Opinion
No. COA12–125.
2012-09-4
STATE of North Carolina v. Shenicka FLIPPEN.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kathryn Jones Cooper, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. Marie H. Mobley, for the defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 August 2011 by Judge R. Allen Baddour, Jr., in Rockingham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2012. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kathryn Jones Cooper, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. Marie H. Mobley, for the defendant.
THIGPEN, Judge.
Shenicka Flippen (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon her conviction of felonious possession of stolen goods, challenging the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss the charge for insufficiency of the evidence. We conclude the trial court did not err.
On the morning of 23 June 2010, Eric Samuel (“Samuel”) returned home from work to find that his house had been broken into. He called the Reidsville Police Department. When officers arrived at the residence, Samuel identified the stolen items, which included a 42–inch television, a computer and all its accessories, a PlayStation 3 gaming system, and an old pellet gun. Additionally, a dog food bag that Samuel had emptied and used as a trash can was gone.
Officers received information that Samuel's stolen property was at Defendant's residence and went there to speak with Defendant. An officer questioned Defendant, and she denied there was stolen property at her house. The officer told Defendant he had reliable information that there was stolen property there, and Defendant indicated, “the TV[,]” and consented to a search of her house. Officers recovered a 42–inch flat screen television, a PlayStation 3 game console, and a computer and its accessories located in a dog food bag, all of which were identified as the property stolen from Samuel's residence. Defendant made the following statement to the police:
The stuff you got from my house that was stolen was brought there by my sister[,] Shavonne. Shavonne said she paid $200 for it at Statler's. When she got there, somebody helped her unload the stuff, but I don't know who.
Defendant was indicted on 13 September 2010 for felony possession of stolen goods. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on 10 August 2011 and sentenced to six to eight months imprisonment. This active sentence was suspended, and Defendant was placed on supervised probation for thirty months. From this judgment, Defendant appeals.
I. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence to support the charge of felony possession of stolen goods. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss a charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines “whether the State presented substantial evidence in support of each element of the charged offense.” State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 374, 611 S.E.2d 794, 827 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion.” State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 328, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “In this determination, all evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a “substantial evidence inquiry examines the sufficiency of the evidence presented but not its weight,” which remains a matter for the jury. State v. McNeil, 359 N.C. 800, 804, 617 S.E.2d 271, 274 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[i]f there is substantial evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or both—to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant was charged with, and convicted of, feloniously possessing stolen property in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–71.1. “The essential elements of felonious possession of stolen property are: (1) possession of personal property, (2) which was stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering, (3) the possessor knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the property to have been stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering, and (4) the possessor acting with a dishonest purpose[,]” State v. Southards, 189 N.C.App. 152, 156, 657 S.E.2d 419, 421 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant only contests whether there was substantial evidence to support the following elements: (1) that Defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen; (2) that Defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to know the property was feloniously stolen; and (3) that Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose. We address each argument in turn.
A. Guilty Knowledge that Property was Stolen
In Defendant's first argument, she contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the charge of felonious possession of stolen goods because, according to Defendant, the State did not supply substantial evidence that Defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen. At trial, Defendant denied knowing that the property was stolen, and the State offered no direct evidence to show that Defendant had the requisite knowledge. However, the State did present sufficient circumstantial evidence that Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen, as a legitimately purchased computer would not be sold in a dog food bag, nor could all of the stolen property reasonably be legitimately purchased for only $200.00. Therefore, there was substantial evidence of this element of the crime. See State v. Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 304, 341 S.E.2d 555, 560 (1986) (recognizing that a defendant is guilty of feloniously receiving stolen property if “he received property having reasonable grounds to believe it was stolen”); see also State v. Maynard, 65 N.C.App. 81, 85, 308 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1983), disc review denied, 310 N.C. 628, 315 S.E.2d 694 (1984) (standing for the proposition that selling or buying goods “for substantially less than their fair market value” is evidence that supports the element that the possessor knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen).
B. Guilty Knowledge that the Property was Feloniously Stolen
Defendant next argues the State did not present substantial evidence that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the property was “stolen pursuant to a breaking and entering[.]” Our review of the record shows that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction of felonious possession of stolen goods.
In this case, we agree that the State offered no proof that Defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the property was stolen pursuant to a breaking and entering. However, the State offered sufficient evidence to support a different theory of felonious possession. Evidence showed that the property in this case had a value in excess of $1,000. See State v. Privette, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 721 S.E.2d 299, 309,disc. review denied,––– N.C. ––––, 724 S.E.2d 532 (2012) (reciting the following elements of a different theory of felonious possession of stolen property: “(1) ... possession of personal property[;] (2) valued at greater than [$1,000.00;] (3) which has been stolen[;] (4) with the possessor knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen[;] and (5) with the possessor acting with dishonesty”). “Stolen property's fair market value is the item's reasonable selling price[ ] at the time and place of the theft, and in the condition in which it was when [stolen].” State v. Davis, 198 N.C.App. 146, 151, 678 S.E.2d 709, 714 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is not necessary that a witness be an expert in order to give his opinion as to value[;][a] witness who has knowledge of value gained from experience, information and observation may give his opinion of the value of specific real property, personal property, or services.” State v. Cotten, 2 N.C.App. 305, 311, 163 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1968) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this case, Samuel gave the following testimony at trial: “The television, since I've had it for a while, I would probably try to sell it for $1,000. The computer probably around $500. My PlayStation, I would try to get at least $200[.]”
Based on the foregoing, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that the stolen goods were valued at greater than $1,000.00. As such, it was not necessary for the State to also supply sufficient evidence that Defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the property was taken pursuant to a breaking and entering. See State v. Harper, 51 N.C.App. 493, 499, 277 S.E.2d 72, 76 (1981) (stating, the “[d]efendant was charged with feloniously possessing stolen property in violation of G.S. 14–71.1. The indictment could have supported proof either that defendant knew or had reason to know that the property was feloniously stolen pursuant to a breaking and entering, or otherwise by means described in G.S. 14–72(b), or that the property stolen was of a value in excess of $[10]00”).
C. Dishonest Purpose
We also believe the State has provided substantial evidence to support the final element of the crime—that Defendant acted with a dishonest purpose. “[W]hether someone is acting with a dishonest purpose is a question of intent.” State v. Brown, 85 N.C.App. 583, 586, 355 S.E.2d 225, 228,disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 172, 358 S.E.2d 57 (1987).
[T]he ‘dishonest purpose’ element of the crime of possession of stolen property can be met by a showing that the possessor acted with an intent to aid the thief, receiver, or possessor of stolen property. The fact that the defendant does not intend to profit personally by his action is immaterial. It is sufficient if he intends to assist another wrongdoer in permanently depriving the true owner of his property.
Parker, 316 N.C. at 305–06, 341 S.E.2d at 561. “Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Withers, 111 N.C.App. 340, 348, 432 S.E.2d 692, 698,disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 180, 438 S.E.2d 207 (1993) (citation omitted).
The testimony of Captain Ken Hanks supplies circumstantial evidence that Defendant knew the property her sister brought into her home was stolen and that Defendant attempted to assist her sister by telling the police there was no stolen property in her home:
A. I advised [Defendant] that I had received information that there was possibly stolen property at her residence, asked her was there any property in her house that didn't belong there and may be stolen. And her answer was no. And then I told her I had got good information that there's possibly stolen property at her residence and I would like to go in, and she gave me consent to come in. And as soon as I stepped in the door, I saw the TV.
Q. The first time you asked her was there any stolen property, she told you no?
A. That's correct.
Q. The second time you asked her, did she give you an answer before you entered?
A. She said the TV.
We believe the foregoing evidence that Defendant told the police there was no stolen property in her home—alongside evidence that Defendant's sister had delivered various electronics to Defendant's home in a dog food bag earlier that morning, and that Defendant indicated, “the TV[,]” when asked a second time whether there was stolen property in her home—was evidence of Defendant's intent to assist her sister. This, we believe, is sufficient to establish the final element of the crime. See Parker, 316 N.C. at 304, 341 S.E.2d at 560 (“It is sufficient if he intends to assist another wrongdoer in permanently depriving the true owner of his property.”).
We conclude, in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the elements of felonious possession of stolen goods. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence was properly denied.
NO ERROR. Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).