Summary
In State v. Elliott, 63 Ohio Misc.2d 114, 619 N.E.2d 1247 (M.C. 1993), the trial court found that "the restraint on the defendant's movement was of the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Summary of this case from State v. TullisOpinion
No. 92-CRB-456-01.
Decided March 16, 1993.
Norman E. Brague, for the state.
Clark Weaver, for defendant.
The defendant, Charles J. Elliott, has filed a motion to suppress pursuant to Crim.R. 12. The defendant is seeking to suppress two different sets of statements made by him to police officers.
The first set of statements was made prior to the defendant being given any Miranda warnings and prior to his arrest.
The second set of statements was given after he was given the Miranda warnings and after he was arrested.
For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the first set of statements given by the defendant to the police should be suppressed, but that the second set of statements should be admitted.
Based upon the evidence, the court makes the following findings of fact pursuant to Crim.R. 12:
Late in the evening of December 21, 1992, and early in the morning of December 22, 1992, Medina County Sheriff Deputies James Sanford and Scott Phillips were on duty. At that time, the Medina County Sheriff's office received a report that a red Porsche had been stolen from a residence on Silvercreek Road in Wadsworth Township.
Deputy Sanford was dispatched to the scene and talked to an occupant at the residence. He was advised that this person, who was William Sampsel, believed that his step-brother, who is the defendant, had taken the car. This belief was based on the fact that the defendant had made threats to harm the person and property of William Sampsel.
After receiving that information, Deputy Sanford and Deputy Phillips proceeded to the address that they had been given as being where the defendant was located. That location was a residence in Wayne County and not in Medina County.
Deputy Sanford, Deputy Phillips, a Rittman Police Officer, and a State Highway Patrol officer all came to the above location. The other officers were apparently contacted by Deputies Sanford and Phillips because they believed that they could not arrest the defendant in Wayne County.
When the officers arrived at the designated location, they found the defendant hiding behind a wood pile. Upon seeing them, the defendant stood up, raised his hands, and said "I need to talk to you guys." At that point, Deputy Sanford escorted the defendant to his cruiser and the defendant got into the back seat.
The back seat of the deputy's cruiser has door handles, but they cannot be used to get out of the car unless the deputy permits it from the front seat. There is also a wire screen separating the occupants of the back seat from the occupants of the front seat.
While the defendant was in the cruiser, he told the deputies that he had gone to the house on Silvercreek Road and had pushed the red Porsche into a lake on the property. He stated that he had done this because of problems between his step-brother and himself. At the time he made these statements, he was emotionally distraught and appeared to the officers to be intoxicated. The officers' opinion was based on the fact that there was an odor of alcohol coming from him and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy.
Following those statements, the officers asked the defendant if he would come with them to Medina County. He said he would and they transported him to the Wadsworth Police Station. At the police station he was read a written explanation of his rights and a waiver of rights form. He signed the form indicating that he was waiving his rights and initialed the form beside each explanation of his rights.
Following the execution of that form, he made written and oral statements to the deputies concerning the evening's events.
Statements made by a defendant while he is in "custody" are not admissible into evidence unless the defendant has received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. In this case, then, the first issue to be decided is whether the defendant was in custody when he made the first set of statements to the deputies.
Police officers are allowed to briefly detain and question suspects whom they believe are involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. A determination of whether a defendant is in custody will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or a restraint upon the defendant's movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Warrell (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 286, 534 N.E.2d 1237.
In this case, unlike the Warrell case, supra, the court finds that the restraint on the defendant's movement was of the degree associated with a formal arrest. He was surrounded by four police officers, all of whom were armed and in uniform. He was put in the back seat of a cruiser from which he could not get out without the consent of one of the police officers, and he was separated from the police officers by a wire cage. He was, effectively, inside a mobile jail. Therefore, the statements made at that point to the police officers were made while he was in custody and the officer should have given him the warnings required by Miranda, supra, before placing him in the back seat of the cruiser.
Such a determination, however, does not resolve the issue of whether the statements taken after the defendant was formally placed under arrest and given the Miranda warnings are admissible.
In State v. McMillan (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 36, 590 N.E.2d 23, the Lorain County Court of Appeals addressed this very issue. In that opinion, the following language appears at 40-41, 590 N.E.2d at 25-26:
"As to the first argument, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a subsequent warned confession may be admissible if the prior unwarned statement was voluntary. Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 235. Where police ask questions of a suspect in custody without administering the required warnings, Miranda requires that the answers be presumed compelled, and thus the state is prohibited from using them in its case in chief. Id. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d at 237. If, however, the initial questioning is uncoercive and the responses are voluntarily made, then the second statement made after Miranda warnings may be admissible. Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1297-1298, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238."
In this case, the court finds that the initial statements made by the defendant were not coerced and, therefore, the administration of the Miranda warnings before the second set of statements were taken renders those statements admissible.
The court further finds that the fact that the defendant was intoxicated does not, in and of itself, mean that the waiver of his rights was not done voluntarily. There is no evidence that his intoxication rendered him incapable of understanding the Miranda warnings or the consequences of a waiver of his rights. Nor is there any indication that the defendant's intoxication meant that his will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Cf. State v. Dailey (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 559 N.E.2d 459.
Therefore, the motion is suppress is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above.
So ordered.