Opinion
A-2189-20
04-07-2022
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALEXIS L. FLOWERS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on the brief). James L. Pfeiffer, Warren County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Naya A. Tsang, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted March 21, 2022
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Warren County, Indictment No. 15-12-0563.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
James L. Pfeiffer, Warren County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Naya A. Tsang, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Rose and Enright.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Alexis L. Flowers appeals from a December 17, 2020 order denying her post-conviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge John H. Pursel in his cogent and thoughtful oral decision.
In 2012, defendant entered into a cooperation agreement with the State and agreed to plead guilty to a Warren County accusation charging first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), and second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), for her role in the armed robbery of a gas station attendant who was fatally shot during the incident. In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas and agreement to testify against her co-defendants, the State agreed to recommend a maximum sentence of sixteen years in prison on the robbery offense, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a concurrent ten-year term on the conspiracy offense, with other charges to be dismissed.
Approximately three years after defendant provided a detailed Mirandized statement to the Warren County Prosecutor's Office and pled guilty to the robbery and conspiracy offenses, the State called her to testify against her co-defendant, Andy Torres, consistent with the terms of her cooperation agreement. Shortly after defendant took the stand in Torres's trial, she informed the trial judge she did not want to abide by the cooperation agreement. Several months later, the State successfully moved to vacate her guilty pleas and cooperation agreement.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In December 2015, defendant was indicted with her brother, Zachary D. Flowers, for first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); third-degree unlawful possession of a BB gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(2); and third-degree unlawful possession of a shotgun without a firearms purchaser identification card, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1).
Defendant pled guilty a second time in July 2016, the day before the return date on her motion to suppress statements to police. This time, defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), amended from felony murder. In exchange for her guilty plea, the State recommended a twenty-year prison term, subject to NERA and dismissal of the remaining charges. Defendant was sentenced in September 2016 consistent with her second plea deal, and we affirmed the sentence after argument on the excessive sentencing oral calendar, per Rule 2:9-11. State v. Flowers, No. A-1010-16 (App. Div. Mar. 7, 2017).
In March 2020, defendant pro se filed a timely PCR petition, which was supplemented by assigned counsel a few months later. In part, defendant argued she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney pressured her to plead guilty; she also argued plea counsel refused to file a suppression motion on her behalf, thereby allowing the State to use her statements from her custodial interview against her at sentencing.
Following argument on December 16, 2020, Judge Pursel rendered a decision from the bench, denying defendant's petition. In part, the judge found defendant pled guilty, not once, but twice, and that the transcripts from the plea proceedings reflected she entered her guilty pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit of "competent defense counsel." The judge also found that when defendant pled guilty for the second time in 2016, she acknowledged during her plea colloquy that she was giving up her right to proceed with an upcoming suppression hearing. Thus, the judge concluded, "she knew what she was doing," "she entered that plea freely and voluntarily," and "knew at the time that she was giving up her right to have her confession reviewed by a court." Further, the judge was not persuaded plea counsel was ineffective for suggesting defendant plead guilty, noting that upon an attorney's through review of a case, a client may be "better advised to plead guilty than to stand the risk of a trial" where the client "stand[s] a chance of being convicted of a more serious offense." On December 17, the judge issued a conforming order.
On appeal, defendant limits her argument to a single point for our consideration:
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [DEFENDANT'S] PETITION WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HER CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL IMPROPERLY PRESSURED HER TO PLEAD GUILTY.
We have carefully reviewed defendant's contention, considering the applicable law, and conclude it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief remarks.
"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J.Super. 351, 373 (App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted). We review a PCR court's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must establish, first, that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and, second, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey). To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). This test applies to plea counsel as well. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350-51 (2012).
A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by simply raising a PCR claim. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. at 170 (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)). An evidentiary hearing is required only when: a defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; the court determines there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record; and the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10).
Measured by these standards, we agree with Judge Pursel that defendant failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test and failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood her PCR claim would ultimately succeed on the merits. As the judge explained, defendant's claims were contradicted by her testimony at the second plea hearing and otherwise unsupported by the record. Because there was no prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and defendant failed to "demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that [her] . . . claim [would] ultimately succeed on the merits," State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462), she was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.