Decided February 5, 1996 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 39 Conn. App. 840 (AC 13501/13503), is denied. Matthew J. Collins, in support of the petition.

As discussed earlier, the span of time between the victim's first observation of the defendant, the assault and the victim's identification of the defendant at the hospital was no more than several hours. See State v. Howard, 221 Conn. 447, 452-55, 604 A.2d 1294 (1992) (identification occurring two and one-half months after commission of crime not unreliable); State v. Gettes, 42 Conn. App. 472, 478, 680 A.2d 996, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921, 682 A.2d 1009 (1996) (identification occurring fifteen days after commission of crimes did not render identification unreliable); State v. Felder, 39 Conn. App. 840, 848, 668 A.2d 382 (1995), cert. denied, 236 Conn. 906, 670 A.2d 1306 (1996) (identification made ten days after commission of crime not unreliable). The victim observed the defendant up close at least five times during the afternoon immediately preceding the assault. Within a short time after the assault, she gave a detailed description of the defendant and what he was wearing to the police.

See State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 470, 512 A.2d 189 (1986); State v. Askew, supra, 283-84. The factors used to determine whether an unnecessarily suggestive photographic array is nevertheless reliable are set forth in State v. Felder, 39 Conn. App. 840, 668 A.2d 382, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 906, 670 A.2d 1306 (1996). "If a court determines that an identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the court may determine that the identifications are nevertheless reliable and thus admissible.

On March 11, 1994, the court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fourteen years. His conviction was upheld on appeal. State v. Felder, 39 Conn. App. 840, cert. den., 236 Conn. 904 (1995). The petitioner alleges in this habeas corpus proceeding that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Felder, 39 Conn. App. 840, ___ A.2d ___ (1995). Thus, Prosser is not an employer based on the plain meaning of General Statutes § 46-60(a)(8), and as such the plaintiff may not bring a cause of action against him under this statute.

Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431-432 (1994). "Where the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. Its unequivocal CT Page 1267-ZZ meaning is not subject to modification by way of construction."Grievance Committee v. Tarantolo, 192 Conn. 15, 22 (1984); State v. Felder, 39 Conn. App. 840, 844 (1996). The court, after examining the statute, its purpose, the legislative scheme and the 1994 Supreme Court decision ofConnecticut Light and Power Company v. DaSilva concludes that the plain meaning or the statute controls the issue in this case.