State v. Felton

7 Citing cases

  1. Rollison v. State

    502 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

    Affirmed. See Ferris v. State, 475 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1985); J.B. v. Korda, 436 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). DOWNEY and STONE, JJ., and RIVKIND, LEONARD, Associate Judge, concur.

  2. Hampton v. Miner

    411 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

    While the rule sets forth several examples of circumstances deemed to be exceptional, it does not purport to include an exhaustive or exclusive cataloging of such circumstances. State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Judge Stephen Grimes, in a concurring opinion in Sumbry v. State, 310 So.2d 445 (Fla.App. 2nd DCA 1975), observed that the "speedy trial rule serves the laudable objective of trying to ensure that an arrested person shall be brought to trial with reasonable promptness.

  3. Mellman v. Rudd

    389 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    State ex rel. Smith v. Rudd, 347 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). A contract of immunity would not appear to fall within any category of exceptional circumstances delineated in 3.191(f)-although on at least two occasions, the courts have found exceptional circumstances other than those provided in subsection (f). See State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State ex rel. Canup v. Langston, 341 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Even if we were to hold the execution of such a contract is an exceptional circumstance, subsection (d)(2)(ii) may not be relied upon to justify an extension of trial time because the state failed to move for an order extending the time before it had expired.

  4. Williams v. State

    383 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that it is not error for counsel to waive speedy trial without the client's approval if the waiver was made in good faith and the attorney believed the delay would benefit the client

    Fairfax's testimony made it clear that he continually moved from one Florida location to another, and Jacksonville police made numerous attempts to find him through his contacts in the Tampa and Polk County police agencies. See State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Nor did the trial judge abuse his discretion by denying severance because of John Thomas Williams' illness. Dove v. State, 287 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). A motion for severance may be denied, moreover, even when one co-defendant commits more reprehensible acts than another. Scheel v. State, 350 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977).

  5. Rodriguez v. State

    376 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

    PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Gereca v. State, 336 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1973); Thompson v. State ex rel. Mitchell, 353 So.2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(c), (d), (f)(i), (iii).

  6. State v. Rheinsmith

    362 So. 2d 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 6 times

    A continuance granted upon such an exceptional circumstance extends the speedy trial period. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f)(i); State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The court's order discharging Rheinsmith is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

  7. State ex Rel. Smith v. Nesbitt

    355 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 23 times
    In Nesbitt, the fact that the charge was changed from a felony to a misdemeanor and then back to a felony did not alter the running of the speedy trial period from the original arrest date.

    The only exception to this rule is where the speedy trial limits have been waived or extended by court order under certain limited circumstances not applicable here. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2), (f). See State v. Felton, 348 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State ex rel. Smith v. Rudd, 347 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State ex rel. Canup v. Langston, 341 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); State v. Wolfe, 271 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); State v. Earnest, 265 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). "Except as otherwise provided by this Rule, every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall without demand be brought to trial within 90 days if the crime charged be a misdemeanor, or within 180 days if the crime charged be a felony, capital or noncapital, and if not brought to trial within such time shall upon motion timely filed with the court having jurisdiction and served upon the prosecuting attorney be forever discharged from the crime; provided, the court before granting such motion shall ascertain that such person has been continuously available for trial during such period of time for trial. The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or cri