Therefore, we will consider only the "cigarette box." The defendant on oral argument in this court said that State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966), was his "fall back position." By this the defendant must have meant that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the white powder in the cigarette box was contraband.

Third, although the Court of Appeals' decision was based on its conclusion that "a thief has no protected interest in stolen property," 82 Or App at 300, the character of the effects given by defendant to the Bests, and in particular whether they were stolen, is irrelevant in this instance. Searches and seizures are separate acts calling for separate analysis. See State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 205-07, 729 P.2d 524 (1986); State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 286-88, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). The unlawfulness of which defendant complains was a search of the Best residence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, 59 Or. App. 338, 650 P.2d 1062 (1982). Judge Buttler dissented on the ground that the court had misapplied the law as stated in State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). We allowed review to consider that question and because the Court of Appeals did not have available our later decision in State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982).

In sum, the court avoided the issue by never finding a search invalid, at times straining hard to avoid doing so. Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra, which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 442 P.2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. Throughout the entire period before Mapp and Ker v. California, supra, it normally treated this issue, and all other search and seizure questions, under the Oregon Constitution alone, looking to other jurisdictions for guidance but not accepting their decisions as controlling.

This is an issue that was expressly not addressed in State v. Brown, 291 Or. 642, 634 P.2d 212 (1981), because it was not raised in the trial court or this court. The leading case on this question is State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). In that case, the defendant was arrested for public drunkenness, and a search incident to the arrest revealed a bottle containing three kinds of pills.

The presence of these tablets among one's personal belongings, without more, is simply not a reasonable basis for a warrantless seizure. An instructive case is State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966), where a police officer, in the course of lawfully searching the defendant's person for a weapon, found an unlabeled bottle containing, inter alia, white tablets. The defendant appeared to be intoxicated at the time, and the officer testified that he was suspicious of the white tablets.

However, the extent to which Katz states a principle of Oregon law is presently unsettled and, whatever the extent, it will add to, not replace, the trespass analysis. See State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57, 60, 672 P.2d 708 (1983) (application of Article I, section 9, to a person's house does not depend on showing an expectation of privacy; the purpose of Katz is to extend protection beyond what the Fourth Amendment literally protects, not to qualify unquestioned constitutional protections); State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 288-89, 422 P.2d 450 (1966) (Article I, section 9, protects property rights as well as privacy interests); State v. Ohling, supra, 70 Or App at 252 n 4. We have now followed and explained — as best we can — State v. Lowry.

These facts were sufficient cause upon which to base the officer's belief that the beer was stolen. The requirements of State v. Elkins [ 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966)] are met in this case." 249 Or at 624.

Given these circumstances, at that point the officer had probable cause to believe the powder was an illegal drug. State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). The seizure of the substance, which proved to be heroin, was lawful.

This court has often stated that "privacy" is the interest protected by Article I, section 9, against unreasonable searches but has had little occasion to further define that interest. See, e.g., State v. Tanner, supra, 304 Or at 319; State v. Owens, supra, 302 Or at 206; State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57, 60-61, 672 P.2d 708 (1983); State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 288-92, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). Nearly all of the government actions that have been challenged under Article I, section 9, have long been recognized as searches, and the court has had no difficulty equating these traditionally recognized searches with infringements of privacy interests.