State v. Dupuy

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Halford

    327 So. 3d 1004 (La. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 4 times

    "Where there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential." State v. Dupuy , 319 So.2d 294, 298 (La. 1975) (citing State v. Pizzolotto , 209 La. 644, 651-52, 25 So.2d 292, 295 (1946) ). Whether a particular communication is protected as confidential is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.

  2. State v. Lilly

    111 So. 3d 45 (La. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 36 times
    In Lilly, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2) and was sentenced to thirty-five years at hard labor.

    “Where there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential.” State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294, 298 (La.1975) (citing State v. Pizzolotto, 209 La. 644, 25 So.2d 292 (1946)). However, in the instant case, the trial court found that the calls were not protected by the privilege because there was notice that the calls were subject to recording and monitoring.

  3. State v. Lee

    559 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1990)   Cited 131 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding uncle-nephew relationship between prospective juror and arresting officer (who testified at suppression hearing but not expected to testify at resentencing hearing) did not warrant challenge for cause, absent evidence that the relationship influenced the prospective juror’s ability to make a decision

    Only if that relationship would influence the juror in his decision should the challenge be granted. State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this instance. Nor did the judge's comment so prejudice this juror against the defendant as to warrant excusing him for cause.

  4. State v. Narcisse

    426 So. 2d 118 (La. 1983)   Cited 211 times
    Stabbing death of elderly woman

    Where there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential. State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Pizzolotto, 209 La. 644, 25 So.2d 292 (1946). In State v. Dupuy, supra, this court addressed a similar situation.

  5. State v. Carthan

    377 So. 2d 308 (La. 1979)   Cited 79 times
    In State v. Carthan, 377 So.2d 308 (La.1979), the prospective juror had known the State's attorney since high school, considered him a friend, and saw him from time to time at social events.

    We are unable to say that the refusal to excuse this juror for cause was an abuse of discretion granted to the trial judge in determining whether the relationship would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Richmond, 284 So.2d 317 (La. 1973). Assignment of Error No. 3 is without merit.

  6. State v. Qualls

    353 So. 2d 978 (La. 1978)   Cited 53 times

    We cannot say that his failure to excuse her was an abuse of his discretion. C.Cr.P. 797(2) and (3); State v. Wilkerson, 326 So.2d 353 (La. 1976); State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Blanton, 312 So.2d 329 (La. 1975). This assignment has no merit.

  7. State v. Gray

    351 So. 2d 448 (La. 1977)   Cited 55 times
    In State v. Gray, 351 So.2d 448 (La. 1977), this court reviewed the defendant's conviction and life sentence for aggravated rape.

    We cannot say that the failure to excuse these jurors was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. C.Cr.P. 797(3); State v. Dupuy 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Blanton, 312 So.2d 329 (La. 1975); State v. James, 305 So.2d 514 (La. 1974). Prospective juror John R. Graf, Sr. was challenged because of the following opinion expressed on voir dire:

  8. State v. Bell

    346 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1977)   Cited 58 times
    In Bell as in the present case, the defendant failed to point out any particular words or conduct demonstrating bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge.

    To be entitled to a change of venue, the defendant must prove that there is such prejudice in the collective mind of the community that a fair trial is impossible. La.C.Cr.p. art. 622; State v. Smith, 340 So.2d 222 (La. 1976); State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208 (La. 1976); State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157 (La. 1976); State v. Berry, 329 So.2d 728 (La. 1976); State v. Dillard, 320 So.2d 116 (La. 1975); State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975). Whether the defendant has made the requisite showing is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

  9. State v. Ford

    336 So. 2d 817 (La. 1976)   Cited 31 times
    In State v. Ford, 336 So.2d 817, 821 (La. 1976), we held specifically that even the acts of pointing to and selecting a photograph constitute such assertive conduct and that testimony about these acts is hearsay, "an assertive communication introduced for the truth of the assertion thereby made."

    La.C.Cr.P. arts. 621, 622. See, e.g.: State v. Stewart, La., 325 So.2d 819 (1976); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La. 1975); State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Flood, 301 So.2d 637 (La. 1974); State v. Leichman, 286 So.2d 649 (La. 1973); State v. Richmond, 278 So.2d 17 (La. 1973). The trial court correctly denied a change of venue.

  10. State v. Dupuy

    319 So. 2d 299 (La. 1975)   Cited 10 times
    In State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 299 (La. 1975), This court similarly held that the consent of a spouse to search "jointly owned and controlled premises permits a warrantless search."

    The showing made does not convince us that the trial court abused its discretion in either instance. See State v. Depuy, 319 So.2d 294 (rendered this date), wherein we discussed in more detail the evidence for a change of venue of both prosecutions. (No other evidence is in the present record).