Opinion
Case No. 2019 CA 00011
12-20-2019
STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff - Appellee v. RANDY KEITH FIELDS Defendant - Appellant
APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee R. KYLE WITT Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney By: BRIAN T. WALTZ Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 39 West Main Street, Suite 101 Lancaster, Ohio 43130 For Defendant-Appellant JAMES A. ANZELMO Anzelmo Law 446 Howland Dr. Gahanna, Ohio 43230
JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Hon. Craig R. Hon. Earle E. Wise, J.
OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018 CR 00595 JUDGMENT: Affirmed APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee R. KYLE WITT
Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney By: BRIAN T. WALTZ
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
39 West Main Street, Suite 101
Lancaster, Ohio 43130 For Defendant-Appellant JAMES A. ANZELMO
Anzelmo Law
446 Howland Dr.
Gahanna, Ohio 43230 Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Randy Keith Fields appeals his conviction and sentence from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On September 13, 2018, the Fairfield County Grand Jury indicated appellant on two counts of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2929.25, felonies of the fourth degree. At his arraignment on September 19, 2018, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} A superseding indictment was filed on December 13, 2018, charging appellant with two counts of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2929.25, felonies of the third degree, one count of disrupting public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(1) and/or (3) and 2909.04(C), a felony of the fourth degree, and two counts of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and 2925.11(C)(1)(a), felonies of the fifth degree. At his arraignment on December 19, 2018, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.
{¶4} Thereafter, a jury trial commenced on January 15, 2019. The following testimony was adduced at trial.
{¶5} On September 5, 2018, Levi Benner of the Lancaster Police Department was dispatched to the 1100 block of Sugar Grove Road in response to a 911 call about a domestic violence situation. The caller to 911 was Kaelen Friesner. When the officer approached the house, he observed two females out front, Kaelen Friesner and A.G., the juvenile daughter of the victim. The officer spoke with Nikole Miller and A.G. He testified that Miller was crying, visibly upset and had a cut above her right eye. She was using a rag to wipe off the blood so that it did not get in her eye. He also testified that she was actively bleeding at the time.
{¶6} When Officer Benner entered the house and went into the bedroom shared by Miller and appellant, he observed that the bed had been physically flipped over, clothing was all over the floor and there was blood on the mattress and bed. Miller signed a domestic violence statement that evening and a temporary protection order. When asked, the Officer testified that it was five to seven minutes from the time of the 911 call to the time when the police arrived on the scene. The appellant was not present.
{¶7} On cross-examination, Officer Benner testified that he did not take the sheets or mattress cover that contained blood spots into evidence or have them tested and did not know whose blood was on the sheets or the mattress cover. He further admitted that Miller did not want to sign the request for a protection order at first and told him that she did not want to get appellant in trouble. On redirect, Officer Benner testified that the blood on the mattress cover and mattress itself appeared to be fresh and that he did not observe anyone else with injuries other than Miller. On recross-examination, he admitted that he did not see appellant that evening and did not know if appellant had injuries.
{¶8} Nikole Miller testified that she lived at 1041 Sugar Grove Road and that appellant was her boyfriend. She testified that her daughter Kaelen was 18 years old and she had two other children all who lived with her. Miller testified that on September 5, 2018, arrangements had been made to have Christopher Pappas come over to her home to work on her vehicle. When Miller arrived home that day with one of her daughters, she noticed that the bedroom had the mattress flipped over and a bunch of clothes had been pulled out of the dresser onto the floor. In addition, other items had been knocked over. Miller and appellant had been arguing earlier in the day.
{¶9} Miller then walked out to her detached garage where she had contact with Christopher Pappas. While she was in there talking to Pappas, appellant jumped down from the attic of the garage and the two got into a further argument, Appellant was upset with Miller and the two were yelling at one another. Miller testified that she did not remember appellant pushing her across the garage and did not remember telling the police that he did. A CD from the police body cam, which was marked as an exhibit, was played. On the CD, Miller stated that appellant had pushed her in the garage.
{¶10} Miller testified that she had a cell phone in the garage with her and that appellant had grabbed the phone and smashed it. Miller then asked her daughter, Kaelen, to call 911. When Miller went into her house, appellant followed her inside and followed her into the bedroom. The following is an excerpt from her testimony:
{¶11} Q. Okay. When you go into the house and into that bedroom, the Defendant follows you in and follows you into that bedroom; is that correct?
{¶12} A. Yes.
{¶13} Q. Okay. And while he's in that bedroom, he pushes, shoves, grabs, does something to your head and hits it up against the dresser causing you to be injured; is that correct?
{¶14} A. No. That's why I wanted to plead the Fifth earlier.
{¶15} Q. Well, I don't care why you wanted to plead the Fifth.
{¶16} A. Okay.
{¶17} Q. You're saying that that didn't happen.
{¶18} A. Yep.
{¶19} Q. Okay. You told them repeatedly, correct, that he had slammed your head into the dresser; right?
{¶20} A. Yes, I told them that. I don't know if I told them repeatedly, but I told them that, yeah.
{¶21} Trial Transcript at 145-146. She testified that she was actively bleeding from her head when the police arrived.
{¶22} At trial, appellee played an audio recording of Miller telling the police that appellant had assaulted her. Appellant objected on the grounds that it was improper impeachment, but the trial court overruled the objection. After the recording was played, Miller admitted that she told the police that Miller had been living there for about three or four months. She testified that appellant's clothes were there, that they were in a sexual relationship and that she believed that appellant had keys to her residence. The two were in a romantic relationship. Miller testified that she spoke to appellant on the phone while he was in jail and had communicated with him in other ways. She recalled signing a statement of domestic violence as part of a request for a temporary restraining order on that evening. In her statement, Miller indicated that appellant pushed her, got in her face, grabbed her by the back of her neck, and pushed her head into the corner dresser drawer and then onto the bed. She further admitted telling the police that appellant had inflicted the injury shown on from Exhibit 6-B on her and that appellant had trashed her bedroom. Miller took the officer into the bedroom to shown him what it looked like and while in the bedroom, indicted that appellant had slammed her head into the dresser.
{¶23} Miller testified that photos that were admitted as exhibits accurately showed her injury and the blood on the bed. Miller, when asked, remembered speaking with appellant over the phone while he was in jail. Recordings of some of the jail calls were admitted as exhibits and played at trial. During the calls, appellant said that he was sorry and needed to apologize. During one of the conversations, appellant repeatedly told Miller not to go to the Grand Jury and that if she goes and answers questions, it "fucks" him. Trial Transcript at 188. During another, appellant indicates that he owed A.G. an apology. During one call, appellant told Miller that he was upset that she told the police everything and "that he's pretty much fucked up because they took pictures;..." Trial Transcript at 192. Appellant also told Miller to go to the Prosecutor's Office and tell them that she had lied. At another time, appellant told Miller that "it was all his fault" because he had "anger issues." Trial Transcript at 194. Miller admitted that she told police that appellant had pushed her in the garage, that he "came down swinging from the attic", and that he had slammed her head into a dresser. Trial Transcript at 197.
{¶24} On cross-examination, Miller admitted that she lied to the police on September 5, 2018 and that is one of the reason why she was granted immunity from prosecution. She also admitted that she was intent on taking the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination and that, prior to coming to court, she had called defense counsel's office and told him that she had lied and was willing to do whatever it took to rectify the situation. Miller signed an affidavit stating that she had made false allegations of domestic violence against appellant when she was mad at him and that appellant had never physically harmed her, attempted to harm her or threaten her. She testified that everything in the affidavit was true and accurate and that she was not lying.
{¶25} Moreover, Miller testified that she made the allegations against appellant because she was mad at him after hearing that he had struck A.G. and had broken her cell phone and wanted to get back at him for hurting her child. Miller, however, did not see these incidents and asked the prosecution to drop the charges that she had made against appellant. She testified that after the incident, she did not see any injuries on A.G. and that she was not the victim of domestic violence at the hands of appellant on September 5, 2018. Miller further testified that she withdrew the request for a protection order.
{¶26} On redirect, Miller denied telling her daughter to call 911 and testified that she felt pressure from police to press charges. She later admitted that the reason that she decided to press charged was because she believed at the time her daughter had been assaulted by appellant and her phone had been broken and that it had nothing to do with what the police said.
{¶27} A.G. was the next witness to testify. She had recanted her statement to police and was offered immunity from prosecution. A.G. testified that Miller was her mother and Kaelen Friesner was her sister. A.G. testified that on September 5, 2018, appellant had been living at the residence with her and her mother and that the two were in a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. She testified that on such date, her mother's bedroom had been torn up pretty bad and there were clothes on the floor and the mattress had been flipped. When A.G. went outside, she heard appellant and Miller arguing in the garage. She saw appellant smash Miller's phone on the ground, but did not see appellant strike Miller. A.G. testified that she remembered Miller telling Kaelen to call 911. A.G. also testified that she observed appellant follow Miller into the house and that both of them were upset and arguing. Appellant was yelling at Miller. After hearing Miller scream "ow", A.G. went into the house. Trial Transcript at 247. Appellant left the house and Miller was crying, upset and bleeding. A.G. testified that there was no one else in the house except for appellant, Miller, A.G. and Christopher Pappas and that Pappas did not assault anyone. A.G. believed that appellant had assaulted her mother and followed him outside where she hit him on the back with a Pooper-Scooper handle. A.G. admitted to telling Miller that she had hit appellant because he had hit Miller.
{¶28} A.G. denied that appellant ever took her cell phone from her or broke the phone. She further testified that he did not injure her. On cross-examination, A.G. admitted signing an affidavit provided to defense counsel stating that the allegations that she had made against appellant that he committed domestic violence against her were not true and that appellant had never caused her physical harm or led her to believe that he would attempt to cause her physical harm.
{¶29} On redirect, A.G. testified that when appellant walked out of the bedroom, he still appeared angry and that she took the Pooper-Scooper with her because she thought that she was going to have to defend her mother. Appellant did not have injuries on him.
{¶30} Kaelen Friesner also testified at trial. She testified that appellant lived with them and was her mother's boyfriend. Kaelen testified that she went looking for her mother to ask her why her room was such a mess. Miller, who was in the garage, was upset and told her "that her and Randy [appellant] had gotten into it." Trial Transcript at 303. After hearing her mother yelling and hearing a loud crash, Kaelen walked back over to the garage and heard appellant yelling and arguing with Miller. She testified that appellant threw Miller's phone down and smashed it on the ground "probably three times." Trial Transcript at 307. Kaelen testified that she told appellant to stop and that her mother asked her to call 911. While she was making the call, appellant and Miller went inside the house. A portion of the 911 call was played for the jury. Appellant, who had no injuries, later left the house and when Kaelen saw Miller, Miller had injuries. Kaelen testified that Miller was crying and bleeding and was very upset. She admitted, after a CD of her statement to police was played, telling police that her mother told her that she had been assaulted by appellant. Kalen testified that appellant had a key to the residence and had other property there, including a motorcycle. When asked, Kaelen denied seeing blood on the bed after her mother was injured.
{¶31} On cross-examination, Kaelen testified that on the day in question, she was working on the porch when she heard a loud bang and that it was possible that some wood or something else fell out of the attic. She testified that she then heard her mother yelling and that her mother frequently yelled and cursed and had a temper. When Kaelen went over to the garage, appellant and Miller were yelling at each other and appellant had the phone in his hand. He then smashed the phone by throwing it to the ground. She testified that appellant and her mother went into the house and that she then called 911 and said that "the boyfriend was freaking out and that he was breaking things;..." Trial Transcript at 335-336. At that point, Kaelen did not say that he had hit anyone. Kaelen testified that she told police that evening that she thought appellant had punched her mother and that that was a wrong assumption on her part. She testified that she did not see appellant punch her mother or take her mother's head and bash it on the dresser.
{¶32} On redirect, Kaelen testified that appellant, when he came out of the house, did not give any explanation for what had just happened and just left. She admitted that her mother told her to call 911 when her mother was in the garage with appellant and that at the time, appellant was a foot or two away from Miller.
{¶33} The parties had stipulated that appellant had previously been convicted of domestic violence and, on a separate occasion, of negligent assault.
{¶34} The next witness to testify was Heather Leppo. Leppo testified that she had been convicted of engaging in a pattern on corrupt activity including forgery and passing bad checks. She testified that she was familiar with appellant and was aware that he had a conviction for negligent assault stemming from an incident that occurred on or about September 25, 2016. She testified that she was the victim in that incident and that at that time, she was in a relationship with appellant and they had been boyfriend/girlfriend for about a year. The relationship was sexual in nature. Leppo testified that they lived together in a condo and that appellant lived with her for approximately three months. Leppo further testified that she was aware that appellant had been convicted of domestic violence in another case due to an offense in October of 2016 and that she was the victim in that case.
{¶35} On cross-examination, Leppo testified that the utilities for the condo were in her name and that she and appellant had no joint account together or any bank accounts together. The two did not have any joint credit cards or debts and did not have any car loans or leases together. She testified that appellant would leave her residence and go home where he lived with his mother. Appellant, according to her, resided at both residences. On redirect she clarified that appellant only went to this mother's house to get his belongings and take them to Leppo's house. On recross-examination, Leppo admitted that appellant would carry a suitcase with him with his clothes between places.
{¶36} At the conclusion of the evidence and the end of deliberations, the jury, on January 16, 2019, found appellant guilty of domestic violence in regards to Miller, but not guilty of domestic violence in regards to A.G. and not guilty of disrupting public services. The jury further found that appellant had previously been convicted once of domestic violence and/or negligent adult when the victim of the negligent assault offense was a family or household member.
{¶37} As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on February 8, 2019, appellant was sentenced to 18 months in prison. The trial court ordered that such sentence be served consecutively to another Fairfield County case. In a separate Entry filed on February 8, 2019, the trial court, upon appellee's motion, dismissed the aggravated drug counts.
{¶38} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
{¶39} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION TO GO BEYOND THE LIMITS OF PROPER IMPEACHMENT, SET FORTH IN EVID.R. 613, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
{¶40} "II. THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT FIELDS' PRIOR NEGLIGENT ASSAULT CONVICTION CANNOT BE USED TO INFER THAT HE HAS A PROPENSITY TO COMMIT CRIMES, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
{¶41} "III. RANDY KEITH FIELDS' CONVICTION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
{¶42} "IV. RANDY KEITH FIELDS' CONVICTION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 1 & 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
I
{¶43} Appellant, in his first assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to improperly impeach Miller's testimony. Appellant specifically argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach Miller with her prior statements to the police and with her prior statements in her protection order.
{¶44} Evid. R. 613(B) states as follows:
{¶45} (B) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is admissible if both of the following apply:
{¶46} (1) If the statement is offered solely for the purpose of impeaching the witness, the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness on the statement or the interests of justice otherwise require;
{¶47} (2) The subject matter of the statement is one of the following:
{¶48} (a) A fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action other than the credibility of a witness;
{¶49} (b) A fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence under Evid.R. 608(A), 609, 616(A), or 616(B);
{¶50} (c) A fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence under the common law of impeachment if not in conflict with the Rules of Evidence.
{¶51} However, where impeachment is used as a "subterfuge" to get evidence before the jury which is not otherwise admissible, it is improper. State v. Arnold, 189 Ohio App.3d 507, 2010-Ohio-5379, 939 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.), quoting Annotation, Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court under Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 A.L.R.Fed. 498, 500-501 (1981).
{¶52} Appellant argues that appellee used Evid.R. 613(B) "as a subterfuge for improperly getting substantive evidence before the jury." However, even without Miller's testimony, there was overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, including the recordings of the jail phone calls between Miller and appellant. Finally, while appellant argues that trial counsel should have asked for a jury instruction stating that the evidence was limited to impeachment purposes, appellant did not request a jury instruction on the matter be given and, we therefore review appellant's allegations under the plain-error standard.
{¶53} "For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal rule, the error must have been an obvious defect in the proceeding, and the error must have affected a substantial right. E.g., State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 2002 Ohio 68, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).
{¶54} Appellant has failed to demonstrate that giving an instruction would have changed the outcome of the trial, based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, or that such was not a trial strategy. State v. Sneed, 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 584 N.E.2d 1160 (1992).
{¶55} Appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
II
{¶56} Appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide an instruction to the jury that appellant's prior negligent assault conviction could not be used to infer that he had a propensity to commit crimes.
{¶57} However, in the case sub judice the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Evidence was received about the commission of a crime other than the offense with which the Defendant is charged in this trial. That evidence was received only for a limited purpose. It was not received and you're not permitted - you may not consider it to prove the character of the Defendant in order to prove or to show that he acted in accordance with that character. That is, you cannot consider it as proof that the Defendant had the propensity to commit any of the offenses charged against him.
If you find that the evidence of the other crime is true and that the Defendant committed it, you may consider that evidence only for the purpose of deciding the additional finding of whether the Defendant was previously convicted of domestic violence or neglect assault when the victim
of the negligent assault was a family or household member at the time of the offense.Trial Transcript at 512-513.
{¶58} Moreover, at the oral argument, appellant acknowledged that the trial court included the instruction and withdrew his second assignment of error.
{¶59} Appellant's second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
III, IV
{¶60} Appellant, in his third assignment of error, maintains that his conviction for domestic violence is based on insufficient evidence. In his fourth assignment of error, he argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶61} When an appellate court reviews a record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 47. Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. Accordingly, the question of whether the offered evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Perkins, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-13-01, 2014-Ohio-752, 2014 WL 855870, ¶ 30, citing Thompkins at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541.
{¶62} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and "in reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury 'clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered'." Thompkins, supra at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
{¶63} "The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts." State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), at paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
{¶64} Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) & (D)(3). R.C. 2919.25 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
{¶65} (A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member....
{¶66} (D)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of domestic violence, and the court shall sentence the offender as provided in divisions (D)(2) to (6) of this section.
{¶67} (2) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (D)(3) to (5) of this section, a violation of division (C) of this section is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
{¶68} (3) Except as otherwise provided in division (D)(4) of this section, if the offender previously has pleaded guilty to or been convicted of domestic violence, a violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of this or any other state or the United States that is substantially similar to domestic violence, a violation of section 2903.14, 2909.06, 2909.07, 2911.12, 2911.211, or 2919.22 of the Revised Code if the victim of the violation was a family or household member at the time of the violation, a violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of this or any other state or the United States that is substantially similar to any of those sections if the victim of the violation was a family or household member at the time of the commission of the violation, or any offense of violence if the victim of the offense was a family or household member at the time of the commission of the offense, a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree, and, if the offender knew that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the violation, the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender pursuant to division (D)(6) of this section, and a violation of division (C) of this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree.
{¶69} The victim in this case was Nikole Miller.
{¶70} At trial, there was testimony that appellant, on September 5, 2018, was a family or household member of Miller and that they were living together as spouses and engaging in a sexual relationship. On the day in question, there was testimony that appellant became angry with Miller and was yelling at her, and after jumping down from the attic, pushed her across the garage . Appellant then grabbed and smashed her phone. Appellant then trashed the bedroom that the two shared. After Miller then told her daughter to call 911, appellant followed Miller into the house where he slammed her head into the dresser, leaving her bleeding. There was testimony that no one else was in the bedroom with them. A.G. testified that she heard her mother say "ow". Appellant then fled the scene. As noted by appellee, shortly thereafter, Miller was seen coming out of the bedroom crying with a cut above her eye that was still bleeding.
{¶71} Moreover, during jail calls that were recorded, appellant did not deny the victim's accusations but begged her not to go to the Grand Jury and told her to go the Prosecutor's Office and change her story. During the calls, he told her that he was sorry and that it was due to his temper.
{¶72} Based on the foregoing, we find that, construing the evidence in the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of domestic violence proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We further find, upon our review of the record, that the jury did not lose its way in convicting appellant. The jury, as trier of fact, was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses at trial.
{¶73} Appellant's third and fourth assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.
{¶74} Accordingly, the judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. By: Baldwin, J. Gwin, P.J. and Wise, Earle, J. concur.