Summary
construing claims against the police department as made against the City of Elizabethtown as the "proper defendant"
Summary of this case from Blair v. LoganOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-569-H.
March 23, 2010
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs, Velma M. State and Ryan Monk, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiffs name as Defendant the Elizabethtown Police Department. Plaintiffs state that they have been harassed and discriminated against by the Elizabethtown Police Department. The complaint states that Officer Turner pushed Plaintiff State for no reason when she went to see about her son. Plaintiff State then went to the County Attorney to press charges on the police officer and was told that she could not. The complaint further states that Officers Hodge and Latham have harassed her numerous times. The complaint states that officers will pull her over for no reason and harass her about her kids and that the police department dispatcher has told her that if she calls them again Plaintiffs will not get any service. An attachment to the complaint alleges that when she told the Chief of Police that Officer Hodge had told her son that if he caught him he would shoot him, the Chief of Police told her that her son was lying; that the police told Plaintiff Monk that they did not like her family; that she was told that she could not file a complaint against police officers at the police station; and that "the police disrespect us, curse us out and tell us to shut up." Plaintiffs ask for injunctive relief in the form of having the police department stop harassing them, have the police department investigated, and have better officers on the force.
Confusingly, in a section of the complaint providing additional room to name defendants, Plaintiffs listed themselves as well as the names of nine other individuals, who do not appear to be police officers and are nowhere else mentioned in the complaint. The Court finds that Plaintiffs did not intend for these other individuals to be named as defendants.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604-05. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the action is "frivolous or malicious," fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The Elizabethtown Police Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the county police department is not an entity which may be sued); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983). Rather, it is the municipality itself that is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson County Gov't, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (construing claims brought against the Jefferson County Government, the Jefferson County Fiscal Court, and the Jefferson County Judge Executive as claims against Jefferson County itself). In the instant case, the proper defendant is the City of Elizabethtown.
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, a court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Here, many of the allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. A police officer's rudeness, verbal harassment, and abusive language are not sufficient to state a constitutional claim under § 1983. See Slagel v. Shell Oil Refinery, 811 F. Supp. 378, 382 (C.D. Ill. 1993).
Second, even if some of the allegations can be liberally construed as constitutional violations, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the municipality is responsible. "[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). "[T]he touchstone of `official policy' is designed `to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.'" City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in Pembaur).
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). Simply stated, the plaintiff must "identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy." Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Frantz v. Village of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom "must be `the moving force of the constitutional violation' in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983." Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (indicating that plaintiff must demonstrate "deliberate conduct"). Plaintiffs do not identify any policy of Defendant that is the moving force of any alleged constitutional violations.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate order, dismiss the instant action.