§

State v. Ellison

301 Or. 676 (Or. 1986)
State v. Ellison

5 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hathaway

    728 P.2d 908 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 15 times
    Finding distribution of cocaine to same undercover agent separated by four hours not same episode

    The separate prosecutions also do not violate Article I, section 12, which provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence." In State v. Ellison, 301 Or. 676, 725 P.2d 363 (1986), the defendant was stopped by the police for a traffic infraction and falsely identified himself. He was indicted for driving while suspended after his true name and license suspension were discovered. He pled guilty to the false name charge and moved to dismiss the DWS indictment. The trial court denied the motion, and we affirmed without opinion.

  2. State v. Lopez

    193 P.3d 985 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)

    Charges arise out of the same act or transaction if the alleged crimes occur simultaneously and pursue a single criminal objective. State v. Ellison, 301 Or 676, 679-80, 725 P2d 363 (1986); State v. Hathaway, 82 Or App 509, 516, 728 P2d 908 (1986). Defendant argues that "the acquisition and maintenance of drug-related paraphernalia and property was necessary to facilitate and enable defendant's drug dealing activities.

  3. State v. Cox

    178 Or. App. 426 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 2 times

    Rather, a second prosecution is for the "same offense" for the purpose of Article I, section 12, if: (1) the charges arise out of the same act or transaction; (2) the charges could have been tried in the same court; and (3) the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known of the facts relevant to the second charge at the time of the original prosecution. State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 457-58, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972) (setting out standard); State v. Ellison, 301 Or. 676, 725 P.2d 363 (1986); State v. Farley, 301 Or. 668, 672, 725 P.2d 359 (1986); State v. Hunt, 119 Or. App. 452, 851 P.2d 622 (1993). It is not disputed that the charges could have been tried in the same court or that the prosecutor knew of the facts relevant to the second charge at the time of the original prosecution.

  4. State v. Talbert

    153 Or. App. 594 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times
    In Talbert, we relied on State v. Pope, 150 Or App 457, 946 P2d 1157 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 521 (1998) and State v. Riggs, 143 Or App 427, 923 P2d 683 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 247 (1997).

    Therefore, his statutory double jeopardy challenge fails. State v. Ellison, 301 Or. 676, 679, 725 P.2d 363 (1986); State v.Wilson, 115 Or. App. 217, 221, 836 P.2d 1380 (1992); cf. Gardner, 71 Or. App. at 597 n 4 (decided before the effective date of ORS 131.525(2)). We now turn to defendant's contention that the felony hit and run prosecution violates the double jeopardy protection provided by Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.

  5. State v. Black

    749 P.2d 1185 (Or. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times
    Concluding that Mancuso was not apposite in determining whether thefts constituted a single "criminal episode" and relying on Hathaway as "more relevant authority"

    Separate prosecution for each of the second group of charges also does not violate Article I, section 12, of the Oregon constitution or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In State v. Ellison, 301 Or. 676, 725 P.2d 363 (1986), the Supreme Court determined that the defendant could be tried in separate prosecutions for driving with a suspended license and falsely identifying himself, because the two crimes had not occurred simultaneously and were motivated by two independent criminal objectives. Under similar analysis, defendants constitutional rights were not violated. The facts underlying the charges against each defendant occurred on different days and sometimes involved different participants. Also, as already noted, even though each of the thefts was inspired by the same motive (i.e., obtaining money), that does not constitute a single objective for double jeopardy analysis.