State v. Erickson

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Mohr

    549 N.W.2d 497 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that circuit courts must advise defendants of the presumptive minimum sentence associated with a plea

    It would simply be without any logical basis to assume that when our supreme court was mandating the need for notice of the maximum sentence, it was also deciding that any presumptive minimum sentence would not have to be communicated. We have found one case, State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972), where the supreme court examined a plea to drug charges carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of the type that appeared in our statutes prior to the 1971 repeal. But there is nothing within that decision which suggests that the court even considered whether the defendant should be informed about the minimum sentence.

  2. State v. Williams

    2003 WI App. 116 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 9 times   8 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Williams, 2003 WI App 116, ¶ 3, 265 Wis. 2d 229, 666 N.W.2d 58, the circuit court held a conference with the parties on the morning of trial.

    SeeFarrar v. State, 52 Wis.2d 651, 657, 191 N.W.2d 214, 217 (1971) ("[T]he entire sentencing process is to be a search for the truth and an evaluation of alternatives. Any advance understanding between prosecutor and defendant must not involve the trial judge . . . or court."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 481 192 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1972) ("[T]his court has firmly stated that a trial judge is not to participate in plea bargaining."); Melby v. State, 70 Wis.2d 368, 385, 234 N.W.2d 634, 643 (1975) ("[S]ince State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis.2d 478, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970), this court has made it clear that trial courts are not to participate in plea bargains."); State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶ 24, 249 Wis.2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 ("[A] sentencing court may not participate in a plea agreement."). ¶ 16.

  3. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Deladurantey (In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nathan E. Deladurantey)

    2023 WI 17 (Wis. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    ¶5 In the criminal context, a circuit court has discretion whether to accept a plea, be it a guilty plea or a no-contest plea. State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) ("... a court has discretion whether or not to officially receive or accept [guilty or no-contest] pleas ..."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 476, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972) ("The trial court earlier rejected a plea of nolo contendere [i.e., no contest], but it was within its discretion to do just that."); State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19 N.W.2d 289 (1945) ("The right of the court to refuse to accept a plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts."); Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311, 313 (1928) (a plea of nolo contendere "is received at the discretion of the court"). Although an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a civil action, rather than a criminal case, we see no reason why this rule would not also apply to a referee in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

  4. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. DeLadurantey (In re DeLadurantey)

    2023 WI 17 (Wis. 2023)

    ¶5 In the criminal context, a circuit court has discretion whether to accept a plea, be it a guilty plea or a no-contest plea. State v. Martin, 162 Wis.2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) (". . . a court has discretion whether or not to officially receive or accept [guilty or no-contest] pleas . . ."); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 476, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972) ("The trial court earlier rejected a plea of nolo contendere [i.e., no contest], but it was within its discretion to do just that."); State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 308, 19 N.W.2d 289 (1945) ("The right of the court to refuse to accept a plea is an inherent power of all criminal courts."); Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1928) (a plea of nolo contendere "is received at the discretion of the court"). Although an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a civil action, rather than a criminal case, we see no reason why this rule would not also apply to a referee in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

  5. State v. Chamblis

    2015 WI 53 (Wis. 2015)   Cited 11 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Chamblis, the defendant was advised of the correct potential punishment for the charged offense prior to entering a guilty plea. Chamblis, 362 Wis.2d 370, ¶ 1, 864 N.W.2d 806. After his plea was entered and he was sentenced, however, the State appealed, arguing that the circuit court should have considered evidence showing the defendant should have faced a more serious charge with a higher potential punishment.

    Accordingly, the general practice is to advise defendants of the minimum and maximum penalties associated with a plea. Id.; see also State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 479–80, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972) (discussing the importance of informing the defendant of the maximum penalty possible upon entry of a plea); State v. Mohr, 201 Wis.2d 693, 700, 549 N.W.2d 497 (Ct.App.1996) (holding that circuit courts must advise defendants of the presumptive minimum sentence associated with a plea). ¶ 25 A defendant's failure to understand the precise maximum punishment is not necessarily a due process violation.

  6. State v. Frey

    2012 WI 99 (Wis. 2012)   Cited 36 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Discussing "longstanding public policy" that authorizes a circuit court to consider the character of the defendant, including uncharged and unproven read-in offenses, when imposing sentence

    ¶ 49 Second, the defendant's suggestion violates the principle that circuit courts may not participate in plea bargaining. State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶ 27, 274 Wis.2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14;State v. Williams, 2000 WI 78, ¶ 26, 236 Wis.2d 293, 613 N.W.2d 132;State v. Comstock, 168 Wis.2d 915, 927, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992); State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 481, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972); State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis.2d 478, 487, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970). ¶ 50 The defendant points to State v. Conger, 2010 WI 56, ¶ 3, 325 Wis.2d 664, 797 N.W.2d 341, where the court held that a circuit court may reject a plea agreement that does not, in its view, serve the public interest.

  7. State v. Conger

    2010 WI 56 (Wis. 2010)   Cited 16 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Conger, the court rejected a plea agreement that would have reduced charges to secure the defendant's cooperation and his plea.

    ¶ 147. In State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 481, 192 N.W2d 872 (1972), the court said: Whatever may be the policies or procedures elsewhere, this court has firmly stated that a trial judge is not to participate in plea bargaining.

  8. State v. Hampton

    2004 WI 107 (Wis. 2004)   Cited 122 times   15 Legal Analyses
    Holding that circuit courts must specifically inquire as to whether defendants understand the circuit court is not bound by a plea agreement sentence recommendation, and that simply asking defendants whether they understand a waiver of rights form is not sufficient

    In Wisconsin, circuit judges do not involve themselves in plea bargaining. State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 481, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972); Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 150, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971); Statev. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 487, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970).

  9. In re Amendment of Rules of Civil & Criminal Procedure: Sections 971.07 & 971.08, Stats

    383 N.W.2d 496 (Wis. 1986)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Determining — after first referring proposed modification of rule of criminal procedure governing plea agreements to Judicial Conference of Wisconsin, and conducting survey of Wisconsin trial judges with respect to their experience with plea agreements and their views regarding the proposed rule — that proposed modification to rules of civil and criminal procedure should be rejected on the basis of established norm that " trial judge should not participate in plea bargaining"

    "The second and equally compelling reason for not entitling defendants to be told, at time of entry of plea, what sentence will probably be imposed is the rule or policy in this state against participation by judges in so-called `plea bargains.' . . ." State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 480-81, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972). In addition to interfering with the sentencing process by requiring the judge who rejects a plea agreement to determine the sentence he intends to impose without the benefit of a presentence investigation, the proposed procedure blurs the distinct roles of the executive and judicial branches of government in the operation of our criminal justice system. If the prosecutor's dispositional recommendation made pursuant to an agreement reached with the defendant is rejected, the defendant could understandably perceive the judge's subsequent declaration of an intended sentence as the judge's assuming the prosecutor's role and making a "counter offer," which the defendant could accept or, by withdrawing his plea, reject.

  10. Garski v. State

    75 Wis. 2d 62 (Wis. 1977)   Cited 37 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Garski, the defendant argued that "the trial court never informed him that it could order restitution as a condition of probation on... dismissed [read-in] charges...."

    "`(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed, . . .'" In State v. Erickson, 53 Wis.2d 474, 479, 480, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972), this court interpreted the above standards as requiring ". . . that the defendant be informed of the full range of statutorily authorized penalties for commission of the crime charged, particularly the maximum sentence possible." In Preston v. State, supra, this court held that where a trial court misinforms the defendant as to the maximum penalty in accepting a guilty plea, the court cannot then impose a greater sentence than that of which he was informed.