Opinion
No. 3-010 / 01-2021.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mary E. Howes, District Associate Judge.
Evans appeals his conviction for harassment. AFFIRMED.
Gary Koos, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General, William Davis, County Attorney, and Robert Bradfield, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Evans appeals his conviction for harassment in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(b) (2001). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The evidence admitted at trial indicates Evans approached a woman in a Davenport bookstore and told her that her feet looked nice. Evans also stated he had a foot fetish since childhood. Evans then sat on the floor, removed one of the woman's sandals and began rubbing her foot. Evans also told her that he would like to photograph the woman's feet.
Evans' motions for judgment of acquittal were denied, and judgment was entered in accordance with the jury's guilty verdict. On appeal Evans challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
II. Scope of Review.
We review Evans' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Phams, 342 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1983).
III. The Merits.
The trial court's finding of guilt is binding on us unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993). Substantial evidence means such evidence that could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence we view the record in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
A person commits harassment when he or she "purposefully and without legitimate purpose has personal contact with another person with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person." Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(b); State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 2001). "Personal contact" is defined as "an encounter in which two or more people are in visual or physical proximity to each other"; physical touching or speech is not required, but may occur. Id.
Harassment is a specific intent crime. Button, 622 N.W.2d at 483. The State was accordingly required to prove Evans' personal contact with the complaining witness was with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or annoy her. Id. at 484.
As far as we know, there is no Iowa authority defining the "intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm" language of section 708.7(1)(b). In interpreting statutes we strive to discern and give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999). If the words of a statute are not defined, we give them their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. White, 563 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1997). In the absence of ambiguity, the dictionary is an accepted source for defining the common meaning of legislative language. State v. Ahitor, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1996).
The parties have confined their argument to the "intent to alarm" language of the statute. The State cites the following dictionary definition of "alarm": "sudden fear or apprehension; dismay; trepidation." New Webster's Dictionary 19 (1991). We adopt and apply this definition of "alarm" for purposes of resolving the substantial evidence issue in this case.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the law of specific intent. See State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 320-21 (Iowa 1979). Instruction Twelve states:
"Specific intent" means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind.
Because determining the defendant's specific intent requires you to decide what he was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant's specific intent. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of his acts.
The gist of Evans' claim is that no reasonable person would have been alarmed by his personal contact with the complaining witness. He argues:
The contact between [the complaining witness] and Mr. Evans was very brief and Mr. Evans was polite. [The complaining witness] never expressed any kind of disapproval, and at such time that she wanted to leave, the two of them separated. There was no attempt to restrain her at the point where it became apparent that she did not want to have the contact.
We disagree. Contrary to Evans' claims, the complaining witness testified that she was "kind of shocked" by Evans' conduct and afraid when he touched her foot. Evans' argument also ignores the implications of his effort to conceal his conduct by instructing the complaining witness not to tell her boyfriend or parents about her experience. A reasonable jury, following the court's specific intent instruction, could have found Evans' personal contact with the complaining witness was with the intent to alarm her.
The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.