All other jurisdictions which have addressed this particular issue hold that field sobriety tests are non-testimonial in nature and, thus, do not fall within the protective sphere of the privilege against self-incrimination. To date the Courts which have specifically found that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to field sobriety tests are: Stone v. City of Huntsville, 656 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1994); Coates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 93, 453 S.E.2d 35 (1994); Allred DiAndrea v. State, 622 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1993) (No Miranda warnings are required before requesting performance of field sobriety tests, with the exception of asking a suspect to say the alphabet backwards; the Court specifically found that test to require a testimonial response); State v. Zummach, 467 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1991); State v. Erickson, 802 P.2d 111 (Utah 1990); McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 509, 551 A.2d 875 (1989); Dixon v. State, 103 Nev. 272, 737 P.2d 1162 (1987); People v. Boudreau, 115 A.D.2d 652, 496 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1985); State v. Lombard, 146 Vt. 411, 505 A.2d 1182 (1985); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 438 N.E.2d 60 (1982); Trail v. State, 526 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn.Crim. 1975); State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 336 A.2d 244 (1975); Flynt v. State, 507 P.2d 586 (Okla.Crim.
See Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984, 987 (Fla. 1993); Commonwealth v. Conway, 368 Pa. Super. 488, 534 A.2d 541, 546-47 (1987), rev. denied, 520 Pa. 581, 549 A.2d 914 (1988). The State relies on the following cases in support of its contention that Vickers' counting and his reciting the alphabet were not testimonial: Dawkins v. State, 822 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.App. — Waco 1991), pet. ref'd percuriam, 825 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Chadwick v. State, 766 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988), aff'd, 795 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Smith v. State, 202 Ga. App. 701, 415 S.E.2d 495 (1992); Lankford v. State, 204 Ga. App. 405, 419 S.E.2d 498 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 972, 122 L.Ed.2d 127 (1993); People v. Bugbee, 201 Ill. App.3d 952, 147 Ill. Dec. 381, 559 N.E.2d 554 (1990); State v. Maze, 16 Kan. App. 2d 527, 825 P.2d 1169 (1992); State v. Zummach, 467 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1991); State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1990); and State v. Erickson, 802 P.2d 111 (Utah App. 1990) (per curiam). We do not find Chadwick, Smith, Lankford, Zummach, Fasching, or Erickson persuasive because none mentions Muniz, the case we find to be determinative of this question.
When this court exercises its option under Rule 31(f) to dispose of a case by written opinion, that opinion, if published, has the same precedential effect as other published opinions of this court. See State v. Erickson, 802 P.2d 111, 112 n. 1 (Utah App. 1990). Resolution of this appeal turns on two issues: (1) Does the theory of constructive eviction apply when the tenant remains in possession of the rented property? (2) If the constructive eviction theory does not apply, can the judgment nonetheless be affirmed on an implied warranty of habitability theory?