Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0219-PR
03-13-2024
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Jon Edward Erickson, Petitioner.
Jon Edward Erickson, Eloy In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Cochise County No. CR200100103 The Honorable Timothy B. Dickerson, Judge
Jon Edward Erickson, Eloy In Propria Persona
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, JUDGE
¶1 Jon Erickson seeks review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb this ruling unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). Erickson has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Erickson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Erickson, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0012 (Ariz. App. Jan. 21, 2011) (mem. decision). Erickson has since sought and been denied post-conviction relief numerous times.
¶3 In September 2021, Erickson filed a notice of post-conviction relief, and the trial court appointed counsel. Counsel filed a notice stating he had reviewed the record but was "unable to find a colorable claim to raise in this successive" post-conviction proceeding. Erickson then filed a pro se petition indicating he was raising claims under Rule 32.1(a), (b), (c), (e), and (g). He identified twelve issues, including that his trial counsel had been ineffective for advising him he would be parole-eligible even if convicted at trial, his speedy trial and double-jeopardy rights had been violated, the state had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, he had not been properly advised pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and there had been prosecutorial and judicial misconduct.
¶4 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding Erickson's claims "were raised or could have been raised in the prior PCR proceedings and therefor[e] are precluded" and "any claim [that] is not precluded . . . does not present a colorable claim." Erickson filed a motion for rehearing, which the court denied. This petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, Erickson first argues the trial court was required to "liberally constru[e]" his claims. But "a defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney." State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 331 (1994). In any event, Erickson has not demonstrated some less stringent review of his claims would have altered the trial court's ruling. He asserts only that had the court "liberally construed [his] claims, it would have found his claims are not precluded," citing Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), for the proposition that he may raise "procedurally defaulted claims . . . if there was no post-conviction counsel or post-conviction counsel was ineffective." But Martinez does not apply to Arizona post-conviction proceedings and does not alter our longstanding rule that non-pleading defendants like Erickson are not constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See State v. Escareno-Meraz, 232 Ariz. 586, ¶ 6 (App. 2013). Thus, it provides no basis for the trial court to have addressed Erickson's constitutional claims, which were subject to preclusion under Rule 32.2. See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a). And, on review, Erickson has not identified any claim not subject to preclusion, much less argued that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing any such claim. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) (claims raised under Rule 32.1(b) through (h) not subject to preclusion on waiver ground).
¶6 We grant review but deny relief.