, 1990. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
But RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) did not change Fornah's duty to register. First, the legislature specifically stated that "[t]his act is intended to clarify and amend the deadlines for sex offenders to register. This act's clarification or amendment of RCW 9A.44.130 does not relieve the obligation of sex offenders to comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9A.44.130 as that statute exists before the effective date of this act." Laws of 1991, ch. 274, §§ 1. Second, Fornah was convicted of rape in the second degree on September 8, 1989, and RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) only applies to an offender who committed an offense on or after February 28, 1990. Finally, the State did not charge Fornah with a failure to register as a returning Washington resident under RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v). Fornah registered with the Sheriff's Office when he returned to Washington. The State charged Fornah with a failure to notify the Sheriff's Office of his change in residential status between March 11, 2004 and June 7, 2004.
We conclude that as a consequence of his second degree rape conviction, Fornah has a duty to register as a sex offender for life under RCW 9A.44.130 unless the court orders otherwise under RCW 9A.44.140. Because Fornah did not notify the Sheriff's Office of his change in residential status between March 11, 2004 and June 7, 2004, we affirm.
Because we conclude RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) did not apply to Fornah, the legislature's amendment of RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) in 2006 does not change our analysis. We also reject Fornah's alternative argument that because RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) conflicts with RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(i), construing the statutes in his favor relieves him of his duty to register upon his return to Washington. Again, because we conclude that RCW 9A.44.130(4)(a)(v) did not change Fornah's duty to register or apply to Fornah, there is no conflict.