"Although the trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on the relevancy of evidence . . . its rulings will be reversed if the court has abused its discretion or where injustice appears to have been done." State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 393, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987); State v. Smith, 198 Conn. 147, 157, 502 A.2d 874 (1985). Had the trial court been correct in its conclusions, this evidence would not have been barred by General Statutes 54-86f as that statute excludes only the introduction of "evidence of sexual conduct."
“We have recognized consistently that a defendant has a right to introduce evidence that indicates that someone other than the defendant committed the crime with which the defendant has been charged. State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 401, 631 A.2d 238 (1993); State v. Hernandez, [224 Conn. 196, 202, 618 A.2d 494 (1992) ]; State v. Echols, [203 Conn. 385, 392, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987) ]. The defendant must, however, present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime.... State v. Hernandez, supra [at], 202 . It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime ... nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused.... State v. Echols, supra [at], 392 .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cerreta, supra, 260 Conn. at 262–63, 796 A.2d 1176.
"Both this state and other jurisdictions have recognized that a defendant may introduce evidence which indicates that a third party, and not the defendant, committed the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . The defendant, however, must show some evidence which directly connects a third party to the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime . . . nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused. State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 392 [ 524 A.2d 1143 (1987)] . . . State v. Milner, 206 Conn. 512, 517 [ 539 A.2d 80] (1988)." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
He also testified that he knew of the difficulty involved in succeeding in an appeal from a judge's ruling on relevancy because such a ruling will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 393, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987). In State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 393, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987), our Supreme Court held that "the trial court has wide discretion in its ruling on the relevancy of evidence; State v. McClendon, [ 199 Conn. 5, 8, 505 A.2d 685 (1956)]; State v. Deforge, 194 Conn. 392, 396, 480 A.2d 547 (1984); its rulings will be reversed if the court has abused its discretion or where injustice appears to have been done.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Cerreta , supra, 260 Conn. at 262, 796 A.2d 1176, citing State v. Hernandez , 224 Conn. 196, 202, 618 A.2d 494 (1992) (evidence of threat by third party), and State v. Echols , 203 Conn. 385, 392–94, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987) (evidence that third-party lookalike committed similar crime in same vicinity). By contrast, in State v. West , supra, 274 Conn. at 610, 877 A.2d 787, this court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain forensic evidence recovered from a crime scene.
There is no requirement that the petitioner specifically name the alleged third party perpetrator. See State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 389, 393-94, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987) (trial court improperly excluded evidence of third party look-alike despite unknown identity). In addition, we conclude that in circumstances that largely involve a credibility contest, as did the petitioner's trial, "the testimony of neutral, disinterested witnesses is exceedingly important."
Third party suspect evidence is admissible if it directly connects the third party to the crime. State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 392, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987). It is not enough [however] to show that another had the motive to commit the crime . . . nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . State v. Hernandez, supra [202].
The restrictions placed on third party culpability evidence are concerned primarily with reliability and, in essence, seek to ensure that a defendant does not introduce tenuous evidence of third party culpability in an attempt to divert from himself the evidence of guilt. See State v. Hernandez, 224 Conn. 196, 202, 618 A.2d 494 (1992); State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 392-93, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987). Those same concerns do not exist under the circumstances of this case, where the evidence the defendant sought to introduce was reliable, physical evidence that had undergone the rigors of forensic analysis.
The trial court is vested with wide discretion when considering whether evidence is relevant in a particular case. See State v. Boles, 223 Conn. 535, 549, 613 A.2d 770 (1992); State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 392, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987); see also State v. Kulmac, supra, 230 Conn. 54 (evidence of prior sexual conduct of victim that would be inadmissible under other provisions of statute admissible if otherwise so relevant and material to critical issue in case that excluding it would violate defendant's constitutional rights). Consequently, whether the record supports a defendant's offer of proof on the admissibility of a complainant's prior sexual conduct is a matter to be determined by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.
We agree. "Both this state and other jurisdictions have recognized that a defendant may introduce evidence which indicates that a third party, and not the defendant, committed the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . The defendant, however, must show some evidence which directly connects a third party to the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime . . . nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . State v. Echols, 203 Conn. 385, 392, 524 A.2d 1143 (1987); State v. Milner, [supra, 206 Conn. 517]. The admissibility of evidence of third party culpability is governed by the rules relating to relevancy. State v. Echols, supra, 393; State v. Giguere, 184 Conn. 400, 405-406, 439 A.2d 1040 (1981).