DiPENTIMA, C.J. The defendant, Blake Warner, appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, made pursuant to Practice Book § 39–27(4), and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine if his counsel, Attorney Frank Riccio, Jr., provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an independent investigation as to whether a purported witness for the state would testify against him. He also claims that the court “abused its discretion when presented with a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel—by way of a [State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 7–8, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) ] violation—by flatly denying the defendant an opportunity to be heard on his claim and preventing him from perfecting the record needed for him to present his claim either on direct appeal or through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” We agree with the parties that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding Riccio's alleged ineffective assistance.
The bond determination made at arraignment is our starting point. We recognize the "heavy flow of judicial business in the busy geographical area courts during arraignment sessions"; State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1, 24, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) ; along with the fact that it may be difficult at the time of a defendant's arraignment for the parties to marshal the evidence necessary to hold a meaningful hearing in a relatively complex case involving high bonds, such as the present case. Given the press of business during arraignment proceedings, and the frequent unavailability at that early time of actual evidence as to the defendant's financial ability to make a bond, the trial court should exercise its discretion to impose an initial bond in accordance with the relevant statutory and Practice Book factors, as it always has, guided by any available evidence and representations from counsel.
(Citations omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 203, 982 A.2d 620 (2009); see also State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 116 n. 32, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (Palmer, J., dissenting in part) (“Generally speaking, an argument is a point or line of reasoning made in support of a particular claim. Only claims are subject to our rules of preservation, not arguments.”); Rowe v. Superior Court, 289 Conn. 649, 663, 960 A.2d 256 (2008) (reviewing theories not raised in trial court because “those theories [were] related to a single legal claim”); cf. Vine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 281 Conn. 553, 569, 916 A.2d 5 (2007) (addressing alternative ground for affirmance that was not raised at trial because, inter alia, issue was “closely intertwined” with certified question).
The statutory scheme involving criminal protective orders informs our understanding of what is required by the phrase "notice and opportunity to be heard." Our Supreme Court in State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1, 981 A.2d 427 (2009), held that the statutory scheme concerning family violence protective orders "permit[s] the trial court to issue a criminal protective order at arraignment after consideration of oral argument and the family services report ... [and] require[s] the trial court to hold, at the defendant's request made at the initial hearing, a subsequent hearing within a reasonable period of time wherein the state will be required to prove the continued necessity of that order by a fair preponderance of the evidence ...." Id., at 13, 981 A.2d 427. The court emphasized that the family violence protective order statutes do not "entitle a defendant to an evidentiary hearing beyond consideration of the parties' arguments and the family services report prior to the initial issuance of a criminal protective order at arraignment, which may well occur within hours of the alleged incident of family violence.
Accordingly, we agree with the state that the claim is unpreserved. The defendant relies on Rowe v. Superior Court , 289 Conn. 649, 663, 960 A.2d 256 (2008), and State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1, 31 n.26, 981 A.2d 427 (2009), to support his argument that his claim is preserved. In those cases, our Supreme Court found that a claim was preserved when the objection raised at trial and those raised on appeal were related, meaning "there [was] substantial overlap between [the] theories under the case law."
To the contrary, our Supreme Court recently made a distinction between a criminal protective order issued in connection with a pending criminal case and a civil domestic violence restraining order issued pursuant to § 46b–15. See State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 9–13, 25 n. 19, 981 A.2d 427 (2009). The family court's finding of a civil contempt in this action is not transformed into a criminal contempt simply because the plaintiff's behavior in this case subjected him to both a criminal prosecution and a civil proceeding in the family court for violation of a § 46b–15 domestic restraining order.
Although the term “action” is not defined in the statute, Black's Law Dictionary defines “action” as “[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding.”See State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 17 (2009) (“If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.”).
Practice Book § 78a-1. In State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1, 981 A.2d 427 (2009), we observed that an appeal to this court ordinarily would not lie from a trial court order concerning pretrial conditions of release because the "exclusive nondiscretionary remedy from an order concerning conditions of release is a petition to the Appellate Court pursuant to ... § 54-63g." Id., at 5 n.3, 981 A.2d 427.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction , 319 Conn. 623, 635 n.7, 126 A.3d 558 (2015), quoting State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1, 116 n.32, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (Palmer , J. , dissenting in part). Our rules of preservation apply to claims, but they do not apply to legal arguments, and, therefore, "[w]e may ... review legal arguments that differ from those raised" below "if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim" before the court.
Specifically, the plaintiffs rely on the legislature's failure to amend §§ 7–147i or 8–8(a)(1) in response to Peeling v. Historic District Commission , supra, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 284, in which the Superior Court concluded that the reference in § 7–147i to the " 'procedure' " in § 8–8"clearly states the legislature's intent to incorporate the statutory aggrievement standards of ... § 8–8 and makes them applicable to appeals from the actions of historic district commissions." Although we have applied the doctrine of legislative acquiescence to Superior Court decisions, we have done so only with respect to the limited array of significant trial court decisions that the Reporter of Judicial Decisions has officially published in the Connecticut Supplement. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 51–215a (a); see also State v. Fernando A. , 294 Conn. 1, 20 n.15, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) (en banc) ("the fact that [State v. Doe , 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518 (2000) ], is a Superior Court decision not binding statewide does not detract from its status at that time as the only published authority construing [General Statutes] § 46b–38c"); accord State v. Courchesne , supra, at 717–18, 998 A.2d 1 (unnecessary to apply presumption of legislative acquiescence because legislative history demonstrated General Assembly's approval of two published Superior Court decisions adopting common-law "born alive rule"). Because Peeling lacks the precedential imprimatur and enhanced public notice that attends official publication in the Connecticut Supplement, we decline to presume the legislature aware of it for purposes of legislative acquiescence.