{6} On appellate review of the metro court's denial of a motion to suppress, we must determine whether the law was correctly applied to the facts. See State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162. We give deference to the metro court's determination of facts, together with all reasonable inferences arising from those facts, and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress stating: [T]he most recent case dealing with this, [State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162] . . . . [held] that we will not dispense with the requirement of individualized particularized suspicion. In this particular case, both the officers testified that . . . there was no criminal activity that was taking place.

Finally, the police officer must have a reasonable suspicion at the inception of the detention. See State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 11, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162. We reiterated and applied the foregoing principles and authorities in Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856, but cite the older cases to emphasize that these principles are embedded and well settled in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Our courts have repeatedly emphasized, "[g]uilt by association and generalized suspicions are insufficient grounds upon which to base an investigatory detention." State v. Prince , 2004-NMCA-127, ¶ 17, 136 N.M. 521, 101 P.3d 332 ; see also State v. Jones , 1992-NMCA-064, ¶ 15, 114 N.M. 147, 835 P.2d 863 (refusing to infer that "gang membership and presence in a gang activity area [were] sufficient alone to support reasonable suspicion"); In re Eli L. , 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (concluding that an officer's knowledge that juvenile was a gang member and "may have been warning other gang members that officers were present" was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Graves , 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 17, 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971 (holding that a defendant's "mere presence" at a location subject to a search warrant was insufficient to "justify the arrest or detention of a person, other than the resident, at a residence lawfully being searched"). In the absence of any additional facts suggestive of trafficking, it was not reasonable for the agents to believe that Defendant was engaging or about to engage in a narcotics exchange with the woman.

In the absence of specific and particularized incriminating information about the criminal activity that defendant is or is about to engage in, generalized suspicions and mere corroboration of innocent activity, even if it is not readily available to the general public, is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention.Id. ¶ 17; see also State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (holding that a child-defendant's mere identification as a gang member and his making a "gang whistle" and "sagging" his pants in a manner associated with gang members was not sufficient to constitute individualized reasonable suspicion to search the child). The Court, therefore, held the investigatory detention for drugs following the traffic stop unlawful and further held that this police illegality tainted the defendant's subsequent consent and any evidence discovered thereafter.

{6} The standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress is "whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party." State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). A district court's denial of a motion to suppress will not be reversed if it is supported by substantial evidence, the only exception being if the ruling was incorrectly applied to the facts.

In support of its argument, the State acknowledges that Child's mere presence at the smoker's corner prior to stepping onto the school campus does not provide the requisite individualized suspicion. See generally State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (noting that New Mexico has not dispensed with the need for individualized suspicion and affirming the lower court's determination that the actions of the defendant's companion could not be used to justify the defendant's detention); State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 3, 11, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (holding that the child's proximity to the initial reported disturbance, the child's dress in gang-attire and the child's gang-whistle, and the fact that another juvenile in the area had been found carrying a concealed weapon did not provide the necessary individualized suspicion to justify the search of the child in the school parking lot). However, the State argues that individualized suspicion is not solely dependent on Child's presence at the smoker's corner and subsequent entry onto the school campus.

In "appropriate circumstances, a police officer may detain a person in order to investigate possible criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest." State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such "circumstances must arise from the [police] officer's reasonable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken."

{21} Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Officer Gould had the authority to briefly detain Defendant in order to determine whether Defendant was the man who had harassed and stalked the victim. See State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (stating that a police officer may detain a person if the officer has "reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person stopped is or has been involved in criminal activity") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, as we have already stated, the jury was free to infer that Defendant had knowledge that Officer Gould was attempting to arrest or apprehend him from Defendant's flight through the house, out the back door, and over the fence.

Whether or not a search and seizure is unreasonable and "`violates the Fourth Amendment is judged under the facts of each case by balancing the degree of intrusion into an individual's privacy against the interest of the government in promoting crime prevention and detection.'" State v. Eli L., 1997-NMCA-109, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 205, 947 P.2d 162 (quoting State v. Jones, 114 N.M. 147, 150, 835 P.2d 863, 866 (Ct.App. 1992)). {9} Certain points are fixed in the legal landscape.