Opinion
No. 4-352 / 03-2016.
June 9, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Jon Stuart Scoles and James M. Drew, Judges.
Lane Factor appeals from his conviction for domestic battery. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and James Tomka, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Christen Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Paul Martin, County Attorney, and Steven Tynan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Miller, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Lane Edward Factor was originally charged with domestic assault resulting in injury, third or subsequent offense. Factor denied the State's allegations and filed a notice of intent to rely on self defense as justification for the conduct underlying the charge against him. Factor subsequently entered a written guilty plea to the lesser offense of domestic abuse, an aggravated misdemeanor. After an in-court colloquy, the trial court accepted Factor's guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation. The presentence investigation report included a recommendation that Factor be sentenced to the maximum indeterminate two year term of confinement.
After receipt of the PSI, Factor filed a motion in arrest of judgment challenging the validity of his plea. Factor claimed his plea was the product of coercion by his attorney, and as a result, the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered as constitutionally and statutorily required. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied Factor's motion in arrest of judgment and motion requesting withdrawal of his guilty plea. Factor was sentenced as recommended by the PSI report, resulting in this appeal.
On appeal, Factor claims the trial court erred by denying his motions in arrest of judgment and to withdraw his plea.
II. Standard of Review
We review both a district court's decision to grant or deny a request to withdraw a guilty plea and motion in arrest of judgment for an abuse of discretion. State v. Meyers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002) (motion in arrest of judgment reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Blum, 560 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Iowa 1997) (review of ruling on request to withdraw a guilty plea is for abuse of discretion).
III. The Merits
We will not find a court abused its discretion in denying a defendant's request to withdraw a guilty plea unless the defendant shows the court's discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons which are clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Blum, 560 N.W.2d at 9. A court's refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea will be upheld where "a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandably and without fear or persuasion." Id. (quoting State v. Ramirez, 400 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Iowa 1987)).
Factor's written guilty plea included the following provisions:
18. I believe my attorney has done everything possible to counsel and assist me; I am satisfied with the advice and help given me.
19. No one has made any threats or any promises to force me to plead guilty. I am pleading guilty only because I am guilty of the charge against me.
Before the trial court accepted Factor's guilty plea, the court personally addressed Factor to ensure the plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and was supported by a factual basis. The record of that proceeding includes the following:
COURT: Mr. Factor, it would appear that it's your desire to change your plea of guilty on an amended charge of domestic abuse assault, second offense, which is an aggravated misdemeanor; is that correct?
FACTOR: Yes, that is, Your Honor.
COURT: Has that decision been made freely and voluntarily by you?
FACTOR: Yes, it has, Your Honor.
COURT: Have there been any threats or promises made in order to induce you to plead guilty?
FACTOR: No, there hasn't, Your Honor.
Contrary to those statements, Factor now claims his attorney coerced his plea by advising him that, in her opinion, his self-defense claim would ultimately fail. Both Factor and his attorney testified that the prospects of Factor's self-defense claims were thoroughly discussed before the State's plea offer was accepted.
We, like the trial court, conclude Factor's request to withdraw his guilty plea should be denied. The timing of Factor's request suggests it was premised on the prospect of significant jail time rather than any coercive conduct by his attorney. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Factor's plea was voluntary, knowing, and supported by the facts. The fact that he unwillingly or reluctantly accepted his counsel's advice regarding the strength of his defense does not mean there was overreaching of the defendant's free will and judgment. See State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 1998) (noting that "[l]awyers and other professionals often persuade clients to act upon advice which is unwillingly or reluctantly accepted").
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Factor's request to withdraw his guilty plea, and we therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.