Opinion
No. 2-269 / 01-0932
Filed April 10, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Fredrick E. Breen, Judge.
The defendant, Eric Erickson, appeals from his conviction and sentence for OWI following his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
C. Joseph Coleman, Jr., Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, Ron Robertsen, County Attorney, and Stephen Lickiss and Ricki Williamson, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
The defendant-appellant, Eric Erickson, appeals from his conviction and sentence for OWI following his guilty plea. He claims the court erred in denying his motion in arrest of judgment. He contends his plea was involuntary because the court had not ruled on his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Erickson was charged with OWI third offense. Based on the alleged malfunction of the Intoxilyzer used in his breath test, Erickson filed a motion to suppress and hearing was set on the motion. Prior to the hearing, he withdrew the motion and agreed to plead guilty to OWI first offense. His written plea states in part, "I submit this written plea of guilty with full knowledge and waiver of my rights and I do so freely and voluntarily." During the plea colloquy, the court asked Erickson if he intended to plead and he initially responded, "I'm still contemplating." The court offered to continue the proceedings and suggested he talk with his attorney. In relating the discussion he had just had with his client, Erickson's attorney stated in part, "we're at a point, Judge, that I think rather than saying he's contemplating, I think he needs to make a decision." Erickson then stated, "I think I'm ready to go with the plea." The court, based on their conversation and the written plea, stated "I find that you're pleading guilty voluntarily; that you're doing that with the knowledge of the rights you lose by pleading guilty; and also with the knowledge of the consequences of conviction at worst." Prior to sentencing, Erickson filed a motion in arrest of judgment alleging he was hesitant at the plea hearing, he did not desire to plead guilty, he believed his motion to suppress had failed, and he should be allowed to raise the defense of the failure of the Intoxilyzer. The court analyzed the plea proceeding, determined Erickson's plea was knowing, voluntary, and without coercion or being misled, and denied the motion in arrest of judgment.
Our review of trial court's decision to grant or deny a request to withdraw a guilty plea is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998). A district court's refusal to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea will be upheld, "where a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandably and without fear or persuasion." Id. (quoting State v. Weckman, 180 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1970)). A guilty plea "waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself." Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000). From our review of the record, we conclude the district court considered the motion in arrest of judgment correctly and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
AFFIRMED.