Code, art. 75, sec. 10; 1 Poe, Pl. Pr., sec. 710; 2 Poe, Pl. Pr., secs. 591, 826; Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209. Where, however, the only judgment in the case is the judgment on demurrer, then "the time for the appeal is counted from the judgment on the demurrer and not from the ruling of the court; and that the judgment on demurrer was an adverse determination of appellant's suit from which he had the right of appeal." State, use of Brooks, v. Fidelity Dep. Co., 147 Md. 194; Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, 132 Md. 210, 215; State v. Jenkins, 70 Md. 472, 479. The appeal in this case was taken from a judgment of non pros. and a judgment for the defendant for costs, and there being no other issue after the abandonment of the first six counts of the declaration, the judgment so entered was final and one from which an appeal will lie. Henderson v. Maryland Home Ins. Co., 90 Md. 52; Rutledge v. McAfee, 72 Md. 32; Gittings v. State, 33 Md. 461; Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, supra; Stabile v. Danini, 132 Md. 567; State, use of Brooks v. Fidelity Dep. Co., 147 Md. 194, 195.

Jahns v. Clark, 138 Wn. 288, 244 P. 729, 731, 732. State v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 147 Md. 194, 127 A. 758, 759; Huffman v. Koppelkom, 8 Neb. 344, 1 N.W. 243.

It was held in that case that an officer who, without provocation or necessity, assaults a person not a party to the writ he is serving is personally liable for the tort; but the sureties on his bond are not liable, because the assault is an act which he has no authority to commit by virtue of his office. Another striking example of the Maryland rule is the case of State, to Use of Brooks v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 147 Md. 194, 199, 127 A. 758, 760. There the sheriff of Talbot County had arrested a woman without a warrant and kept her in jail for thirty days without a commitment, and maltreated her in an effort to force her to give some information, which she did not have, about another person. The Court held that the surety on the sheriff's bond was not liable for these wrongful acts.

100 P. 174. State v. Hill (Md.) 41 A. 61. State v. Fidelity and D. Co. (Md.) 127 A. 758. Delay on the part of owners of interest coupons in presenting them for payment when due, creates no liability on the part of the payor, where the designated agent fails before the coupons are presented. Lusk State Bank v. Town Council of Lusk, 48 Wyo. 547. As the creditor has consented to the acts of the principal relied upon as causing the surety's liability, the creditor cannot hold the surety therefor. 50 C.J. 111. Pickering v. Day, 2 Del. Ch.an. 333. Huntington v. Williams, 3 Conn. 427. Stevens v. Partridge, 109 Ill. Appeals 486. Casper authorities ratified and approved the acts of Joyce in making the remittances to Kountze Brothers. Gage County v. Wright (Nebr.)

" Board of Com'rs v. Vaughn, 51 Okla. 609, 152 P. 115. We quote from State to Use of Brooks, v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 147 Md. 194, 127 A. 758, 759, as follows: "The surety's obligation, therefore, is coextensive with the duties of the sheriff's office, but does not extend beyond this single limitation on the scope of the bondsman's contractual liability. In the ascertainment of whether the wrong complained of is within the stipulations of the bond, the Maryland rule, which was adopted after careful consideration of the opposite view and of the authorities supporting it, is that, if the act is done by virtue of the authority of the office, the surety is liable, but, if the thing committed is merely by color of his office, the surety is not responsible under the terms of the bond.

By extending the system to the annexed territories the clerk no doubt rendered a useful service in facilitating reference to conveyances of property in those sections, but unless it was a duty "required of him by law," this suit on his bond is not maintainable. State v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 147 Md. 194; State, use of Southern Maryland Bank v. National Surety Co., 126 Md. 290; State, use of Smith, v. Turner, 101 Md. 584, 587. The reasons supporting the view that the bond is not liable in this action were well stated in the opinion delivered by Judge Frank in the lower court, which was, in part, as follows: