Opinion
I.D. No. 0106006383
Submitted: November 12, 2002
Decided: November 13, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 30th day of January, 2003, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On May 2, 2002, Defend ant, Michael Duke, pleaded guilty to Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and three counts of first degree Reckless Endangerment. On July 12, 2002, the Court sentenced Defendant to a total of five years Level 5 incarceration, suspended after two years for probation.
(2) Defendant has now filed the above-captioned Motion for Postconviction Relief. In support of his motion, Defendant lists as grounds for relief: illegal search and seizure, coerced confession, coerced guilty plea, "suppression of favorable evidence," and ineffective assistance of counsel. This is Defendant's first motion for postconviction relief and the Court has determined that none of the procedural bars listed in Rule 61 are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's motion.
(3) In his first ground for relief, illegal search and seizure, Defendant claims that police illegally searched his girlfriend's apartment. His second ground for relief, coerced confession, alleges that detectives coerced his confession by threatening him with jail time if he did not confess. The Court need not determine whether Defendant's claims are credible. By pleading guilty, Defendant waived his Constitutional trial rights, including the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him. As a result, the Court finds that Defendant's first two grounds for relief are without merit.
State v. Jones, 1990 WL 18267 (Del.Supr. 1990).
(4) Defendant's third ground for relief alleges that his attorney coerced his guilty plea by using his feelings for his family against him. However, on his guilty plea form, Defendant indicated that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the plea agreement, that no one had promised him anything not stated in the plea agreement, and that no one, including his attorney, threatened or forced him to enter the plea. Defendant averred that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation of him and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of the guilty plea. Review of the guilty plea colloquy transcript also supports the Court's finding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's third ground for relief also is without merit.
(5) Defendant lists as his fourth ground for relief, "suppression of favorable evidence." Defendant claims that he told his attorney about an illegal search and that his attorney told him that he would get the evidence seized suppressed. Defendant's claim is, in reality, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(6) A criminal defendant who raises an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that the attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards so that such conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. A defendant must be able to show that "[t]here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." (7) As set forth above, by pleading guilty, Defendant waived his constitutional trial rights, including the right to challenge the admissibility of any evidence seized by police. Therefore, even if the Court were to assume that a motion to suppress evidence would have been successful, given Defendant's guilty plea, Defendant has failed to show that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Therefore, Defendant's fourth ground for relief also is without merit.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 669.
(8) Defendant's final ground for relief also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims that he was taken advantage of because he "did not know the process a case went through in the court system." Defendant claims that he should not have waived his preliminary hearing and that his public defenders were not "looking for [his] best interests ." Upon review of Defendant's guilty plea form and his plea colloquy transcript, the Court cannot find that Defendant has presented any evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant indicated that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of the guilty plea. Defendant indicated that he read and understood all the information contained in the guilty plea form. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's final ground for relief also is without merit.
Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record in this case that Defendant is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.