Opinion
C.A. No.# ID# 84006719D1
Submitted: September 22, 2000
Decided: December 1, 2000
Dear Mr. Duffy:
Pending before the Court is the motion of defendant Charles Duffy, Sr. ("defendant") for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61") as well as pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4504. Relief is denied for the reasons set forth below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December, 1984, defendant was indicted on ten charges, including a charge of rape in the first degree. On July 8, 1985, defendant pled guilty to the charge of rape in the first degree, whereby he conceded that the State of Delaware ("the State") had sufficient evidence to prove the charge, but he was unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the crime. Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 291 A.2d 279 (1972). The State nolle prossed the remaining nine charges. Defendant was sentenced, beginning June 18, 1984, to imprisonment for the balance of his natural life; the first twenty years of this term of imprisonment were not subject to suspension, probation, or parole.
On October 9, 1985, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, he alleged the plea was not voluntary, his conviction was obtained by use of a coerced confession, his conviction was obtained by use of evidence unlawfully seized, the prosection withheld favorable evidence from him, and he was denied his right to effective counsel. On December 6, 1985, he filed a motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea on the ground that his appointed attorney was incompetent and ineffective. By letter dated April 11, 1986, the Superior Court denied all petitions which defendant had filed. State v. Duffy, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. S84-11-0037, Tease, J. (April 11, 1986)
The postconviction relief motions filed in 1986 and 1987 were filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35. Effective January 1, 1988, Rule 61 replaced Rule 35. Bover v. State, Del. Supr., 562 A.2d 1186 (1989). Defendant's motions filed after January 1, 1988 have been filed pursuant to Rule 61.
Defendant filed an appeal from the April 11, 1986 order. The Supreme Court examined defendant's claims. Duffy v. State, Del. Supr., 513 A.2d 1318 (1986). It held that the claim his plea was not voluntarily entered was "clearly contrary to the evidence in the record"; defendant did not show that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and gone to trial; and the other issues defendant raised were meritless in light of the guilty plea and under the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. Id.
Thereafter, defendant applied for federal habeas corpus relief on the same grounds asserted in the state court proceedings; this application was denied. Duffy v. Redman, D. Del., C.A. No. 86-380, Latchum, J. (March 8, 1987), certificate of probable cause denied, 3rd Cir., No. 87-3173, Stapleton, J. (April 17, 1987)
On September 9, 1987, defendant filed another motion for postconviction relief. Therein, he claimed defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective and the plea colloquy was inadequate. In a letter dated September 30, 1987, the Superior Court summarily dismissed these claims as redundant. State v. Duffy, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. S84-11-0037, Chandler, J. (September 30, 1987) Defendant also advanced new allegations which the Court dismissed because defendant did not explain why he did not raise these allegations in his first Rule 35 motion. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. Duffy v. State, Del. Supr., 536 A.2d 615 (1987)
On August 22, 1988, defendant filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Rule 61. In the motion, defendant argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and the entry of his guilty plea was defective. The Superior Court summarily denied his motion due to the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(2) and (4). State v. Duffy, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. S84-11-0037, Chandler, J. (September 6, 1988). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. Duffy v. State, Del. Supr., 550 A.2d 34 (1988).
On September 12, 2000, defendant filed the pending postconviction relief motion. Therein, he seeks DNA testing pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4504. He also seeks relief pursuant to Rule 61.
DISCUSSION
I examine the Rule 61 motion first. In that motion, defendant asserts the following grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel, guilty plea was not voluntary, conviction was obtained via coerced confession, evidence was unlawfully seized, prosecution withheld favorable evidence, denied evidentiary hearings, pretrial publicity, rape kit not used nor line-up conducted.
The Rule 61 motion is procedurally barred. Before examining the procedural bars which apply, I set forth the following applicable provisions of Rule 61:
(i) Bars to relief. (1) Time limitation. A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.
(2) Repetitive motion. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding, as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(3) Procedural default. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows:
(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and
(B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights.
(4) Former adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(5) Bars inapplicable. The bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
The procedural bars preclude a consideration of defendant's motion. First, the motion is time-barred because it was not filed within three years of the date of his conviction. Rule 61(i)(1) ; Boyer v. State, Del. Supr., 562 A.2d 1186 (1989). Furthermore, the claims are barred because they are repetitive. Rule 61(i)(2). Defendant has failed to show that the bars of Rule 61(i)(1) and (2) might not apply either because the Court lacked jurisdiction or because he has a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. Rule 61(i)(5). Finally, these claims are barred because they have been formally adjudicated and defendant has not asserted any reason why they bear reconsideration in the interest of justice. Rule 61(i)(4).
Because these claims are procedurally barred, I summarily dismiss them.
Defendant also seeks access to evidence in order to conduct DNA testing. He seeks this access pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4504. Defendant has created procedural confusion because he has asked the Public Defender's office to represent him in presenting a claim pursuant to § 4504 while he has asserted the claim himself in the document containing his Rule 61 motion.
Because defendant has presented the claim, I have reviewed it.. I conclude that because defendant pled guilty to the crime, he is not entitled to pursue DNA testing pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4504. This statute allows for DNA testing only in the case where there has been a trial; a defendant who enters a guilty plea may not invoke it. 11 Del. C. § 4504. This claim is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's postconviction relief motion is denied.