Opinion
(8825)
The state, with the permission of the trial court, appealed to this court from the dismissal of the information charging the defendant with acting as a professional bondsman without a license. Held that the trial court improperly read into the statutory ( 29-144) definition of a professional bondsman a requirement that the individual receive a tangible benefit in return for posting bond.
Argued June 7, 1991
Decision released September 3, 1991
Amended information charging the defendant with the crime of acting as a professional bondsman without a license, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham, geographical area number eleven, where the court, Conway, J., granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the state, on the granting of permission, appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Paul J. Ferencek, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Mark S. Solak, state's attorney, Vincent Dooley, assistant state's attorney, and MaryJean Kanabis, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
James Fiasconaro, pro se, the appellee (defendant).
The state appealed, with the trial court's permission, from the dismissal of its amended information charging the defendant with the crime of acting as a professional bondsman without a license in violation of General Statutes 29-145. The state contends that the court mistakenly required an allegation of receiving a tangible benefit in return for posting bail. The state also claims that the trial court improperly distinguished between a person who obtains the pretrial release of an individual by posting cash bail from one who posts a surety bond.
General Statutes 29-145 provides in pertinent part: "Any person desiring to engage in the business of a professional bondsman shall apply to the commission of public safety for a license therefor."
The following facts are relevant to a determination of this appeal. The defendant was accused of posting cash bail for five separate individuals on five separate occasions between July 25 and November 26, 1988, without having obtained a state license to engage in the business of a professional bondsman. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the information on the ground that it failed to allege that the defendant received a tangible benefit for posting such bail. The court in support of its decision attempted to distinguish between cash bail and surety bonds as the term "bail" applies to this statute. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
General Statutes 29-144 provides in pertinent part: "Any person . . . who furnishes bail in five or more criminal cases in any one year, whether for compensation or otherwise, shall be deemed a professional bondsman . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes 29-145 requires a professional bondsman to be licensed. Neither 29-144 nor 29-145 makes a distinction between posting cash bail and posting bail by means of a surety bond. Furthermore, we do not find that General Statutes 54-66 supports the trial court's conclusion that there is such a distinction for purposes of a prosecution under 29-145.
The trial court properly declined to consider the validity of General Statutes 29-144 as applied to a defendant who posts bail more than five times within one year for himself or a member of his family because the facts of this case do not require such determination.
General Statutes 54-66 provides: "ACCEPTANCE AND DISPOSITION OF BAIL. In any criminal case in which a bond is allowable or required and the amount thereof has been determined, the accused person, or any person in his behalf, (1) may deposit, with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the offense with which the accused stands charged or any assistant clerk of such court who is bonded in the same manner as the clerk or any person or officer authorized to accept bail, a sum of money equal to the amount called for by such bond, or (2) may pledge real property, the equity of which is equal to the amount called for by such bond, provided the person pledging such property is the owner of such property, and such accused person shall thereupon be admitted to bail. When cash bail is offered, such bond shall be executed and the money shall be received in lieu of a surety or sureties upon such bond. Such cash bail shall be retained by the clerk of such court until a final order of the court disposing of the same is passed; provided, if such bond is forfeited, the clerk of such court shall pay the money to the payee named therein, according to the terms and conditions of the bond."
The statute is unambiguous and the state's information clearly alleged sufficient facts to charge a violation of 29-145. A court cannot by construction read a provision into legislation that is not clearly stated therein. Lucarelli v. State, 16 Conn. App. 65, 68-69, 546 A.2d 940 (1988). Nor may a court substitute its own idea of what might be a wise provision in place of a clear expression of legislative will. Sutton v. Lopes, 201 Conn. 115, 119, 513 A.2d 139, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 466, 93 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Section 29-144 expressly exempts the state from showing that the defendant received compensation. Accordingly, it was improper for the trial court to read into the definition of a professional bondsman a requirement that he receive a tangible benefit for posting bail. The information should be reinstated.