Opinion
UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET No. CR-12-4193
01-22-2013
STATE OF MAINE v. JOHN FONTAINE, Defendant
ORDER
Before the court is defendant's motion to suppress certain statements. A hearing on that motion was held on December 20, 2012.
The facts are straightforward. On June 23, 2012 Officer Longanecker of the South Portland Police Department was called to the Food Court at the Maine Mall based on a report of an assault. Longanecker was informed by the dispatcher that a white male in a black shirt was leaving the scene.
When Longanecker responded to the area in his cruiser, he had a brief conversation with a loss prevention officer who directed Longanecker's attention to a white vehicle traveling on Philbrook Avenue and informed Longanecker that the male who had left the scene was a passenger in that vehicle.
Longanecker stopped the vehicle, using his blue lights, on John Roberts Road. At that point Fontaine got out of the passenger side of the vehicle and immediately approached Longanecker, moving quickly toward him. As he came toward Longanecker, Fontaine made a statement about "hitting Josh" and requested that Longanecker not arrest him, adding that he was on federal probation.
There is no dispute that those statements were spontaneous utterances made when defendant was not in custody and the defense is not seeking to suppress those statements.
Concerned about the manner in which Fontaine had rushed towards him, Longanecker told Fontaine to stop where he was and placed Fontaine in handcuffs for officer safety. After he had handcuffed Fontaine, Longanecker patted him down for weapons and found none. At that point, with Fontaine still in handcuffs, Longanecker asked Fontaine what had happened. Longanecker did not give Fontaine any Miranda warning at that time.
In response to Longanecker's question, Fontaine offered some information about a prior encounter with Joshua Jensen (the alleged victim of the assault) and stated that Jensen had followed him and had threatened to "fuck him [Fontaine] up."
Fontaine is seeking to suppress the statements he made after he was handcuffed in response to Longanecker's question as to what had happened and to a further question by Longanecker was to whether Jensen had elaborated on what he meant when he said he was going to "fuck him up."
The motion to suppress turns on whether Fontaine was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he responded to Longanecker's two questions after Longanecker had handcuffed him and whether, even if Fontaine was in custody, the "public safety" exception to Miranda is applicable here. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656-59 (1984).
Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes requires evaluation of a number of factors to determine whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that he was under arrest or was constrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251 ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222, 1226. In this case, the court has considered the factors set forth in Michaud and concludes that a reasonable person in Fontaine's position, having been handcuffed and frisked under the circumstances of this case, would have believed that he was under arrest or was constrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676-77 (2d Cir. 2004).
A person may be detained without being in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436, 440 (1984); United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d at 669. Where Fontaine had been handcuffed and frisked, more than a simple investigatory detention occurred here.
--------
At the same time the court finds that Officer Longanecker's actions in handcuffing Fontaine were motivated and justified by officer safety. However, the Miranda exception under New York v. Quarles applies only to questions designed to elicit information necessary for the officer's safety and the safety of the public. See 467 U.S. at 658-59 (distinguishing between "questions necessary to secure [police officers'] safety or the safety of the public" and questions designed to elicit testimonial evidence); United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d at 677-79.
In this case Officer Longanecker acted reasonably in handcuffing Fontaine when Fontaine exited the vehicle in which he was riding and swiftly approached Longanecker. However, once Longanecker had handcuffed Fontaine, Longanecker's questions focused on what had happened at the mall and not on any immediate issue relating to Longanecker's safety or the safety of the public. Accordingly, Fontaine's motion to suppress is granted as to the statements Fontaine made in response to the two questions Longanecker posed after Fontaine had been handcuffed handcuffed. See State v. Brann, 1999 ME 113 115, 736 A.2d 251.
Defendant's motion to suppress statements is granted to the extent set forth above.
_____________
Thomas D. Warren
Justice, Superior Court