Opinion
ID No. 0108017501
Submitted: October 4, 2002
Decided: October 28, 2002
Upon Defendant's Pro Se Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea — DENIED
Upon Defendant's Court-appointed Attorneys' Motion to Withdraw as Counsel — DENIED
ORDER
Facing trial on Murder First Degree, a capital offense, and related felonies, on June 3, 2002 Defendant pleaded guilty to Murder Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and Robbery Second Degree. The latter was a lesser-included offense. When he pleaded guilty, Defendant was represented by counsel.
On August 6, 2002, the court received a single page, pro se, motion to withdraw guilty plea. The grounds presented by Defendant are, in their entirety:
1. I, the defendant, Michael A. Eley was mistaken as to my legal rights and information in relation to a trial in that a jury of reasonable men could find me guilty [sic] of the charges
2. The plea was not entered on a voluntary basis by the defendant, Michael A. Eley. I felt, I was coerced to sign the plea based on what they believed. Not as to how a jury might side. Thus causing conflict in interest.
3. After viewing their conduct in a courtroom, I find my counsel proved to be ineffective for trial arguments.
In response to Defendant's motion and taking this case's seriousness into account, the court ordered a transcript of Defendant's plea colloquy. The transcript confirms that after counsel introduced the plea agreement, upon inquiry by the court Defendant repeatedly admitted that he was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty. Further, Defendant represented to the court, in writing and in answer to the court's questioning, that no one had threatened him in order to get him to plead guilty. Defendant told the court that he had reviewed the Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form before he signed it and that he understood the enumerated rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. And the court reviewed those rights with Defendant aloud during the plea colloquy.
During the plea colloquy the following exchange occurred:
The Court: Do you understand that your case is scheduled for trial next month? It is likely — it will happen that your trial date will come and go and there will be no trial. That is one of the reasons why once this plea is entered, probably a few moments from now, from that point on it will be virtually impossible for you to back out of this plea Do you understand all of that?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Finally, the court asked Defendant: "Are you satisfied with the work [Defendant's court-appointed attorneys] have performed for you as lawyers?"
Defendant replied, "Yes." Then the following exchange occurred:
The Court: Do you understand that if you feel they have come up short in any way in looking after your interests, once this plea is entered, from then on it will be almost impossible for you to complain about any shortcomings you feel they are responsible for; do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Taking everything into account, are you satisfied that entering this plea is a knowing, voluntary and intelligent thing that you are doing?
The Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
In the proceedings leading to Defendant's guilty plea, the court became familiar with the State's potential case. According to the State, Defendant was in league with a prostitute. Apparently suffering from pangs of conscience, Defendant's confederate reported the murder to the police and she showed them to the victim's body. She told the police that before or after conducting business, Defendant attacked the victim with a brick, or similar blunt object. She further said that Defendant had chased the elderly victim, who pleaded for his life until Defendant beat him senseless and killed him. The state also was prepared to introduce Defendant's videotaped confession where he admitted that he hit the unarmed victim with a brick. In light of his confederate's eyewitness testimony and Defendant's confession, Defendant's vague claims that he was mistaken about his rights, that a jury could find him not guilty, that the plea was involuntary, that his plea was coerced and that his counsel was ineffective border on fanciful. They certainly are meritless.
If Defendant had stood for trial, he probably would be facing life in prison without parole, at best. As it stands, thanks to his counsel's efforts, Defendant has a possibility of probation after twelve years. Defendant, by his own, repeated admissions, is guilty of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. He was repeatedly informed, orally and in writing, about the rights he gave up by pleading guilty. Like he told the court, orally and in writing, no one coerced him into pleading guilty. And he was warned repeatedly that the court would not be sympathetic to his attempt to back out of the plea, especially based on after-the-fact complaints about his lawyers.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's undated motion to withdraw guilty plea, received on August 6, 2002 is DENIED. Because of Defendant's motion and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant's court-appointed attorneys have asked to withdraw as counsel. At sentencing, the court will allow Defendant to act as co-counsel with his court-appointed attorneys. Meanwhile, Defendant's attorneys frequently are called upon to represent clients who do not appreciate their lawyers' efforts. That comes with the territory for assistant public defenders. The court has no doubt that Defendant's counsel have no disabling conflict of interest simply because Defendant has accused them of being ineffective. In any event, as provided above, Defendant shall be allowed to act as his own counsel along with this court-appointed attorneys at sentencing, which shall be held on November 8, 2002 at 1:15 p.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED.