7. Post-conviction trial counsel Wilkins rendered IAC by: (a) failing to challenge Judge Carter's qualification to serve as the thirteenth juror under State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2015) (ECF No. 1-8 at PageID 76, 78-79);

In so doing, "'[t]he trial judge does not have to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution'" but "'may weigh the evidence himself as if he were a juror.'" Id. at 727 (quoting State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889, 899 (Tenn. 2015)). "A trial judge's position is in stark contrast to an appellate judge's, whose review of the case is limited to the cold written record of the trial" and who must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Stephens, 521 S.W.3d at 727.

Additionally, our supreme court has stated "a criminal defendant's right to have the trial court sit as the thirteenth juror is not constitutional in nature." State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tenn. 2015). As such, the Petitioner has failed to show that application of the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-1-305 violated his due process rights.

This court must "review a successor judge's decision about whether he can act as the thirteenth juror under a de novo standard of review." State v. Justin Ellis, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. E2011-02017-SC-R11-CD, slip op. at 22 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2015). "[T]he key factor for a successor judge to consider in her analysis of whether she can act as the thirteenth juror is the extent to which the credibility of one or more material witnesses is actually a significant aspect of the case."