Opinion
2 CA-CR 2022-0164
07-29-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Antron Fairchild, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Tanja K. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Law Offices of Thomas Jacobs, Tucson By Thomas Jacobs Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20192416001 The Honorable Javier Chon-Lopez, Judge
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Tanja K. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Law Offices of Thomas Jacobs, Tucson By Thomas Jacobs Counsel for Appellant
Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Gard and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STARING, CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Antron Fairchild appeals from his convictions and sentences for assault, aggravated domestic violence, and two counts of aggravated assault. Fairchild argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the victim's statement to a treating physician regarding the identity of her assailant. Additionally, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Finally, Fairchild argues the court erred in dismissing his motion for a new trial based on its refusal to order reevaluation of his competency. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdicts. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, ¶ 5 (2014). In May 2019, an altercation occurred between Fairchild and K.R., who have a child together. K.R. sustained injuries that included facial and spinal fractures. She received treatment at a hospital where she was examined by a trauma surgeon, Dr. Bellal Joseph.
¶3 The next day, a Tucson Police Department detective interviewed K.R. at the hospital and subsequently executed a search warrant at the home she shared with Fairchild. After a failed attempt to hide from police, Fairchild exited the home and spoke to the detective, acknowledging that an "incident" had occurred "in the master bedroom" while his son was "in an adjacent bedroom." Fairchild was arrested and charged with assault, aggravated domestic violence, aggravated harassment, and two counts of aggravated assault.
After Fairchild received a text from the detective that officers were at the home, believed him to be inside, and were in the process of obtaining a search warrant, he responded that he was at a grocery store.
Fairchild was also charged with kidnapping and one additional count of aggravated assault, but these counts were dismissed at trial.
¶4 After a jury trial, Fairchild was acquitted of aggravated harassment but convicted of the remaining charges. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial, Fairchild was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which is eight years. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13- 4033(A)(1), (2).
Discussion I. K.R.'s Statement to Treating Physician
¶5 Fairchild argues the trial court erred by permitting the state to introduce through Dr. Joseph K.R.'s statement to him that her "baby's daddy" had assaulted her. Fairchild argues the statement was inadmissible under Rule 803(4), Ariz. R. Evid., as it was "unnecessary for her medical treatment." Fairchild also contends admission of K.R.'s statement through Joseph's testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We review the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion but review challenges under the Confrontation Clause de novo. State v. Bennett, 216 Ariz. 15, ¶ 4 (App. 2007); see State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, ¶ 12 (2006) (error of law in reaching discretionary conclusion may constitute abuse of discretion).
¶6 Before trial, the state moved for admission of K.R.'s statements to doctors for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment pursuant to Rule 803(4). At the hearing on the state's motion, Fairchild acknowledged the admissibility of medical testimony regarding K.R.'s injuries and how they had occurred. However, he argued, testimony regarding the identity of the person who had inflicted the injuries was irrelevant to K.R.'s medical treatment and was therefore inadmissible. The state countered that, pursuant to State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 (1987), testimony about "who committed the assault" is relevant to a victim's medical treatment because it "guides the doctors as to further treatment follow-up, consultation with any social workers, [and] whether or not the victim would be safe to return home." The trial court agreed with the state, ruling K.R.'s statements to doctors identifying her assailant were admissible.
¶7 On the second day of trial, during the state's direct examination of Dr. Joseph, Fairchild reminded the court he had "previously made an objection to identifying [him] through [K.R.'s] medical records" and asked the court to acknowledge his "standing objection" to such testimony. The court, in "repeat[ing]" its previous ruling, noted the statements were "admissible for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment," and, "just from the foundation that was laid, it is important to devise any treatment plan knowing the history and sometimes the perpetrator who committed the offenses." The doctor subsequently testified K.R. had reported "[h]ead, neck, [and] facial pain after being assaulted by her baby's daddy earlier th[at] evening." K.R. did not testify at trial.
¶8 We first address Fairchild's argument that admission of Dr. Joseph's testimony was erroneous under the rules of evidence. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "in[to] evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, such statements are inadmissible unless they fall within a recognized exception. See State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 8 (App. 2008); Ariz. R. Evid. 802, 803. Rule 803(4) creates such an exception for a victim's statements that are "made for-and [are] reasonably pertinent to-medical diagnosis or treatment" and "describe[] medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause." The rationale behind Rule 803(4) is that "doctors will seek and patients will give reliable information to further necessary medical treatment." Robinson, 153 Ariz. at 199. The defining question for application of Rule 803(4) is "whether the declarant's out-ofcourt statements were 'reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985)). To determine whether statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, our supreme court has developed a two-part test requiring us to consider whether: (1) the declarant's apparent motive was consistent with receiving medical care, and (2) it was reasonable for a doctor to rely on the information in diagnosing or treating the declarant. Id.; see State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 420-21 (1983).
¶9 Here, Fairchild argues that, "[w]hile the description of how [K.R.] was assaulted may have been relevant to medical treatment, the identification of the alleged assailant was not." In support of his argument, Fairchild cites Robinson, 153 Ariz. at 200, for the proposition that Arizona courts "recognize that the identity of the victim's assailant and other statements attributing fault ordinarily are inadmissible under Rule 803(4) because identity and fault usually are not relevant to diagnosis or treatment." The Robinson court, he asserts, permitted only "limited use of identification testimony that was offered during medical treatment in child sex abuse cases, where the identification of the perpetrator is necessary for treatment." And, because this case does not involve sexual abuse of a child, Fairchild argues, K.R.'s "identification of her 'baby daddy' as her assailant was in no way relevant to her treatment" and the court erred in admitting Dr. Joseph's testimony.
¶10 The trial court did not err in admitting K.R.'s statement to Dr. Joseph that she had been assaulted by her "baby's daddy." Although Robinson set forth a general rule that the identity of the perpetrator is usually not relevant to medical care, it concluded that the identity can become relevant where "effective treatment" requires the victim to "avoid contact with the abuser, not just to prevent further abuse, but also to facilitate recovery from past abuse." 153 Ariz. at 200. We do not read that opinion as limiting that reasoning to cases of child sex abuse. And as in child sex abuse cases, medical providers treating domestic violence victims must identify the abuser to counsel the patient in the practical steps necessary to prevent further injuries and allow the current injuries to heal.
¶11 Notably, Dr. Joseph testified that "we traditionally try to screen for domestic violence whether the person says it or not." He also testified that if domestic violence is identified or documented, "based on the history, . . . we do have a case manager and social worker who also approach the patient" to identify "places they can go that are safe." Thus, "[w]hen the abuser's identity is elicited and given to further treatment, the doctor's and the declarant's 'selfish interest[s]' in giving and obtaining proper treatment are sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to at least allow the jury to evaluate the statements." Id. (alteration in Robinson) (quoting Renville, 779 F.2d at 438).
¶12 Further, even were we to conclude the trial court erred by admitting K.R.'s statement regarding the identity of her assailant, any error was harmless. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 18 (2005). In assessing whether an objected-to error is harmless, we must determine whether the state has shown "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence." State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 30 (2018) (quoting State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, ¶ 126 (2017)). "The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993) (omission in Bible) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
¶13 As the state points out, it presented evidence that Fairchild had implicitly acknowledged in an interview with a detective that he was K.R.'s assailant. The same detective testified at trial that, after interviewing K.R. at the hospital, and after Fairchild's failed attempt to hide, he had spoken to Fairchild at the couple's home. After confirming K.R. was the mother of his five-year-old son, Fairchild told the detective there had been an "incident" in "the master bedroom." Fairchild stated he had not been injured during the "incident" and referred to it as "something stupid, the totality of what had transpired that night."
¶14 Additionally, the state presented evidence that Fairchild had made several recorded calls to K.R. from jail during which he apologized and encouraged her to talk to his lawyer and not detectives. In a recorded call, Fairchild tried to convince K.R. to give "some sort of statement" that she had been "under the influence" or "drugged" when detectives talked to her at the hospital. And in another, he told friends he was going to "sweet talk this bitch" to "let this shit get up off of [him]." This evidence establishes that Fairchild assaulted K.R. and the jury would have found him guilty regardless of whether K.R.'s statement to Dr. Joseph identifying Fairchild as her assailant had been admitted. See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588; State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, ¶ 27 (App. 2022) (erroneously admitted evidence harmless when it "supports a fact otherwise established by existing evidence" (quoting State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, ¶ 40 (2000))); cf. State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶¶ 57-58 (2000) (improper admission of evidence could not have affected jury's verdict given "strong circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt").
¶15 Fairchild also argues that admitting K.R.'s statement violated his right to confront witnesses against him as protected by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution. Because he did not object on constitutional grounds below, we review that claim only for fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Robles, 213 Ariz. 268, ¶ 12 (App. 2006); State v. Alvarez, 213 Ariz. 467, ¶ 7 (App. 2006) (hearsay objection does not preserve for review claim admitted evidence violated Confrontation Clause).
¶16 The Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24. It bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial evidence unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). However, the Confrontation Clause applies only "[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue." Id.; see Alvarez, 213 Ariz. 467, ¶ 14. A victim's pretrial statement to a medical professional is likely to be nontestimonial when made for the primary purpose of obtaining medical care. State v. Hill, 236 Ariz. 162, ¶ 22 (App. 2014); see Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4).
¶17 As previously noted, K.R. made the statement to Dr. Joseph upon arrival at the hospital, while he was assessing her injuries and providing treatment. On this record, the primary purpose of K.R.'s exchange with Dr. Joseph was the provision and receipt of medical care, making the statement nontestimonial. See Hill, 236 Ariz. 162, ¶ 22. Thus, there was no violation of Fairchild's confrontation rights.
II. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
¶18 Fairchild argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, asserting the state failed to present substantial evidence that he had assaulted K.R. We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15 (2011), and we will not reverse unless "there is a complete absence of probative facts to support [the jury's] conclusion," State v. Johnson, 215 Ariz. 28, ¶ 2 (App. 2007) (alteration in Johnson) (quoting State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 206 (1988)).
¶19 Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., provides that "the court must enter a judgment of acquittal on any offense charged in an indictment . . . if there is no substantial evidence to support a conviction." Sufficient evidence is "'such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate' to 'support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt'" and may be direct or circumstantial. State v. Aguirre, 255 Ariz. 89, ¶ 8 (App. 2023) (quoting State v. Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, ¶ 9 (App. 2013)). We "test the evidence 'against the statutorily required elements of the offense,'" but we do not reweigh the evidence. Id. (quoting State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, ¶ 8 (App. 2005)); see State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, ¶ 38 (App. 2013) (weight of evidence and witness credibility is a determination for the jury). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, ¶ 22 (2007) (alteration in Cox) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). "While each element of the offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, each supporting fact need not be." State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 28 (1999).
¶20 On the third day of trial, Fairchild moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20. He argued the evidence was insufficient to establish he was the "alleged assailant," pointing to the lack of evidence regarding identity and the trial court's admission of hearsay evidence.
¶21 In denying Fairchild's motion, the trial court relied on State v. Dutton, explaining that the "identity of one charged with a crime may be established by natural and reasonable inferences deducible from proven facts, and may rest wholly on circumstantial evidence." 83 Ariz. 193, 199 (1957) (quoting 3 Clark A. Nichols, Applied Evidence § 28 (1928)). The court continued, "[I]t is a matter for the jury to determine from all the circumstances" whether the evidence is "sufficient to sustain a conviction." The court concluded that, in this case, "the totality of the evidence on identity," including "the picture that was identified by one of the police officers when they went to the scene, the statements of the victim, [and] the phone calls to the victim," was sufficient to "allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Fairchild] is the one who" had assaulted K.R.
¶22 On appeal, Fairchild argues Dutton is distinguishable because, while "circumstantial evidence may support identification," the state failed to present any "competent evidence" identifying him as K.R.'s assailant. He contends the trial court erred in relying on K.R.'s statement that her "baby's daddy" had assaulted her because evidence was presented that K.R. had children with four different men and thus "there was only a one in four chance he was the assailant." Additionally, he claims statements made in recorded jail calls to K.R. cannot reasonably be "heard as an admission of guilt." As such, Fairchild argues, "[n]o evidence in this case rises to the level of circumstantial evidence sufficient to submit the case to the jury," and no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fairchild also asserts he "denied at trial that he made . . . statements" to the detective and there was conflicting testimony as to what K.R.'s friend had told the detective about how K.R. had been injured. Fairchild's argument does not go to the sufficiency of the evidence, but to its credibility and weight, which we do not reassess on appeal. State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶ 6 (App. 2004).
¶23 At trial, as discussed above, the detective testified that upon arriving at the shared residence and making contact with Fairchild by phone, Fairchild had lied to him about being inside. And Fairchild told the detective an "incident," which he described as "something stupid, the totality of what had transpired that night," had occurred in the master bedroom. Additionally, as noted, the jury heard the series of recorded phone calls made by Fairchild while in jail.
¶24 Based on the totality of the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable juror could have concluded Fairchild was K.R.'s assailant. See Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶ 28 (evidence sufficient where "jury could have pieced together a web of suspicious circumstances tight enough that a reasonable person could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt," that defendant had committed the crime); Dutton, 83 Ariz. at 199 (identity may be established by inferences from the facts).
III. Motion for New Trial
¶25 Fairchild argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial, in which he had challenged the court's mid-trial denial of his motion to reevaluate his competency. We review a court's refusal to conduct an additional competency evaluation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mendoza-Tapia, 229 Ariz. 224, ¶ 22 (App. 2012). Likewise, we review the court's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 97 (1984).
¶26 Before trial, defense counsel moved for an evaluation pursuant to Rule 11.2(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., citing concerns about Fairchild's "ability . . . to understand the proceedings against him," "assist in his defense," and "understand and respond appropriately to information and advice." Over Fairchild's objection, the trial court granted the motion and ordered two psychiatric evaluations and one neuropsychological evaluation. The results of all three evaluations indicated Fairchild was competent, and, in January 2020, the court determined he was competent to stand trial.
¶27 On the third day of trial, defense counsel moved for a reevaluation of Fairchild's competency based on his behavior and "outbursts" in the courtroom, mental illness, "history of head injury," and inability to cooperate with and assist counsel. The state objected, pointing to Fairchild's previous evaluations finding him competent and arguing he had demonstrated an understanding of the proceedings and "how to help his attorney," as evidenced by his attempts "to bring in witnesses."
¶28 The trial court found that, based on its observations of Fairchild's actions and responses throughout the proceedings, he was "clearly able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him" and "assist in his own defense." The court further noted Fairchild's behavior at previous trials, stating it showed a pattern of behavior that reflected Fairchild's desire to "do everything in his power to somehow cause a mistrial and not to have the matter go to the jury." The court concluded Fairchild was "competent to stand trial" and denied his motion for an additional Rule 11 evaluation.
Fairchild had previously been tried for several offenses in Pima County unrelated to the instant case.
Fairchild argues for the first time in his reply brief that the "trial court . . . determined competency without a hearing," which is "not permissible in the context of granting or denying a request for evaluation." Because Fairchild failed to raise this argument in his opening brief, we do not further address it. See State v. Yonkman, 233 Ariz. 369, n.3 (App. 2013) (failure to present argument in opening brief waives claim on appeal); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7).
¶29 After the jury had returned its verdicts, Fairchild moved for a new trial, asserting, in relevant part, that the trial court "erred in ruling that [he] was competent to proceed with his trial" despite "substantial evidence of his inability to assist his counsel in his defense, and in fact, his frequent obstruction of that defense." The motion further stated that Fairchild's "bizarre conduct throughout the trial served no rational end or purpose, and is the product of mental illness and/or a brain injury suffered by [Fairchild] earlier in his life." The trial court denied the motion, noting again that Rule 11 proceedings had been held after which Fairchild was found competent.
¶30 On appeal, Fairchild contends the trial court's failure to order another Rule 11 evaluation was a "manifest abuse of discretion" that "denied [him] due process of law." Fairchild cites multiple instances he claims "prove[] that [he] was incapable" of "rationally participat[ing]" in his trial. These include arguments with his attorney about trial strategy in the courtroom, his repeated verbal outbursts, requests to address the court directly, and an incident in which he made a "threatening gesture" and "gay slur" to a detective.
¶31 Rule 11.1 states that a "defendant may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced" while "unable to understand the nature and objective of the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense because of a mental illness, defect, or disability." See also A.R.S. § 13-4501(3). A defendant has a right to a mental examination and hearing on his competency to stand trial when "reasonable grounds exist for a competence examination." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.3(a); see State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 48 (2004). Similarly, in order to grant another competency hearing after one has already been conducted, a trial court must find "some reasonable ground to justify another hearing on facts not previously presented to the trial court." State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 360-61 (1975).
¶32 Fairchild does not contend the trial court abused its discretion in determining he was competent to stand trial in January 2020. Rather, Fairchild suggests the court should have granted his mid-trial motion for reevaluation based on his behavior and inability to follow the court's directions, as well as defense counsel's "avowal . . . that [he] was interfering with his own defense and was unable to assist . . . counsel during trial due to probable incompetence." But Fairchild failed to establish any reasonable grounds justifying an additional competency evaluation. See id. at 360-61. Indeed, defense counsel pointed to Fairchild's previously sustained head injury, which was known to the trial court when it found him competent to stand trial in January 2020. See State v. Lynch, 225 Ariz. 27, ¶ 18 (2010) (court did not err in refusing second hearing when defendant "proffered no new information to call into question the court's previous finding of competency"); State v. Messier, 114 Ariz. 522, 526-27 (App. 1977) (affirming denial of second competency proceeding when motion failed "to set forth any new, substantial evidence or allegations of incompetency").
¶33 Although defense counsel asserted Fairchild was mentally ill, those observations, absent supporting evidence, are insufficient grounds for requiring an additional competency evaluation. See State v. Verdugo, 112 Ariz. 288, 289 (1975). Nor did Fairchild's disruptive behavior during trial or counsel's disputes with Fairchild about trial strategy necessarily constitute a reasonable ground for reevaluation. See State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 162-63 (1990) (failure to cooperate with counsel in an attempt to undermine prosecution and "conduct intended to disrupt the judicial process" insufficient to require additional Rule 11 evaluation after initial determination of competency); see also State v. Salazar, 128 Ariz. 461, 462 (1981) (court has broad discretion in determining whether reasonable grounds exist to order competency hearing).
¶34 Moreover, as discussed, the trial court observed Fairchild's conduct and concluded additional competency proceedings were unnecessary. See Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 48 ("In determining whether reasonable grounds exist, a judge may rely, among other factors, on his own observations of the defendant's demeanor and ability to answer questions."). As such, the record supports the court's denial of Fairchild's motion for reevaluation of his competency. See Mendoza-Tapia, 229 Ariz. 224, ¶ 22. Accordingly, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial on that basis. See Neal, 143 Ariz. at 97; State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984) ("We are obliged to affirm the trial court's ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason."); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1.
Disposition
¶35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Fairchild's convictions and sentences.