Opinion
No. 1-306 / 00-1674.
Filed May 9, 2001.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, RICHARD GLEASON, District Associate Judge.
Joseph Fedderson appeals from the restitution order entered upon his guilty plea to assault with intent to inflict serious injury and trespass with injury. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and James G. Tomka, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Fred H. McCaw, County Attorney, and Ralph Potter, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by STREIT, P.J., and MAHAN and MILLER, JJ.
Joseph Fedderson pled guilty, via an Alfordplea, to assault with intent to inflict serious injury and trespass with injury. SeeIowa Code §§ 708.2(1), 716.8(2) (1999). Following a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Fedderson to pay $15,816.99 in restitution. On appeal, he claims the court erred in setting the amount of restitution.
An Alfordplea permits "a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty to a crime without admitting participation in the underlying facts which constitute the crime." State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Iowa 2000) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167-68, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-72 (1970)).
Our review of a restitution order is for correction of errors at law. State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Iowa 1998). "Restitution . . . is mandatory in all criminal cases in which a defendant pleads guilty." Id.(citing Iowa Code § 910.2). "The restitution order must rest on `a causal connection between the established criminal act and the injury to the victim.' This causal connection is essentially the tort element of proximate cause." State v. Wagner, 484 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).
Fedderson argues his victim (Harold Jones) proximately caused his own injuries. Specifically, Fedderson argues Jones attacked him with a knife and "[h]e used the reasonable force necessary to protect himself against Jones' onslaught." Fedderson further argues "[i]f Jones had not attacked [him] with the knife, Jones would not have incurred the medical bills in question."
In the incident precipitating Fedderson's conviction, Jones suffered six skull fractures, a broken nose, sinus damage, and a fractured orbital bone.
Fedderson's argument is without merit. "[A] guilty plea implicitly eliminates any question of the defendant's guilt." State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1999). Similarly, "[a] guilty plea waives all defenses or objections which were not intrinsic to the plea itself." State v. Cole, 452 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). Having pled guilty to assault with intent to inflict serious injury and trespass with injury, Fedderson cannot subsequently resurrect his self-defense claim to avoid his responsibility to pay restitution. The fact Fedderson entered an Alfordplea does not require a different conclusion. See State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 2000) (stating "there is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea"). We affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.