Opinion
No. 78-191
Decided October 30, 1978
Motor Vehicles — Habitual Offender Proceedings — Restoration of Privilege To Operate Where statute provides that following a finding that a person is a habitual offender the court shall direct the person not to operate a motor vehicle, and another statute requires a mandatory period of revocation of at least four years from the effective date of the order before a person may petition for restoration of his privilege to operate, restoration of such privilege is an administrative function required by statute and not one involving judicial discretion, such as suspension of a fine or other sentence. RSA 262-B:5 IV, :8.
Thomas D. Rath, attorney general, and Anne E. Cagwin, assistant attorney general (Deborah J. Cooper orally), for the State.
Richard G. Smith, of Jaffrey, filed no brief.
MEMORANDUM
Defendant was found to be a habitual motor vehicle offender following a hearing before the Hillsborough County Superior Court. The trial court ordered defendant not to operate a motor vehicle for six months from the date of its order. This order was later amended to provide for a twelve-month revocation. The State seasonably excepted to the court's order and the matter was transferred here by Loughlin, C.J.
RSA 262-B:5 IV provides that following a finding that a person is a habitual offender the court shall direct the person not to operate a motor vehicle. The period of revocation is governed by RSA 262-B:6 which requires a mandatory lapse of at least four years from the effective date of the order before a person may petition for restoration of his privilege to operate. RSA 262-B:8. Restoration of this privilege is an administrative function required by statute and not one involving judicial discretion, such as suspension of a fine or other sentence. See State v. Greenwood, 115 N.H. 117, 119, 335 A.2d 644, 646 (1975).
Exception sustained; order vacated, remanded.