However, our review of the application of the law to the facts is conducted de novo." State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209 (applying de novo standard of review and reversing where the trial court's admission of specific acts of decedent's violence was premised on a misapprehension of the law) (citation omitted). A misapprehension of the law upon which a court bases an otherwise discretionary evidentiary ruling is subject to de novo review.

{12} Rule 11-404(A)(1) allows the prosecution to offer evidence to rebut a criminal defendant's evidence of his good character. See State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 22, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209 (stating that where the defendant introduces evidence of a good character trait, Rule 11-404(A)(1) allows the prosecution to rebut that evidence). However, Rule 11-405 NMRA limits the manner in which the prosecution can rebut a defendant's character evidence.

“The proponent of the evidence must demonstrate its relevancy to the consequential facts, and the material issue, such as intent, must in fact be in dispute.” State v. Elinski, 1997–NMCA–117, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209,overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012–NMSC–008, 275 P.3d 110. “Evidence of other crimes than the one charged must however have a real probative value, and not just possible worth on issues of intent, motive, absence of mistake or accident,or to establish a scheme or plan.”

–44, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804; State v. McClaugherty, 2003–NMSC–006, ¶¶ 32–34, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486; State v. Gonzales, 2000–NMSC–028, ¶ 42, 129 N.M. 556, 11 P.3d 131; State v. Duffy, 1998–NMSC–014, ¶¶ 38–41, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807; State v. Ross, 1996–NMSC–031, 122 N.M. 15, 27, 919 P.2d 1080, 1092; State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 559, 874 P.2d 12, 20 (1994); State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 687, 726 P.2d 837, 841 (1986); Sanchez v. State, 103 N.M. 25, 27–28, 702 P.2d 345, 347–48 (1985); State v. Skinner, 2011–NMCA–070, ¶¶ 22–26, 150 N.M. 26, 256 P.3d 969; State v. Tom, 2010–NMCA–062, ¶¶ 17–20, 148 N.M. 348, 236 P.3d 660; State v. McClennen, 2008–NMCA–130, ¶¶ 13–15, 144 N.M. 878, 192 P.3d 1255; State v. Morales, 2002–NMCA–052, ¶¶ 24–25, 132 N.M. 146, 45 P.3d 406; State v. Barragan, 2001–NMCA–086, ¶¶ 19–20, 131 N.M. 281, 34 P.3d 1157; State v. Glasgow, 2000–NMCA–076, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 480, 10 P.3d 159; State v. Gutierrez, 1998–NMCA–172, ¶¶ 11, 13–14, 126 N.M. 366, 969 P.2d 970; State v. Elinski, 1997–NMCA–117, ¶¶ 25–27, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209; State v. Tave, 1996–NMCA–056, ¶¶ 17–18, 122 N.M. 29, 919 P.2d 1094; State v. Aragon, 116 N.M. 291, 295–96, 861 P.2d 972, 976–77 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Sansom, 112 N.M. 679, 683, 818 P.2d 880, 884 (Ct.App.

A misapprehension of the law constitutes an abuse of discretion. See State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209. For the reasons that follow, we granted the writ of superintending control and ordered the district court to dissolve the injunction issued in the case, dismiss the complaint, and remand the case to the administrative agency for further proceedings.

A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law. State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209. 1. The Videotaped Statement Was Not Admissible as a Prior Consistent Statement

{7} Nevertheless, even when we review for an abuse of discretion, "our review of the application of the law to the facts is conducted de novo." State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209. Accordingly, we may characterize as an abuse of discretion a discretionary decision that "[is] premised on a misapprehension of the law."

Additionally, the State introduced independent evidence that Martinez owned and routinely carried guns and that he distributed drugs for Gonzales on a regular basis, as well as evidence that Martinez demanded drug money from Aponte on the night of the killings while holding a shotgun. The trial court may have reasonably concluded that this other evidence would have a much greater potential for suggesting a violent character in comparison with the evidence of the prior shooting incident involving Marvin Sandoval and that, therefore, the evidence of the prior shooting did not present a substantial danger of unfair prejudice. Cf. State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 26, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209 (concluding that the erroneous admission of a prior violent act did not constitute harmless error because "there was little or no other evidence purporting to show Defendant as a violent character"). Thus, we do not believe that the trial court's decision to admit Martinez's statements to police about his involvement in the prior shooting incident can be characterized as "contrary to logic and reason."

{28} Moreover, the threshold question of whether the trial court applied the correct evidentiary rule or standard is subject to de novo review on appeal. See State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209 ("[O]ur review of the application of the law to the facts is conducted de novo."); cf. State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144-45, 870 P.2d 103, 106-07 (1994) (discussing circumstances in which mixed questions of law and fact are subject to de novo review). We realize that theAlberico-Daubert evidentiary standard gives rise to mixed questions of law and fact, and that the determination of whether to admit or exclude particular testimony under this standard may result from an inquiry that is "'essentially factual.'"

See State v. Begay, 1998-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 21-23, 125 N.M. 541, 964 P.2d 102 (discussing limits on appellate review of unpreserved evidentiary issues); Contreras, 120 N.M. at 492, 903 P.2d at 234 (1995) (same). Although we acknowledge the injustice of admitting "evidence of other bad acts merely to show the bad character of the accused[,]" State v. Elinski, 1997-NMCA-117, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209, it remains within a trial court's discretion to admit evidence of a Defendant's prior acts under Rule 11-404(B) when the State shows that such evidence is relevant to a material issue such as motive or opportunity. See generally State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 557, 874 P.2d 12, 18 (1994).