State v. Forbes

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Smith

    359 So. 2d 160 (La. 1978)   Cited 5 times
    In State v. Smith, 359 So.2d 160 (La. 1978) [citing State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983 (La. 1977); State v. de la Beckwith, 344 So.2d 360 (La. 1977)], the Louisiana Supreme Court restated its position that a subsequent state prosecution of defendants on a similar charge for which they were prosecuted in federal court is constitutionally permissible under both Federal and State Constitution.

    In recent decisions this Court has adhered to the principle developed in the federal decisions by holding that, under the doctrine of double jeopardy, a subsequent prosecution by a different sovereign is constitutionally permissible under both Federal and State Constitutions. State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983 (La. 1977); State v. de la Beckwith, 344 So.2d 360 (La. 1977). Applying this principle to the instant case, the subsequent state prosecution of these defendants on a similar charge for which they were previously prosecuted in federal court did not place them twice in jeopardy for the same offense under the Federal and State Constitutions.

  2. State v. Moeller

    178 Conn. 67 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 29 times
    In State v. Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950, 100 S.Ct. 423, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1979), we reviewed an order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss where the claimed ground of dismissal was that the state prosecution placed the defendant in double jeopardy.

    See, e.g., People v. Hines, 572 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1977); State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 604, 566 P.2d 1142 (1977); State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983 (La. 1977); Crane v. State, 555 P.2d 845 (Nev. 1976); Stathes v. State, 29 Md. App. 474, 349 A.2d 254 (1975); State v. Turley, 518 S.W.2d 207 (Mo.App. 1974); Klein v. Murtagh, 44 App.Div.2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1974); People v. Belcher, 11 Cal.3d 91, 520 P.2d 385 (1974); State v. Cooper, 54 N.J. 330, 255 A.2d 232 (1969); State v. Castonguay, 240 A.2d 747 (Me. 1968). Notwithstanding this universally accepted principle of federal law, the defendant argues that the principle allowing successive prosecutions has been eroded by three subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which, it is claimed, suggest that the attitude of the court may have changed since Bartkus and Abbate.

  3. Commonwealth v. Cepulonis

    374 Mass. 487 (Mass. 1978)   Cited 41 times
    In Commonwealth v. Cepulonis, 374 Mass. 487 (1978), we held that if the elements of a crime for which a defendant faces prosecution are the same as the elements of a crime for which he or she has already faced prosecution, the second prosecution may be barred on double jeopardy grounds.

    See Abraham v. Supreme Court of Bronx County, 37 N.Y.2d 560 (1975). See, e.g., State v. Tiche, 33 Conn. Sup. 51 (1976); State v. Castonguay, 240 A.2d 747 (Me. 1968); Stathes v. State, 29 Md. App. 474, 481 (1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976); State v. Glover, 500 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Mo. App. 1973); State v. Pope, 190 Neb. 689 (1973); State v. Cooper, 54 N.J. 330 (1969); State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 604 (1977); State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983, 988 (La. 1977). Owing, perhaps, to the sound exercise of discretion by prosecutors, this court has not had to decide squarely a jeopardy question where the Commonwealth has prosecuted an offense already tried in another competent jurisdiction.

  4. State v. Phillips

    809 So. 2d 467 (La. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    In recent decisions this Court has adhered to the principle developed in the federal decisions by holding that, under the doctrine of double jeopardy, a subsequent prosecution by a different sovereign is constitutionally permissible under both Federal and State Constitutions. State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983 (La. 1977); State v. de la Beckwith, 344 So.2d 360 (La. 1977). Applying this principle to the instant case, the subsequent state prosecution of these defendants on a similar charge for which they were previously prosecuted in federal court did not place them twice in jeopardy for the same offense under the Federal and State Constitutions.

  5. State v. Martin

    558 So. 2d 654 (La. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 69 times
    In Martin, this Court found no abuse of discretion in a trial court's declaration of a mistrial when a juror failed to provide information which was specifically requested (her panel had been specifically questioned concerning whether or not a close friend or relative had been a crime victim), and thereby concealed a possible ground for disqualification or challenge (the defendant had been on trial for, inter alia, aggravated rape, and the juror's younger sister had been a victim of rape).

    Accordingly, in this context, we find that her failure to provide information which was specifically requested, thereby concealing a possible ground for disqualification or challenge, is equivalent to a false statement. Cf. State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983 (La. 1977). When false statements are made by a juror on voir dire, it is discretionary with the trial court whether or not to order a mistrial.

  6. State v. LeCompte

    441 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 14 times

    Louisiana is one of approximately twenty-seven jurisdictions in the United States which recognize the general view that a state prosecution following a federal prosecution for criminal acts arising from the same transaction does not place the defendant in double jeopardy in violation of his constitutional rights since the federal and state governments are separate sovereigns, each of which may subject the defendant to punishment for an infraction of its own laws. In State v. Smith, 359 So.2d 160 (La. 1978) [citing State v. Forbes, 348 So.2d 983 (La. 1977); State v. de la Beckwith, 344 So.2d 360 (La. 1977)], the Louisiana Supreme Court restated its position that a subsequent state prosecution of defendants on a similar charge for which they were prosecuted in federal court is constitutionally permissible under both Federal and State Constitution. The court further held that the state prosecution was not barred by collateral estoppel: