Opinion
No. 5-071 / 04-0485
Filed February 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Nancy Baumgartner (motion to suppress) and Jane Spande (trial), District Associate Judges.
Gary Eldon Dvorak appeals his conviction, following jury trial, for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. AFFIRMED.
Richard Zimmermann of Arenson Zimmermann, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Harold L. Denton, County Attorney, and Angie Wilson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Gary Eldon Dvorak appeals his conviction, following jury trial, for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was not reasonable cause to justify the stop of his vehicle and the court did not make adequate findings of fact. We affirm.
The record reveals the following facts. Officer Shawn Hall was patrolling southbound on 16th Street in Cedar Rapids when he observed a pickup truck sitting at a stop sign at the intersection of 16th Street N.E. and E Avenue. Officer Hall testified that instead of remaining stopped at the stop sign the pickup truck pulled out and turned left in front of Hall even though Hall was only four to five car lengths away traveling at approximately twenty-five miles per hour. Hall stated he had to brake in order to avoid a collision with the truck. It was later discovered that the defendant, Gary Dvorak, was the driver of the truck.
Officer Hall followed the truck for three to four blocks while he ran the plates. He then turned on the top lights of his squad car in the 100 block of 16th Street N.E. Dvorak did not pull over immediately, but continued on 16th Street to First Avenue and turned right on First Avenue. At that point Hall activated his siren and Dvorak continued slowly on First Avenue, turned onto 15th Street, and pulled over. Hall testified the only reason he stopped Dvorak was because he had pulled out in front of him on 16th Street causing Hall to brake to avoid a collision. He stated he did not observe any other traffic infractions or reasons for stopping Dvorak.
Dvorak was charged, by trial information, with OWI, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). He was also charged in a separate case with failing to yield, in violation of section 321.322. He filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of all evidence gathered as a result of the traffic stop, contending Officer Hall did not have reasonable cause to stop his vehicle. Following hearing the trial court denied the motion. In doing so it found two independent traffic violations justifying the stop, the failure to yield relied on by Officer Hall, and Dvorak's failure to yield to an emergency vehicle with its emergency lights on.
Although the trial court cited no statutory provision concerning failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, it appears the court was in all likelihood referring to Iowa Code section 321.324.
The case proceeded to jury trial on the OWI charge and the jury found Dvorak guilty as charged. At sentencing Dvorak pled guilty to the charge of failure to yield in violation of section 321.322 and that charge is not at issue in this appeal.
Dvorak challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. This challenge is based on his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United Stated Constitution. We review this constitutional question de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001).
To justify a traffic stop, an officer need only have reasonable, not probable, cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W .2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996); State v. Godfrey, 491 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). We judge the reasonableness of the stop by an objective standard. State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1996).
For Fourth Amendment purposes, the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivation of the individual officer involved. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 97-98 (1996). In Whren, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given. Id. at 813-16, 116 S. Ct. at 1775-76, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 98-100. The Court concluded that, because the officers had probable cause to stop, it made no difference that the officers' traffic-violation ground for approaching the vehicle was pretextual. Id. at 812-13, 116 S. Ct. at 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 97-98. Our supreme court has followed Whren in vehicle-stop cases based on probable cause. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa 2000) ( abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001)); Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 205. Reasonable cause, not the motivation of the arresting officer, determines whether the stop is valid. See Predka, 555 N.W. 2d at 206.
It is well settled that a traffic violation, however minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop a motorist. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d at 562. In this case, we agree with the district court that there was reasonable cause to stop Dvorak for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle with its emergency lights on in violation of Iowa Code section 321.324. It is irrelevant for purposes of the objective test we use in determining the reasonableness of traffic stops that this was not the reason Officer Hall expressed for pulling him over. Accordingly, we conclude the district court was correct in finding there was a reasonable cause for the stop.
Dvorak's second contention, that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact, only relates to the credibility findings which would have been necessary to determine if Dvorak in fact pulled out in front of Officer Hall in violation of section 321.322. Because we have determined there was a second objectively reasonable cause for the traffic stop based on Dvorak's violation of section 321.324, we need not and do not address the question of the adequacy of the district court's findings of fact concerning the other possible ground for the stop.