Opinion
I.D. No. 9504013763.
Submitted: March 2, 2000.
Decided: May 26, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Pro Se Motion For Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
ORDER
This 26th day of May, 2000, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61, it appears to this Court that:
1. William John Evans (Defendant) has filed this pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Defendant alleges that his conviction is the result of 1) ineffective assistance of counsel and 2) no factual basis for acceptance of plea. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
2. Defendant pled was charged with Arson First Degree, Reckless Endangering First Degree and Insurance Fraud stemming from a fire at the Village of Windover apartments, which occurred on September 6, 1994. Defendant was subsequently charged with Arson Second Degree and Insurance Fraud stemming from a fire involving a 1989 Ford Ranger, which occurred on May 3, 1991. Defendant pled guilty to the first set of charges on April 1, 1998. On May 28, 1998 Defendant was sentenced. On September 23, 1999, Defendant filed this motion for postconviction relief.
3. In his motion, Defendant raises six grounds for relief. Grounds one, two, four, five, and six allege ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contends that
[Ground One] Counsel refused to obtain repeatedly requested discovery material i.e. still photos and videotape of scene. Counsel did not interview witnesses. Counsel misled defendant about settled Federal and State law, i.e. seizures and Miranda issues, proof beyond a reasonable doubt v. Corpus Delicti, Financial status as evidence.
[Ground Two] Illegal seizure interrogated without Miranda or counsel. September 04, 1994 defendant was illegally seized at the hospital, interrogated without probable cause, forced to answer leading questions. This affected defendant's choice to plead.
[Ground Four] Failure to adequately investigate/ineffective counsel. Counsel failed to adequately or independently investigate into the case. Counsel accepted the States evidence as the only evidence to base her defense. Counsel failed to investigate into governing laws that pertained to the case.
[Ground Five] Conflict of Interest/Ineffective counsel. Counsel chose to use illegally obtained statements by State to base defense and opening remarks. Statements defendant wished to have surpressed [sic].
[Ground Six] Lack of Advocacy and Zeal. Counsel chose a half hearted approach at defending [Defendant]. Counsel abandoned clients cause by advising to accept a plea after he repeatedly expressed his innocence. Counsel abandoned client by not raising suppression issues.
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3 and back of 3. Defendant also attached a memorandum to his motion with virtually the same allegations.
Ground three of Defendant's motion alleges there was no factual basis for acceptance of plea. Specifically, Defendant states that
[Ground Three] Abuse of discretion of accepting plea. Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(f) states there must be factual basis for acceptance of a plea. There was no fact that Arson was committed.
Id.
4. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show both (a) that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (b) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would be different." Since Defendant must prove both prongs in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, failure to prove either prong will render the claim unsuccessful. Defendant must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has consistently held that when setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.
Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1998) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 291 A.2d 279 (1972).
State v. Mason, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN93-02-0279-RI, Barron, J. (April 11, 1996) (Mem. Op.) at 7.
5. There is no evidence in the record which supports Defendant's allegations relating to ineffective assistance of counsel. Whenever evaluating the conduct of counsel, this Court must indulge "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable." Further, the Court must make "every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight[.]" "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.]" Any inadvertence of counsel does not amount to "cause" unless it rises to the level of ineffectiveness in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Albury, 551 A.2d at 58.
Strickland, 466 U.S. At 689.
Id. at 690.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).
This Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate how defense counsel's actions were professionally unreasonable or, in the alternative, but for defense counsel's unprofessional errors, how his sentence would have been any different. Grounds one, two, four, five, and six of Defendant's motion are denied.
6. A guilty plea may only be set aside subsequent to sentencing upon the filing of a meritorious motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In such cases, the defendant "has the burden of showing prejudice amounting to manifest injustice." It is necessary that a defendant's plea of guilty must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently. Furthermore, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by his signature on the plea form.
Allen v. State, Del. Supr., 509 A.2d 87, 88 (1986) (citing Smith v. State, Del. Supr., 451 A.2d 837, 839 (1982)).
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Fullman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 268, 1998, Christie, C.J. (Feb. 22, 1989) (Mem. Op.).
This Court finds that Defendant's allegations with respect to the validity of his guilty plea contained in ground three is not supported by any specific allegations in his motion or the supporting memorandum of law. On April 1 when the Defendant pled guilty the Court asked the Defendant
[Court] Did you fill out the guilty plea form after discussing it thoroughly and carefully with your attorney. Ms. Perillo?
[Defendant] Yes, I did.
[Court] Have you freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the plea agreement?
[Defendant] Yes, I do.
[Court] Have you reviewed with Mr. Perillo the various constitutional rights set forth on the guilty plea form?
Trial Tr. at 9-10.
The Court then made several more inquiries of Defendant and stated that "I find the guilty plea to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily offered, and it is accepted."
Id. at 15.
This Court finds that Defendants' plea of guilty was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. Ground three of Defendant's motion is denied.
7. For the reasons stated, Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.