State v. Eaves

5 Citing cases

  1. Battle v. Rocky Mount

    156 N.C. 329 (N.C. 1911)   Cited 15 times

    The meaning of the statute is clear, and where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for (334) construction, and the intention must be gathered from the words employed. U.S. v. Wittsberger, 5 Wheat., 76; U.S. v. Harlwill, 6 Wall., 386; S. v. Barco, 150 N.C. 792, 796; Fortune v. Comrs., 140 N.C. 322; S. v. Eaves, 106 N.C. 752; Adams v. Turrentine, 30 N.C. 147, 150. "The meaning and intention of the Legislature (and its will) must be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself; for it must be presumed that the means employed are adequate to the purpose, and do express that will correctly." Black Int. of Laws (1896), sec. 25; U.S. v. Goldberg, 169 U.S. 96; Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 421. As a corollary of the foregoing proposition, it follows, that "If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single definite and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the Legislature intended to convey.

  2. State v. Downs

    21 S.E. 689 (N.C. 1895)   Cited 15 times
    In S. v. Downs, 116 N.C. 1064 (quoted and approved S. v. McLean, 121 N.C. 589; Barber v. Justice, 138 N.C. 20), we said that the ignorance of law by counsel would not be an excuse for a client, for if it were, "the more ignorant counsel could manage to be, the more he might be in demand.

    The added word "Methodist" in the indictment is simply harmless surplusage or immaterial variance. S. v. Eaves, 106 N.C. 752. There is nothing tending to show that there was any ambiguity or more than one Bethel Church in the county as in S. v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, or that the defendants were in any wise prejudiced in their defense or misled as to the church which was meant. It was not necessary that the indictment should specify the kind of spirituous liquor sold. That was a matter of evidence.

  3. Harris v. Scarborough

    110 N.C. 232 (N.C. 1892)   Cited 9 times

    If a statute appears upon its face to have been framed with the intent to prevent fraudulent registration, or, in case of failure to accomplish that object, at all events to detect and punish the crime of illegal voting, it is within the purview of the law-making power to pass it. Every presumption is in favor of its validity and of the good faith of the body that enacted it. S. v. Moore, 104 N.C. 717; Powell v. Commissioners, 114 Penn. St., 265; S. v. Eaves, 106 N.C. 752; Brown v. Brown, 103 N.C. 213; Randall v. R. R., 107 N.C. 752. Judge Cooley says: "All such reasonable regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the Legislature important to the preservation of order in elections to guard against fraud, undue influence and oppression, and to preserve the purity of the ballot box, are not only within the constitutional power of the Legislature, but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essential."

  4. Sherrill v. Conner

    12 S.E. 588 (N.C. 1890)   Cited 3 times

    Counsel contended, on the argument, that this is a case in which the court should construe the word "may" in the statute as intended by the Legislature to mean "shall". It would, very obviously, be not only judicial legislation, but a repeal of a law passed by the General Assembly in 1883, were we, by the construction insisted on, to strike out the amendment, and restore the provision of the old statute of Gloucester as to the amount of damage for which judgment must be given. Even in England the courts have never gone so far in the liberal construction of statutes. Parke, B., in Jones v. Harrison, 6 Exch., 332. Where the Legislature expresses its intent in unequivocal terms, the courts must give effect to it by interpretation, without regard to other rules of construction. Bank v. Hole, 59 N.Y. 53; Chapin v. Crusen, 31 Wis. 209; S. v. Eaves, 106 N.C. 752. It was not error in the judge below to exercise his discretion as to giving judgment for single or treble damages. No error.

  5. Randall v. R. R

    107 N.C. 748 (N.C. 1890)   Cited 11 times

    Adams v. Turrentine, supra. In S. v. Eaves, 106 N.C. 752, the principle was laid down that, where the language of the Legislature is clear, the courts will not look into the motive or purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of the law. Justice Merrimon, delivering the opinion in Brown v. Brown, 103 N.C. 213, says: "What is called the policy of the Legislature, in respect to particular enactments, is too uncertain a ground upon which to found the judgment of the Court in the interpretation of statutes, especially when they are clear, unequivocal and absolute in their terms and expressed purpose."