"Where there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential." State v. Dupuy , 319 So.2d 294, 298 (La. 1975) (citing State v. Pizzolotto , 209 La. 644, 651-52, 25 So.2d 292, 295 (1946) ). Whether a particular communication is protected as confidential is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.
“Where there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential.” State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294, 298 (La.1975) (citing State v. Pizzolotto, 209 La. 644, 25 So.2d 292 (1946)). However, in the instant case, the trial court found that the calls were not protected by the privilege because there was notice that the calls were subject to recording and monitoring.
Only if that relationship would influence the juror in his decision should the challenge be granted. State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this instance. Nor did the judge's comment so prejudice this juror against the defendant as to warrant excusing him for cause.
Where there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential. State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Pizzolotto, 209 La. 644, 25 So.2d 292 (1946). In State v. Dupuy, supra, this court addressed a similar situation.
We are unable to say that the refusal to excuse this juror for cause was an abuse of discretion granted to the trial judge in determining whether the relationship would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Richmond, 284 So.2d 317 (La. 1973). Assignment of Error No. 3 is without merit.
We cannot say that his failure to excuse her was an abuse of his discretion. C.Cr.P. 797(2) and (3); State v. Wilkerson, 326 So.2d 353 (La. 1976); State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Blanton, 312 So.2d 329 (La. 1975). This assignment has no merit.
We cannot say that the failure to excuse these jurors was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. C.Cr.P. 797(3); State v. Dupuy 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Blanton, 312 So.2d 329 (La. 1975); State v. James, 305 So.2d 514 (La. 1974). Prospective juror John R. Graf, Sr. was challenged because of the following opinion expressed on voir dire:
To be entitled to a change of venue, the defendant must prove that there is such prejudice in the collective mind of the community that a fair trial is impossible. La.C.Cr.p. art. 622; State v. Smith, 340 So.2d 222 (La. 1976); State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208 (La. 1976); State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157 (La. 1976); State v. Berry, 329 So.2d 728 (La. 1976); State v. Dillard, 320 So.2d 116 (La. 1975); State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975). Whether the defendant has made the requisite showing is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
La.C.Cr.P. arts. 621, 622. See, e.g.: State v. Stewart, La., 325 So.2d 819 (1976); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La. 1975); State v. Dupuy, 319 So.2d 294 (La. 1975); State v. Flood, 301 So.2d 637 (La. 1974); State v. Leichman, 286 So.2d 649 (La. 1973); State v. Richmond, 278 So.2d 17 (La. 1973). The trial court correctly denied a change of venue.
The showing made does not convince us that the trial court abused its discretion in either instance. See State v. Depuy, 319 So.2d 294 (rendered this date), wherein we discussed in more detail the evidence for a change of venue of both prosecutions. (No other evidence is in the present record).