Opinion
A19-0833
05-17-2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kristi Lee Durschmidt, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Carlotta Navarrette, Assistant County Attorney, Marshal, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn . R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Reversed and remanded
Smith, John, Judge Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-18-1029 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Carlotta Navarrette, Assistant County Attorney, Marshal, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. --------
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We reverse the denial of appellant's petition for postconviction relief because there was sufficient reason to doubt appellant's competency thereby denying her right to a fair trial. We remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 2018 the state charged appellant Kristi Lee Durschmidt with two counts of violating a harassment restraining order. Appellant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings on these charges. After a one-day jury trial in March 2019, the jury found appellant guilty of both charges and the district court sentenced her to a stayed term of 90 days in jail. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. We granted her motion to stay this appeal and remanded jurisdiction to the district court for postconviction proceedings.
Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief in district court, seeking to have her convictions vacated or set aside on two grounds. First, appellant alleged that her due-process right to a fair trial was violated because there was reason to doubt her competency to stand trial and a competency evaluation was not conducted. Second, appellant alleged that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her public defender did not move for an evaluation of her competency to stand trial. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on appellant's petition for postconviction relief. Testimony established the following facts.
When appellant was preparing for trial, she told her attorney that she has been tortured as a targeted individual since 2001 and that there was evidence of this in her medical reports and in a report from a private investigator. At trial, during the sentencing hearing and at the evidentiary hearing, appellant maintained that she is a targeted individual. Appellant testified that a targeted individual is someone that the perpetrator does "a multiple host of things" to so that the perpetrator can "get [the target] to commit suicide." Appellant believes that she is being targeted by "the sheriff and the police," "neighbors," and "Boeing Research" through poisoned food, "smart dust," "microchips," "radiation," "microwaves," "ELF waves" and by having her cats killed. Appellant also believes that she is under surveillance and that both a camera on a light pole outside her home and a lens that is physically in her eye are recording her. Appellant also maintains a YouTube channel to provide health tips to other targeted individuals and to expose how the government is "covertly killing people."
Appellant testified at the evidentiary hearing that she understands how a trial proceeds and that a defendant in a criminal case is innocent until proven guilty, that the role of the jury is to decide whether a defendant is guilty based on the evidence presented, that the role of the judge is to "be fair and balanced and hear both sides and submit in any evidence that is relevant to the matter." Appellant further testified that the role of the prosecutor is to "treat both sides fair and equal and not just try to prosecute somebody," and that her attorney's role is to defend her "in every way possible with full and fair information. . . ."
Yet, when asked whether appellant believed the district court judge was involved in targeting her, appellant stated, "I don't know her. Just like they don't know where I am and what I did every minute, I don't know what she does every minute and where she's at, and what her feelings are." When asked whether appellant believed the police officer that testified against her was involved in targeting her she stated, "They are involved in it. They're definitely highly trained in it, they're working out of infusion centers." Appellant also testified she was not sure whether the prosecutor was targeting her and she did not believe that her attorney was involved in her being targeted.
Appellant's trial attorney testified he met with appellant between four and five times to discuss her case and he disagreed with appellant on what was the best defense to present. Appellant wanted to present a defense that she was a targeted individual but her attorney "determined that it was not a valid defense to whether or not she committed the offense of violating a Harassment Restraining Order." Appellant's attorney also testified even though appellant disagreed with him on defense strategy, she could consult with him and participate in her own defense, and he did not observe appellant have any outbursts or behave in a strange or irrational manner. Her attorney, however, testified he believes appellant has "mental health issues." Despite this belief, he did not consult a medical professional regarding appellant's claim that she is a targeted individual, did not view her YouTube channel, and did not follow up with the authors of the reports appellant gave to him because he determined the reports were illegitimate.
The attorney did discuss appellant's mental health with the prosecutor and stated that he thinks that appellant is "a 19.5—a Rule 19.5," which he testified meant appellant has mental health issues but remains competent to stand trial. The attorney also discussed appellant's mental health with the district court judge in chambers. And he testified that based on his interactions and conversations with appellant, her demeanor in court, because she was able to "discuss whether or not she committed the offenses," and because there was no sign she did not understand the criminal proceedings, he did not request a rule 20.01 competency evaluation.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief. Appellant moved to reinstate her appeal, and we granted her motion.
DECISION
Appellant's due-process right to a fair trial was violated.
Appellant argues that the postconviction court erred by finding her due-process right to a fair trial was not violated when the district court and the respective attorneys failed to inquire into her competency. "A defendant has a due[-]process right not to be tried [and] convicted of a criminal charge if he or she is legally incompetent." Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903 (1975)). The district court has a duty to protect the right of the defendant "not to be tried or convicted while incompetent." Id. (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2). Whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency, rule 20.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the district court to raise the issue. The failure "to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent" deprives a defendant of her due-process right to a fair trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 95 S. Ct. at 904; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386, 86 S. Ct. 836, 842 (1966). If a defendant is denied her due-process right to a fair trial, we will vacate her convictions and remand the case for a new trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 95 S. Ct. at 909; Pate, 383 U.S. at 386, 86 S. Ct. at 842; State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 792 (Minn. 2006).
Whether adequate procedures were observed is a separate inquiry from whether the defendant was actually competent. Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 718. Here, appellant challenges only the adequacy of the procedures observed. We determine the adequacy of the procedures observed by considering only whether further inquiry into the defendant's competence was warranted. State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 1976). Specifically, we "review the record to determine whether the district court gave proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence" in concluding that there was not sufficient doubt of the defendant's competence that required further inquiry. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 174 (Minn. 1997).
Appellant argues her delusional behavior that "she documented in her YouTube series, expressed to defense counsel, espoused in trial in the presence of the jury, and expressed to the court at sentencing" was a sufficient reason to doubt her competency and warranted a rule 20 evaluation. We agree. Throughout the duration of this case, appellant maintained she has been a targeted individual for decades and stated the government and private citizens were torturing her by placing foreign objects in her body, poisoning her food, killing her cats, recording her, and trying to get her to commit suicide. Appellant, moreover, expressed her suspicion in open court that the district court judge and prosecutor are involved in the targeting she experiences. And we note while appellant was described as a "Rule 19.5," 19.5 rounds up to 20.
The record contains ample evidence showing further inquiry into appellant's competency was warranted. Because further inquiry was not conducted, appellant was deprived her due-process right to a fair trial. We therefore reverse appellant's convictions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Having concluded appellant was denied her due-process right to a fair trial, we need not reach her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Reversed and remanded.